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EVOLVING BROADBAND POLICY:
TAKING ADAPTIVE STANCES TO FOSTER
OPTIMAL INTERNET PLATFORMS
Richard S. Whittt
"I don't care who writes a nation's laws-or crafts its advanced treaties-if I can
write its economic textbooks." Paul A. Samuelson'
I. INTRODUCTION
So what is the big deal about broadband? Why should we care whether or
not consumers have access to high-speed Internet connectivity? What is so
unique about this particular infrastructure that we worry over crafting national
broadband plans and strategies, and devoting billions of dollars in government
economic stimulus spending, and encouraging corporations to spend their own
tens of billions of dollars-just to get more of it? And what is behind the ongo-
ing clash between network providers and users over broadband as a means of
gaining "open" access to the Internet?
Much ink has been spilled in recent years over the legal and regulatory is-
sues surrounding broadband networks and services. This paper will sacrifice a
little more in the hope of casting additional light on how policymakers should
fashion public policy that fully and effectively enables broadband as an opti-
mal Internet platform. In particular, by focusing largely on the technical, eco-
nomic, and legal grounding of broadband networks, and offering some specific
I Mr. Whitt currently is Washington Telecom and Media Counsel at Google Inc. This
paper solely reflects his personal views, and not necessarily those of Google. The author
would like to thank Anjali Dalal and Debbie Rosenbaum, former policy interns with Goo-
gle, who provided helpful suggestions on the format and content of this paper. Derek Slater
and Donna Lampert also supplied thoughtful critiques of an earlier version. The author ap-
preciated additional suggestions by Tim Wu and Scott Hemphill, and the sharp students in
Tim's Intellectual Property Colloquium at Columbia Law School.
I James Surrowiecki, Class Action, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 7, 2005, at 46 (quoting
Paul Samuelson, the Nobel Prize-winning M.I.T. economist).
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potential policy projects, I hope in some manner to further a healthy debate
over the appropriate policy regime to govern this generative infrastructure.
This work incorporates and expands on two previous papers. In an initial
piece co-authored with Stephen Schultze, we introduced the concept of "emer-
gence economics" to describe a unified framework built on the latest findings
of various schools of economic theory.2 In a second piece I explicated the con-
cept of "Adaptive Policymaking" by governments, including some guiding
principles and framing tools for utilization in the public policy design space
Here, I present some specific ways that policymakers should use these con-
cepts and frameworks to grapple with current controversies in the regulatory
treatment of broadband networks.
First, the Article provides a brief overview of emergence economics, em-
phasizing the unique role of the Internet in creating and furthering innovation
and economic growth. Adaptive Policymaking by governments then is summa-
rized, and some guiding principles and a public policy design space are pre-
sented. The design space includes a proposed adaptive toolkit for use by poli-
cymakers, including institutions (the how), organizations (the who), conceptual
frames and tools (the which, when, and where), and actual projects (the what).
Next, the Article explains how communications policymakers should define
an overarching public policy goal of "more good ideas" and a concomitant
public policy objective of "harnessing broadband networks." The Article
stresses how policymakers should take a particular interest in encouraging
broadband as an optimal platform for accessing the Internet, and how commu-
nications policy should incorporate various realities of the physics and eco-
nomics of deploying broadband networks. The Article also explores the three
dimensions of the availability of broadband infrastructure, the sufficiency of
Net capacity, and the integrity of Net access as necessary components of
broadband networks serving as optimal pathways to the Internet.
After the suggested framework for Adaptive Policymaking is established,
the Article applies it to the development of a public policy design space spe-
cifically for broadband infrastructure. The clash of incentives and mindsets by
market players is explored, including the public policy objective to foment op-
timal broadband deployment against the countervailing market backdrop of
broadband providers facing limited competitive challenges, significant and
growing positive externalities, and the pecuniary benefits from prioritizing In-
ternet traffic, and supplying managed networks. The institutional arrangements
2 Richard S. Whitt & Stephen Schultze, The New "Emergence Economics" of Innova-
tion and Growth, and What It Means for Communications Policy, 7 J. OF TELECOMM. AND
HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 1).
3 Richard S. Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking: Evolving and Applying Emergent Solutions
for U.S. Communications Policy, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. (forthcoming June 2009) (manuscript
at 1-2). [hereinafter Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking].
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that traditionally have governed communications infrastructure-including the
common law roots of common carriage-are examined in light of the policy-
making framework. That examination focuses on the increasingly forgotten
common carriage prongs of public callings and voluntary bailment. Finally the
Article delves into the prospect of evolving policy solutions to deal with the
objective of creating optimal broadband infrastructure for Internet access, in-
cluding utilizing the appropriate organizations, institutions, and tools. In con-
trast to more prescriptive remedies that, for now at least, should be resisted, the
Article puts forward some suggested adaptive projects to deal with concerns
about maintaining and extending robust broadband as an optimal platform to
the Internet.
II. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ROOTS OF ADAPTIVE
POLICYMAKING
For too long, too many policymakers in the United States have assumed that
"Old School Economics"--a term I have employed previously to represent the
outdated versions of economic theory still deemed to be received wisdom in
the policy world-accurately represents the realities of the marketplace.4 As a
result, today's public policy discussions often seem rooted to the past in the
form of economic and technological assumptions that more or less ended in the
1960s.' The rise of new economic thinking combined with new technology
platforms culminating in the Internet directly challenges many of those chief
assumptions. In particular, in a rapidly evolving global marketplace, new ideas
and technologies are the fodder that fuels a nation's economic growth; they
also bring a raft of other personal and social benefits. The extent of the public
policy implications is too important to be ignored.
4 See William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution ofAntitrust: Characteri-
zation, Antitrust Injury and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1242-43 (1989);
S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern ofAntitrust
Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 284, 288-89 (1996); see also The Chicago School,
http://cepa.newschool.edu/net/schools/chicago.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2009) ("The term
'Chicago School' is associated with a particular brand of economics which adheres strictly
to Neoclassical price theory in its economic analysis, 'free market' libertarianism in much of
its policy work and a methodology which is relatively adverse to too much mathematical
formalism and will forego careful general equilibrium reasoning in favor of more results-
oriented parital equilibrium analysis."); Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 77.
5 See infra Part II.A; see e.g., Christopher Caldwell, Old School Economics, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 27, 2008, at 11 (discussing presidential candidates' focus on appeal-
ing to factory workers, when the percentage of Americans working in manufacturing has
declined to 15% in 2008 from 30% in 1950); see also Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 2.
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A. Introducing Emergence Economics
Emergence economics is my umbrella term for the latest findings from a
wide variety of cutting-edge schools of thought including behavioral econom-
ics, game theory, complexity science, network science, new growth theory, and
competition theory.6 Collectively these different theories offer the promise of a
new conceptual framework-a way of approaching and understanding the
growth-oriented network economy created by the Internet. That framework
seeks neither to engineer deterministically the dynamic economy, nor to as-
sume blindly that it is evolving toward perfect efficiency.
The hoary economics presented by policymakers in public policy debates
maintains, for example, that the market is linear and always seeks equilibrium;
that economic actors are perfectly rational, with perfect knowledge of them-
selves and the marketplace; that production is generated only by capital mar-
kets or government subsidy; that growth is exogenous; and the whole of the
economic system is always equal to the sum of its parts. It turns out that every
one of these key assumptions is either overstated, or plain wrong.7
Emergence economics helps clarify, for example, that knowledge and tech-
nology are not just outputs of the economy, but also essential inputs that drive
economic growth and countless other social benefits. Further, game-changing
disruptive innovations tend to emerge from the edges of the Net.' These inno-
vations in turn create far-reaching benefits to unaffiliated entities throughout
the network, in the form of economic innovation "spillovers," and through out-
puts serving non-pecuniary personal, social, and democratic values.9 This sort
of edge-driven, broadly beneficial, mutually reinforcing activity thrives in an
environment of open "generativity" where no market player-whether gov-
ernment or firm-unilaterally can pick winners and losers. °
6 Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at I (explaining that emergence economics generally
views market economies as consisting of "individual agents, acting though interconnected
networks, engag[ing] in the evolutionary market processes of differentiating, selecting, and
amplifying certain business plans and technologies, which in turn generates a host of posi-
tive emergent economic phenomena").
7 See Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 3.
8 See, e.g., Natalie Klym & Marie Jos6 Montpetit, Innovation at the Edge: Social TV
and Beyond 3, (Sept. 1, 2008) (un-published article), available at
http://cfp.mit.edu/publications/CFPPapers/Social%20TV%2OFinal%202008.09.01 %20for
%20distribution.pdf (explaining that devices at the edge of Internet protocol based television
systems drive "social TV"); see also Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 62-63.
9 See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH SPILLOVERS: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR THE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM (1996), http://www.atp.nist.gov/eao/
gcr708.htm ("Economists use the term 'spillover' to capture the idea that some of the eco-
nomic benefits of Research and Development (R&D) activities accrue to economic agents
other than the party that undertakes the research.").
10 See Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1975, 1981-82
(2006) ("Generativity is a function of a technology's capacity for leverage across a range of
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The economy is multi-faceted, and can be seen in different ways, depending
on one's perspective. Several conceptual prisms through which to view the
market are examined below.
1. An Emergent Economy
Emergence economics helps to us understand how the market operates as a
complex adaptive system ("CAS"). Complexity science has demonstrated how
emergent properties arise spontaneously from interactions between the compo-
nents of a complex system." In essence, individual agents acting through inter-
connected networks engage in the evolutionary market processes of differenti-
ating, selecting, and amplifying certain business plans and technologies, which
in turn generates a host of positive emergent economic phenomena. 2 This
leads to what previously was termed the "rough formula" for CAS-spawned
emergence: agents + networks + evolution = emergence. 3
2. A Human Economy
We live in a human economy, where economic actors are not the hyper-
rational creatures of perfect information and consistent wants and needs. In-
stead, the market is peopled with human beings operating under a range of
cognitive constraints and limitations. Concomitantly, those same agents are
highly flexible and adaptable, with a myriad of ever-changing desires, both
economic and non-economic in nature. People are economic creatures, but not
just that; we value many things that have little or no commercial value. 4 Old
school economics has a difficult time accounting for these facets of human
life."
3. A Networked Economy
We live in a networked economy, formed bottom-up by interactions between
people in a highly connected marketplace. This networked economy thrives
where space is available for experimental evolution in which new ideas emerge
and technology constantly is refined. The Internet is a notable and perhaps
tasks, adaptability to a range of different tasks, ease of mastery, and accessibility.").
I I Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 23-24.
12 ERIC BEINHOCKER, THE ORGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY, AND THE RADI-
CAL REMAKING OF ECONOMICS 16, 18-19 (2006).
13 Id. at 97; see Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 11.
"4 See HUMAN WELL-BEING AND ECONOMIC GoALs 22-26 (Frank Ackerman et al. eds.,
1997).
15 See id. at 22-33.
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unique product of these market and non-market forces. Where the Internet at
its birth was something new and interesting, now it is something essential. The
Net's unique architecture-its modular, end-to-end ("e2e") interconnected de-
sign, with the agnostic Internet Protocol ("IP") at its core' 6-- allows it to oper-
ate as a platform for broad-based innovation without permission and other
user-based activities.
4. An Evolving Economy
We live in an evolving economy, which consists of a population of firms dif-
ferentiating themselves as a result of different routines developed by each firm.
These routines are analogous to the genes of biological organisms, 7 and they
influence the specific characteristics of the output produced by each firm.
Market processes then winnow the population of firms by selecting the ser-
vices and products of some firms-physical technologies (designs for working
with objects), social technologies (methods for organizing people), and busi-
ness plans (concrete commercial designs)-over those of others. The selected
firms then become more successful than those not selected. This evolutionary
process engenders the most effective and meritocratic solutions that best fit the
environment. As Francis Crick instructs, "evolution is cleverer than you are." 8
5. A Growth Economy
We also live in a potential growth economy in which the chief currency is
ideas and the primary mechanism for growth is innovation. While traditional
economics tells us that productivity comes simply from adding more capital or
generating greater efficiency, 9 emergence economics emphasizes ways in
which new technologies endogenously create better recipes for economic
growth." In Paul Romer's words, "technological change.., lies at the heart of
16 See Ethan Zuckerman & Andrew McLaughlin, Introduction to the Internet Architec-
ture and Institituions,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/digitaldemocracy/internetarchitecture.html (last visited Mar.
19, 2009).
17 See Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 18-19.
18 DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF
LIFE 74 (1995).
19 See CHARLES L. COLE, MICROECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 117-20
(1973).
20 See Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 41-43; see also Robert M. Solow, Heavy
Thinker, THE NEW REPUBLIC (May 21, 2007), available at
http://www.powells.com/review/2007 07 12 ("I think that it is Schumpter's main legacy to
economics: the role of technological and organizational innovation in driving and shaping
the growth trajectory of capitalist economies.").
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economic growth."'2' The resulting emergent market phenomena include not
just economic growth, but also "Net effects" such as innovation spillovers or
positive externalities, peer production, and a whole social layer of activity.2
6. A Political Economy
Finally, we live in a political economy, where markets and governments co-
evolve with each other as social processes and complex adaptive systems. This
means that the government policymaker must devise a constructive role to deal
with an emergent, network-connected, innovation-fueled economy. The inher-
ent complexity, dynamism, and uncertainty of markets inherently make the
task of government policy-making difficult, even treacherous. Nonetheless, the
tools of government-when employed carefully, deliberately, and in the right
context--can successfully facilitate a more optimal environment for the emer-
gence of innovative new ideas, economic growth, and human freedom. With
the economic prisms of the emergent, human, networked, evolving, growth,
and political economy established, their application to the public policy envi-
ronment can be further examined.
B. Sketching Out A Public Policy Design Space
In my paper on Adaptive Policymaking, I laid out some systematic ways to
consider applying the teachings of emergence economics to the public policy
environment.23 As I explained, creating a public policy design space involves
articulating all the components necessary to achieve successfully policy ends
in a dynamic market environment. Because the policy-making function is a
complex system," each component constitutes a separate set of decisions,
which in turn affects other decisions in diverse and sometimes unpredictable
ways. The design space framework includes both the means and the ends com-
ponents, and should be governed by overarching rules. In particular, where a
market is contestable, policymakers should only tinker with certain useful in-
puts, ultimately allowing the market to function with minimal interference.
21 Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. OF POLITICAL ECON. S71,
S72 (1990).
22 See Brian Regan, Comment, Ushering Universal Service Reform: Politically Feasible
Legislative Principles, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUs 471, 472 n.4 (2008) (discussing the dif-
ference between network externalities and network effects); JAFFE, supra note 9 and accom-
panying text; see also Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 46-47.
23 See Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 13-16.
24 See Ramalingam, supra note 11, at ix (discussing the use of complexity science in the
work undertaken by development and humanitarian agencies to "embrace what were previ-
ously seen as messy realities").
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1. Elements of the Framework
When crafting a policy design space, the different elements must first be dis-
tinguished, particularly the means and ends. The overall purpose for policy
activities, the "why," is straightforward: policymakers seek to discipline the
market behavior of particular economic agents. 5 This is accomplished directly
or indirectly. 6 Other ends components (the "why") include public policy goals
and objectives. The means components of the design space include the "who"
and "how" (organizations and institutions); the "which," "when," and "where"
(tools); and the "what" (projects).
More concretely, the public policy goals are the largest, longest-term ele-
ments to be accomplished. Take, for example, the goal of landing on Mars. The
objectives are the intermediate term elements, which aim to support the public
policy goal: building and testing a rocket ship to send to Mars. The organiza-
tions are the players involved, including--in the Mars mission exam-
ple--Congress, NASA, contractors, sub-contractors, and taxpayers. The insti-
tutions are the legal instruments and other rules of the game; the laws, regula-
tions, and contracts. The tools are the practical mechanisms utilized for achiev-
ing the policy goals and objectives, for example computer programs that model
different components of the rocket ship, while the projects are the specific,
short-term aims, such as devising elements of the engine that will power the
rocket. The chief aim is to be bold about the vision of goals and objectives,
while more modest yet flexible about the particular programs and tools used to
accomplish them. 7
The next elements of the design space are the "how" (institutions) and the
"who" (organizations), the rules and the players of the public policy game, re-
spectively. One key takeaway is the amazing range and scope of institutional
and organizational options, which typically are beyond the ordinary expecta-
tions of policymakers 8 Of course, these institutions and organizations involve
inherent tradeoffs between values like flexibility and adaptability, versus coer-
25 Chee Keong Low, A Road Map for Corporate Governance in East Asia, 25 N.W. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 165, 196 (2004) (quoting WORLD BANK, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA
5-7 (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/55/25778905.pdf); see Whitt,
Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 28.
26 Id.; see John M. Hyde, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble?, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 331, 338-39 (1995) (explaining that indirect methods infer value based upon the item's
market behavior, while direct methods of market behavior determine value based upon use
and nonuse values).
27 Previously I also discussed some of the basic elements for taking an adaptive stance
in the public policy realm. In particular I recommended that policymakers be cautious, in-
cremental, experimental, grounded, flexible, reversible, accountable, sustainable, and incen-
tivized. Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 13-16.
28 See id. at 63.
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cion and accountability. 9 These institutions can be thought of as occupying a
blend of public and private spaces.
We also have the "which," "when," and "where" components: frames, mod-
els, and tools. These components include conceptual tools such as metaphors,
fitness landscapes," and network layered models." Finally, the actual projects
answer the "what" question in the form of specific programs designed to
achieve the policy goals and objectives. These elements; the "who," "how,"
"which," "where," "when," "why," and "what" can be applied to craft specific
frameworks for a public policy design space, including an adaptive policy-
making framework.
2. The Adaptive Approach: Tinkering Without Tampering
An adaptive policy framework can be achieved using a "tinker, don't tam-
per" formula. Where markets are contestable, and supporting legal institutions
are in place and functioning correctly, policymakers generally should avoid
dictating, or tampering with the primary evolutionary forces of market players
differentiating, selecting, and amplifying particular business plans and tech-
nologies. Instead-and only where necessary-policymakers should rely on
enabling or tinkering with narrow market gaps and inputs to the econosphere 2
The fundamental point is to improve the market's ability to formulate and pre-
sent different options to agents-Business Plans ("BPs"), Physical Technolo-
gies ("PTs"), and Social Technologies ("STs")-while leaving undisturbed the
selection processes. In other words, policymakers should improve the quantity
of options without harming the quality of options.
Adaptive policymakers can accomplish environmental enabling or tinkering
with various market gaps in at least four different ways:
(1) feed the evolutionary algorithm--such as investing in government-sponsored re-
29 Id. at 25.
30 See Barbara A. Cherry, The Telecommunications Economy and Regulation as Co-
evolving Complex Adaptive Systems: Implications for Federalism, 59 FED. COMM. L. J. 369,
380-81 (2007) ("A fitness landscape-a concept developed in evolutionary biol-
ogy--consists of varying fitness level potentials for an organism in a given environment,
with peaks, valleys, and planes of the landscape representing the fitness potential of differ-
ent combinations of behavioral schemata and organism structures.").
31 See Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating A New Communica-
tions Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J.
587, 621-24 (2004) [hereinafter Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward]. Most of these "net-
work layers" models divide the increasingly packet-based Internet world into at least four
distinct layers: (1) Content Layer; (2) Applications Layer; (3) Logical/Code Layer; and, (4)
Physical/Infrastructure Layer. See id.
32 Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 17 ("Economic and social systems are essentially
dynamic, and not static. Some have termed it the 'econosphere'-the economy as a dy-




(2) foster agent connectivity--such as enabling more communications links;
(3) shape the fitness landscape-such as creating market incentives for investment;
and
(4) enhance feedback mechanisms-such as generating greater information transpar-
ency.
The dichotomy between acceptable enabling and unacceptable dictating in
the workings of the marketplace is usefully conceptualized:
diversification connectivity landscaping feedback





Thus, in contestable markets the government's role should be to experiment
with the optimal background conditions for a dynamic, unpredictable, and
evolving environment. In particular, adaptive policymakers should determine
whether and how to tinker with the market's inputs, connectivity, incentives,
and feedback, and then let the process unfold with little to no additional in-
volvement. With empowered agents working through connected networks via
evolutionary processes, policymakers and market participants are far more
likely to unlock the full-blown emergence of new ideas and innovation, eco-
nomic growth, and non-pecuniary network effects. Only when private markets
and public policies learn to work constructively with each other and not in
needless conflict can the emergent benefits be more fully realized.
This cycle of decision-making highlights several often overlooked elements:
the right organizations choosing the right policy institutions, utilizing the cor-
rect frames and tools to best assess one's constraints and opportunities, limit-
ing active policy functions to devising market inputs, and monitoring and ad-
justing to the market's emergent phenomena. To be clear, these observations
lead to assumed preferences, not certainty. Any presumptions should be a
product of empirically-derived decision-making and overcome through either
sound technology and economics-based evidence, or a showing that broad pub-
lic interests are better served by alternative approaches. Once an adaptive pol-
icy-making framework has been established, one can examine its application to
specific policies and the market outputs the framework may produce.
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III. BROADBAND DECONSTRUCTED: THE PHYSICS AND FINANCES
OF INFRASTRUCTURE
Before plunging into the pertinent broadband policy issues, first it is helpful
to look more closely at the reality of broadband. As the FCC recently acknowl-
edged, "broadband can be defined in myriad ways."" This section addresses
some basic misunderstandings about broadband and its uses, as well as the
fundamental economics of broadband networks. The conceptual tool of modu-
larity will assist in this exercise in deconstruction. 4
A. The Physics of Broadband
1. What Broadband Is
To understand broadband as a policy concept, first it needs to be appreciated
as a technological reality. Broadband is made up of a series of technology
modules-4ransmission lines, modems, routers-that when aggregated create
the high-speed communications connectivity that end users experience.35 In
sum, broadband can be thought of as communications, transportation, informa-
tion, and interactivity infrastructure.
There are different network configurations that enable broadband functional-
ity. Like the Internet Protocol, broadband can be indifferent to the underlying
facilities. Nonetheless, the network topology of different broadband facilities
can have an enormous impact on the way policymakers and market participants
approach policy projects.36 For example, AT&T's U-Verse is a shared IP plat-
form running over a mix of fiber and copper, with bandwidth allocated in-band
between video, voice, and Internet.37 Verizon's FiOS network is built on fiber
to the home ("FTTH"), and assigns on a fixed basis different laser light to
33 In re A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, Notice of Inquiry, GN Docket No.
90-51, 15 (Apr. 8, 2009).
34 See Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward, supra note 31, at 653-62 (explaining the
utility of a network layered model for analyzing broadband-related policy issues); see also
Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 60-63 (delineating modular network models
as one potential conceptual tool for policymakers to employ in analyzing communications
network-related matters).
35 See FCC Strategic Goals, Broadband, http://www.fcc.gov/broadband/ (last visited
Mar. 12, 2009).
36 See, e.g., Geoff Huston, Best Efforts Networking, http://au.net/ispcol/2001-09/2001-
09-best.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2009) ("IP networks are often described as 'best efforts'
networks. This refers to the approach to service quality where the network itself does not
actively differentiate in its treatment of services that transit the network.").
37 See AT&T U-verse, http://www.att.com/Uverse/files/HowUverselsDelivered_2-
22.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
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video, voice, and Internet functions.38 Comcast and other cable companies em-
ploy hybrid fiber-coaxial ("HFC") topology using a Data Over Cable Service
Interface Specification ("DOCSIS") platform, deployed on a neighborhood-
sharing basis, but with structurally separate bandwidth between their tradi-
tional video service and other uses.39 Finally, many advanced wireless plat-
forms, whether 3G or 4G, 4° and whether WiMAX 41 or LTE,42 use radios that
share frequencies and air space dynamically, often requiring extensive man-
agement techniques. 3
The broadband end-user's experience entails more than the last mile connec-
tivity to and from the home.' In order for broadband to function as a conduit to
the Internet, providers also utilize middle mile connections and Internet back-
38 Verizon, Fiber to the Premises and FiOS,
http://www2.verizon.com/about/community/fl/technology/technology.html (last visited Apr.
18, 2009).
39 See Dane Jasper, Slaughtering the Hogs,
http://corp.sonic.net/ceo/2008/08/28/slaughtering-the-hogs/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
40 AT&T, Inc., 3G, http://www.wireless.att.com/learn/why/technology/3g-
umts.jsp?wt.srch=l (explaining that "3G provides accelerated data speeds" for wireless
devices; download speeds of up to 1.7 Mbps); 3G Americas, Q & A: '4G' or IMT-
Advanced, http://www.3gamericas.org/index.cfn?fuseaction=page&pageid=560 ("The
[International Telecommunications Union] is currently establishing criteria for IMT-
Advanced (4G) and will be screening various technologies for inclusion in the IMT-
Advanced family. Only then will it be understood what is, and can be rightly and credibly
called, 4G."); INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION, RADIOCOMMUNICATION STUDY
GROUPS, WORKING PARTY 5D, BACKGROUND ON IMT-ADVANCED (2008), available at
http://www.itu.int/md/R07-IMT.ADV-C-0001/en (listing key features of IMT-Advanced
including: "high quality mobile services;" "enhanced peak data rates to support advanced
services and applications;" and "worldwide roaming capability").
41 PHILIPPE LAINE, CHRISTOPHE BOSCHER, DIETRICH BOETTLE & LAURANCE FEIJT, WI-
MAX: MAKING UBIQUITOUS HIGH-SPEED DATA SERVICES A REALITY 1 (2004), available at
http://www I .alcatel-lucent.com/publications/abstract.jhtml?repositoryltem=tcm: 172-
44851635 ("Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) is the common
name associated with the IEEE 802.16a/REVd/e standards.... WiMAX can offer very high
data rates and extended coverage.").
42 TOWARDS GLOBAL MOBILE BROADBAND: STANDARDISING THE FUTURE OF MOBILE
COMMUNICATIONS WITH LTE (LONG TERM EVOLUTION) 1 (2008) ("Long Term Evolution
(LTE) describes standardization work by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
to define a new high-speed radio access method for mobile communications systems.").
43 See Michael Finneran, LTE or WiMAX: The Road to 4G, Unified Communications
Strategies, http://www.ucstrategies.com/detailprint.aspx?id=2730 (last visited Jan. 26,
2009) (discussing the problem of limited bandwidth for wireless technologies, and advanced
management techniques employed to ensure efficiency and reliability, including Orthogonal
Frequency Division Multiplexing, Multiple Input-Multiple Output antennas, and forward
error correction).
44 See James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile? A Critique of Open
Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 45 (2000) (explaining that




bone facilities to carry the traffic to and from other Internet service providers.45
So what then is broadband? In the context of this paper, broadband is treated
as a high-speed communications platform, a means of connecting people,
transporting information, and a means of enabling highly desired emergent
properties.46 It provides both a means of commerce and personal, social, and
democratic expression. It is infrastructure for both transportation of bits and
communications (of people), of conveying content (information), and estab-
lishing relationships (interactivity). In this way, broadband resembles the In-
temet as a potential platform for human activity.
2. What Broadband is Not
Just as it is necessary to understand what constitutes broadband as a form of
communications infrastructure, there is a compelling need to understand the
many misnomers about broadband to determine what it is not. Employing a
modular framework is useful to help tease out these crucial differences and
their policy implications.
a. Broadband Is Not the Internet or Internet Access
First, broadband is not the Internet. The Net is a global network of networks
that allows modem day computers to communicate with each other and share
information.48 It is a modem day Agora4 9-in its broadest sense, as a place for
trading and interacting in myriad ways--but with more limited means of entry
and exit. Broadband networks serve as the entry and exit ways to and from the
Internet. This crucial distinction often is lost in the regulatory context. For ex-
ample, by imposing certain requirements or principles on those entryways, one
is not necessarily also regulating the Agora.
Moreover, broadband is not synonymous with Internet access. As much as
45 Lawrence A. Sullivan, Is Competition Policy Possible in High Tech Markets? An
Inquiry into Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Broadband Regulation as Applied to "the
New Economy", 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 41, 76 (2001).
46 Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 24 ("Emergent properties are physical aspects of a
system not otherwise exhibited by the component parts.").
47 See id. at 66 (citing Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communica-
tions Law, 55 UCLA L. REv. 359, 392-93 (2007) (explaining that the independent functions
of the Internet allow individuals to decipher between good and bad ideas, which enables the
good ideas to "persist and replicate")).
48 Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together,
and the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 343, 347-49 (2008).
49 The Agora was the main marketplace of Ancient Athens as well as the center of the




some at the FCC and Supreme Court may have consumers believe," broadband
merely is last-mile infrastructure of a certain speed and carrying capacity. By
contrast, Internet access is the actual capability of reaching the Internet using
that infrastructure.51 In other words, broadband is the physical connective
pathway that allows consumers to access the Internet. I dealt with this dichot-
omy in some detail in a previous paper on a layered approach to communica-
tions regulation.52 Using the network layers model, one should think of the In-
ternet metaphorically as "riding on top of' broadband networks, or "Internet
over broadband." In modular terms, broadband is at Layers 0-2 of the Open
Systems Interconnection ("OSI") protocol 3 stack, while Internet access (along
with private network services like IPTV) is at Layers 3 and above:
"Public" Internet





50 See, e.g., Nat'l Cable and Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967
(2005) (affirming the FCC's determination that cable modem service is not in part a "cable
service" or "telecommunications service," but rather is in total an "information service").
51 See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Broadband Internet Access,
22 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 50-51 (2008).
52 Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward, supra note 31, at 653-62. Whether this distinc-
tion means that the two should be regulated differently is a separate, and intriguing, ques-
tion. As Susan Crawford points out, it is unclear why policymakers simply assume that In-
ternet access by itself constitutes an information service. Susan P. Crawford, Transporting
Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Crawford, Transporting
Communications]. Nonetheless, the FCC continues to treat as unregulated the TCP/IP layer
of the network. For a further discussion of a possible "operational split" model, see infra
Part V.III.C.I.c.
53 Network Layers, http://www.comptechdoc.org/independent/networking/protocol/
protlayers.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2009) ("Each layer of a specific network model may be
responsible for a different function of the network. Each layer will pass information up and
down to the next subsequent layer as data is processed."); see Cisco, Intemetworking Ba-
sics, http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/internetworking/technology/handbook/lntro-to-
Internet.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
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The real-world implications of the Internet over broadband distinction are
just as important. Broadband is not necessarily valued as a policy matter for
what it is, but rather for what it enables: access to the Internet. More to the
point, the Internet is the "killer app" for broadband.
b. Broadband is Not Just A Content Delivery Mechanism
Just as broadband facilitates Internet access, it also facilitates delivering var-
ious forms of content such as streaming video. 4 Broadband infrastructure also
allows for the provision of better health care at reduced cost,55 helps institu-
tions streamline operations,56 and improves the quality and diversity of teach-
ing methods at schools and other educational facilities. 7 Over time, broadband
also is expected to facilitate access to new online technologies like pervasive
computing,58 smart houses,59 and cloud computing.6"
Importantly, using broadband as a one-way entertainment medium is not the
same as using it as an interactive, two-way information, communications, or
entertainment medium.6' This suggests that policymakers should have different
54 See Cable-Modem.net, Streaming Media's Big Boom: Programming That's Cookin',
http://www.cable-modem.net/topics/stream.html (explaining that streaming video "taps
broadband's capacity to move a lot of data very fast to deliver full-motion audio and
video").
55 ALEXANDER H. Vo, THE TELEHEALTH PROMISE: BETTER HEALTH CARE AND COST
SAVINGS FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 11 (2008) (estimating the cost savings from using telecon-
sultation at approximately $3.61 billion).
56 See Motorola, Wireless Broadband for Education,
http://www.motorola.com/Business/USEN/Business+Solutions/Industry+Solutions/Educa-
tion/MOTOwi4 US-EN (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
57 See id.
58 See PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, POSTNOTE: PERVASIVE
COMPUTING 1 (2006), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/postpn263.pdf ("Perva-
sive computing ... refers to the increasing integration of [information and communication
technologies] into people's lives and environments, made possible by the growing availabil-
ity of microprocessors with inbuilt communications facilities.").
59 See, e.g., Smart Home Technology: Changing One Way Houses Operate,
http://articles.castelarhost.com/smarthome_technology.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2009)
("Smart home technology will allow all sorts of electronics and appliances to ... communi-
cate with each other and perform a variety of tasks.").
60 See Eric Knorr & Galen Gruman, What Cloud Computing Really Means, INFO-
WORLD, Apr. 7, 2008, http://www.infoworld.com/article/08/04/07/15FE-cloud-computing-
reality_l.html ("Cloud computing encompasses any subscription-based or pay-per-use ser-
vice that, in real time over the Internet, extends IT's existing capabilities.").
61 Some have questioned the assumption that broadband providers should be attempting
to build special IP-enabled networks designed to stream video. Andrew Odlyzko, The Delu-
sions of Net Neutrality 1-4 (Aug. 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/-odlyzko/doc/net.neutrality.delusions.pdf. Among other points,
Odlyzko observes that many service providers appear to have fallen for the myths that mov-
ies are a gold mine, and should be delivered in streaming mode. Id. at 1. In his view, "con-
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priorities and different policies geared towards these varied uses. As one ex-
ample, it is worth considering whether taxpayers should be asked to subsidize a
universal broadband fund,62 where the money may end up supporting not only
Internet access over broadband, but also-and perhaps predominantly-paid
proprietary content distributed via those same broadband facilities.
c. Broadband is Not Universally Demanded
Not all consumers demand or require network access. We tend to lose sight
of the fact that everyday consumer demand is a critical aspect of the deploy-
ment equation. In the headlong rush to create more, bigger, and open broad-
band pipes, policymakers and market participants sometimes come danger-
ously close to unrealistic demands that consumers must have, for example, 100
Mbps or 1 Gbps of capacity by tomorrow. The utility of broadband may be lost
on many consumers, which may or may not dictate a policy role to encourage
greater demand. We should be appropriately cautious about policies premised
on the need for bigger pipes at any cost.
B. The Finances of Broadband
It is not enough to understand the physical properties of broadband net-
works. We also must realize the unique financial properties of these networks.
First and foremost, broadband is infrastructure. While this seems obvious, the
economic implications often are lost, even on those trained in economic theory.
It is easy to assume that the economics governing the creation of a box of wid-
gets applies equally to a broadband network. However, the economics are very
different.63 As one example, "networks can be distinguished from typical goods
by reference to their increasing returns to scale, which makes network markets
resistant to discipline of competition."' The differing economic characteristics
nectivity has almost universally been valued much more highly and brought much higher
revenues [than movies]." Id. at 2.
62 See In re High-Cost Universal Service Support; Federal-State Joint Board on Univer-
sal Service, Recommended Decision, 22 F.C.C.R. 20,477, 11-15 (Nov. 19, 2007) [herein-
after Joint Board Recommended Decision] (discussing the recommendation to create a uni-
versal broadband fund within the Universal Service Fund).
63 One author puts it more generally, "the provision of telecommunications services is
not like the production and sale of raisins. Even if pure competitive markets are possible in
agriculture, they are not possible in telecommunications, notwithstanding the hype in sup-
port of this assertion." Richard A. Epstein, The AT&T Consent Decree: In Praise of Inter-
connection Only, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 149, 153 (2008). I would have used the word "infra-
structure" for "service," but otherwise the point holds.




of broadband include high fixed costs, reliance on public resources, concen-
trated market, and substantial externalities.
1. High Fixed Costs
Broadband is characterized most centrally by the requirement for exceed-
ingly high up-front fixed capital investments.65 Like other forms of infrastruc-
ture, such as roads, bridges, railroads, and electrical grids, broadband demands
enormous start-up costs and has relatively modest marginal costs.' Robert At-
kinson has referred to "the engineers' perspective" on broadband, which fo-
cuses on this salient economic characteristic.67 Fixed costs may represent some
80% to 90% of the total cost of providing broadband service.68 This cost struc-
ture means that building the infrastructure requires high capital investment;
once completed, however, the cost per additional user is relatively smaller in
comparison.
Even where an incumbent carrier merely is swapping out one form of trans-
port for another, the "truck roll" and other additional expenses can be consid-
erable.69 Further, wireless networks are not immune from these costs. Such
networks still require access to radio spectrum, typically sold for billions of
dollars at FCC auctions,7 as well as cell towers, which cost an average of
$100,000 to build or between $18,000 and $30,000 per year to lease,7 the mid-
dle mile backhaul, and Internet backbone facilities.7"
65 Id. at 108.
66 See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 105 (2008). Heller observes that
broadband policy in the United States is problematic because it "has combined spectrum
underuse with patent thickets and regulatory gridlock," translating to "lost wealth, wrecked
markets, and missed entrepreneurial opportunities." Id. at 106.
67 ROBERT ATKINSON, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., THE ROLE OF COMPETI-
TION IN A NATIONAL BROADBAND POLICY 3-4 (2007),
http://www.itif.org/files/BroadbandCompetition.pdf [hereinafter ATKINSON, THE ROLE OF
COMPETITION IN A NATIONAL BROADBAND POLICY].
68 Saul Hansell, Time Warner: Download Too Much and You Might Pay $30 a Movie,
N.Y. Times Bits Blog (Jan. 17, 2008), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/17/time-
warner-download-too-much-and-you-might-pay-30-a-movie/.
69 See Saul Hansell, A Bear Speaks: Why Verizon's Pricey FiOS Bet Won't Pay Off,
N.Y. Times Bits Blog (Aug. 19, 2008), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/19/a-bear-
speaks-why-verizons-pricey-fios-bet-wont-pay-off/?pagemode=print [hereinafter Hansell, A
Bear Speaks] (explaining that the capital costs to bring Verizon's fiber network to consum-
ers is approximately $4000 per customer).
70 FCC: About Auctions,
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job-aboutauctions&page=l (last visited Apr.
7, 2008).
71 Steel in the Air, Municipalities-Building and Owning a Cell Tower,
http://www.steelintheair.com/municipalities-building-your-own-cell-tower.html (last visited
Jan. 26, 2009).
72 Anna J. Zichterman, Developments in Regulatory High-Speed Internet Access: Cable
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2. Reliance on Public Resources
Unlike many other forms of economic activity, broadband relies to varying
degrees on benefits from the public sector. These include access to rights of
way, mandated access to poles and conduits, 73 and subsidies and tax incen-
tives. 74 No broadband infrastructure can hope to exist absent many of these
business inputs, made possible by the government. A combination of federal,
state, and local government authorities control these public sector resources.
75
3. Concentrated Market
Given the twin economic characteristics of broadband-high fixed costs and
reliance on public resources-it is no surprise that there is not always an ample
supply of it, and that this supply is provided by relatively few firms. The mar-
ket will never sustain dozens of individual broadband service providers. The
current market remains dominated by the pre-existing providers of fixed tele-
phone service and cable television service.76 Given the enormous fixed costs
and reliance on public resources, a duopoly is predictable. Broadband over
powerline ("BPL")77 is the only other potential wireline competitor, at least on
a ubiquitous basis. However, after a decade of promises, its wide scale adop-
tion and deployment still appear unlikely.78
Spectrum-based broadband has emerged as the true wild card-and possibly
the only feasible alternative to the current wireline-dominated marketplace. 79
Modems, DSL, & Wi-Fi, 21 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 593, 599 (2006) ("The 'middle mile' con-
sists of those facilities built by telephone and cable companies for ordering telecommunica-
tions and cable services.").
73 47 U.S.C. § 224(f) (2000).
74 See Joint Board Recommended Decision, supra note 62, at 1-2.
75 See Julian Sanchez, $7.2 Billion for Broadband... Now What?, ARS TECHNICA, Mar.
23, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/03/72-billion-for-broadband-now-
what.ars (discussing the early 2009 appropriation to NTIA for broadband grants).
76 HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2007 3 (2008)
(indicating that 50.6% of high-speed residential Internet users were served by cable modem
connections, while approximately 40% were served by technologies utilized by telephone
companies); see Part VII.B. l.a.
77 The FCC defines BPL as a "type of carrier current technology that provides access to
high speed broadband services using electric utility companies' power lines." In re Amend-
ment of Part 15 Regarding New Requirements and Measurement Guidelines for Access
Broadband Over Power Line Systems; Carrier Current Systems, Including Broadband over
Power Line Systems, Report and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 21,265, 1 (Oct. 14, 2004).
78 See, e.g., Glenn Fleishman, BPL Powers Down,
http://www.wifinetnews.com/archives/catjpowerline.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2009);
Andrew D. Smith, Plan for Net over Power Lines Dies; Oncor to Buy System, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, May 2, 2008, at 4D.
79 See BENJAMIN LENNETr, THE LOBBY THAT CRIED WOLF: NAB'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST
USING TV WHITE SPACE FOLLOWS A FAMILIAR SCRIPT, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION ISSUE
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As more spectrum becomes available and mobile electronics become one-stop-
shop technology solutions, true broadband data speeds are necessary for mo-
bile phones to become mobile Internet computers. The direct impact of spec-
trum-based broadband remains uncertain." Theoretically, however, new gen-
erations of wireless networks would exert some pressure on the existing broad-
band marketplace, forcing incumbents to innovate and better serve user inter-
ests.
4. Substantial Externalities
Finally, broadband networks can generate tremendous amounts of external-
ities." Most forms of infrastructure typically are responsible for large social
benefits not captured by the infrastructure provider.82 For broadband networks,
"because effects"--money made because of something-are greater than "with
effects"--money made from selling that something.83 In essence the "because
effects" of broadband are the sum total of the impact of the Internet.84 Robert
Atkinson notes, "broadband is unique in that the social returns of broadband
investment exceed the private returns to companies and consumers."85 In other
words, broadband providers face, relatively speaking, broadly-spread benefits
and narrowly-borne costs. Now, with the salient characteristics of broadband
defined, some aspirational policy goals and objectives can be sketched out.
BRIEF No. 23, at 1, available at
http://www.newamerica.net/files/TheLobbythatCried%20Wolf.PDF.
80 See, e.g., Amol Sharma, Clearwire 's WiMax Rollout Faces Steep Hurdles, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 17, 2008, at B5 (noting that the new WiMAX joint venture faces major challenges
in deploying and competing against entrenched incumbents).
81 Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 66 (noting that broadband is "changing the world
in countless beneficial ways" including being a catalyst for "innovation, productivity
growth, job creation, and global competitiveness"). For a discussion of network external-
ities, see Regan, supra note 22, at 472 n.2.
82 See Robert D. Atkinson, Framing A National Broadband Policy, 16 CoMMLAW CON-
SPECTUS 145, 153 (2007) [hereinafter Atkinson, Framing A National Broadband Policy].
83 See Brett M Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 257,
259-61 (2007).
84 See Atkinson, Framing A National Broadband Policy, supra note 82, at 153-64
(2007). Atkinson sees four kinds of positive externalities attributable to broadband net-
works: (1) network externalities, both direct and indirect; (2) prosumer investments, where
consumers become both users and producers; (3) competitiveness externalities, or interna-
tional leadership in technology; and (4) regional externalities, particularly impacts on rural
communities. Id.
85 Id. at 145.
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IV. DEFINING OUR PUBLIC POLICY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN
THE BROADBAND ERA
As explained in previous papers, markets and governments are two complex
adaptive systems with "intertwined social constructs that rely upon each oth-
er."'86 As one part of that dynamic mix, communications policy stands out as
having a profound impact on economic well-being. 7 Armed with new insights
from emergence economics, primary goals and objectives, and conceptual
tools, legislators and regulators have a range of roles to play in the communi-
cations space. These roles employ the various components of an adaptive tool-
kit to examine and decide difficult policy issues.
As Patricia Longstaff argues, "[g]oal selection is a critical part of a success-
ful [public policy]."88 We need to define our ultimate goals before pursuing a
rational public policy. As explained below, communications policymakers
should adopt the overarching goal of "More Good Ideas."89 In turn this goal
can be achieved in part through the suggested policy objective of harnessing
broadband networks as optimal on-ramps to the Internet.
A. The Policy Goal: More Good Ideas
The open dissemination of and access to information through the Internet
plays a critical role in innovation, economic growth, and countless non-
economic benefits.9 ° The open flow of information ensures that an idea engen-
dered in one place can impact economies globally.9' Because of nonrivalry92
and increasing returns of ideas, growth in the world's stock of knowledge
86 Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 8; see Barbara A. Cherry, Institutional
Governance for Essential Industries Under Complexity: Providing Resilience Within the
Rule of Law, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 14 (2008) [hereinafter Cherry, Institutional
Governance for Essential Industries].
87 Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 40.
88 PATRICIA LONGSTAFF, THE COMMUNICATIONS TOOLKIT, HOW TO BUILD AND REGU-
LATE ANY COMMUNICATIONS BUSINESS 19-20 (2002).
89 See Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 64; Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note
3, at 41-45.
90 LONGSTAFF, supra note 88, at 41.
91 CHARLES I. JONES, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC GROWTH 73 (1998). Thomas Jeffer-
son was prescient on the point: nature made it possible "[t]hat ideas should freely spread
from one to another over the globe... like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening
their density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical
being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation." Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) in 13 THE WRITINGS THOMAS JEFFERSON 333-34 (An-
drew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903).
92 See JONES, supra note 91, at 73 ("[I]deas are nonrivalrous. The fact that Toyota takes
advantage of just-in-time inventory methods does not preclude GM from taking advantage
of the same technique.").
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drives the rate of growth in every country. Ideas create growth and all its
emergent benefits.
New technologies-products, processes, and forms of organization-are
"the most important determinant of long-term economic growth." 3 The free
flow of information can lead directly to a raft of Business Plans, built with
Physical Technologies and Social Technologies, that compete vigorously and
effectively in the marketplace. The free flow of information also can generate
and encourage the proliferation of information, entertainment, political dis-
course, and commercial and non-commercial speech. As Adam Gopnik aptly
wrote: "Our world rests on science and democracy, on seeing and saying; it
rests on thinking new thoughts and getting them heard by a lot of people."94
An ideal overarching goal for policymakers--especially in the communica-
tions field-is to see the market generate a greater number of useful ideas that
will drive the evolutionary process to optimal heights. Paul Romer calls for a
"combinatorial explosion" of ideas. 5 By increasing the quantity of beneficial
new ideas, more potential innovation is enabled. After all, innovation is "heav-
ily dependent upon freedom of movement of ideas and information among
many individuals and organizations."96
Importantly, ideas are the fodder not just for economic growth, but also for
other benefits. The concept of More Good Ideas is not limited to those that lead
solely to pecuniary outcomes for market players. Ideas can be economic, so-
cial, and personal. Moreover, ideas are understood to be a classic public good;
everyone benefits from useful inventions. 7 An adaptive society must "find and
maintain the means to explore new ideas."" Mechanisms generating new ideas,
which are expressed culturally in human society, "are as important as access to
abundant resources for economic growth and economic adaptation."99 Ideas
93 RICHARD G. LIPSEY, KENNETH I. CARLAW & CLIFFORD T. BEKAR, ECONOMIC TRANS-
FORMATIONS: GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES AND LONG-TERM ECONOMIC GROWTH 11
(2005).
94 ADAM GOPNIK, ANGELS AND AGES: A SHORT BOOK ABOUT DARWIN, LINCOLN, AND
MODERN LIFE 22 (2009).
95 Kevin Kelly & Paul Romer, The Economics of Ideas,
http://www.versaggi.net/ecommerce/articles/romer-econideas.htm (last visited Jan. 11,
2008).
96 Roger Clarke, Business Models to Support Content Commons, 4 SCRIPT-ED 59, 62
(2007), http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/SCRIPT-ed/vol4-1/clarke.asp.
97 Dan Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 71, 90 (2003); See also Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 83 at 268. Frischmann
also points out that ideas, as intellectual and mental goods, are tied up inextricably with our
concepts of speech. Brett M. Frischmann, Speech, Spillovers, and the First Amendment,
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 17), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id= 1082497.
98 GEERAT J. VERMEIJ, NATURE: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 308 (2004).
99 Id. at 3 10.
20091
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
also are the currency of cyberspace." As a result, we should want More Good
Ideas--they will serve as a proxy for maximizing technological change, and
hence economic growth and general human well being.'
There are differing views on what constitutes a good idea, or how many
ideas are adequate. From the public policy perspective, the notion of "more" is
the quantity function, which involves having an optimal number of inputs
available to and from the market agents. 2 The notion of "good" is the quality
function, which involves the evolutionary function of market agents identify-
ing, selecting, and amplifying the ideas they desire. 3 In other words, we trust
ordinary people to decide what ideas they prefer over others. The suggested
premise is that the quantity function of ideas in the market may be lacking in
some instances, requiring some public policy role. Put in rough terms, the more
is where tailored public policy may need to enter the picture, while the good is
where the market agents--properly buttressed by enabling institutions and or-
ganizations-firmly should be in command. As will be demonstrated, this di-
chotomy can lead to government tinkering to provide additional inputs, con-
nectivity, incentives, and transparency to the market. These enabling elements
can help improve opportunities for More Good Ideas to be created, heard, and
accepted.
B. The Policy Objective: Harnessing Broadband Networks
We have already seen that broadband infrastructure is important to users and
consumers for what it enables."° As a general-purpose technology, 5 broad-
band has numerous present and potential uses, 106 such as a one-way entertain-
ment system. However, as a policy matter-and as communications capability
subject to federal regulatory oversight-the chief importance of broadband is
as an optimal means for accessing the Internet, which in turn leads to positive
externalities and the generation of More Good Ideas."7
Communications bandwidth is a core economic input, a basic foundation for
100 JONATHAN ZIrrRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 161 (2008).
1o See Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2 at 64.
102 Id. at 73.
103 Id. at 71.
104 See supra Part III.A.
105 See Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality
Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 385 (2007) (discussing broadband as
a "general purpose technology" that offers "a generic functionality that can potentially be
applied in a large number of sectors within the economy").
106 Johannes M. Bauer, Junghyun & Steven S. Wildman, An Integrated Framework For
Assessing Broadband Policy Options, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 21, 25 (2005).
107 See Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 64-65; Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra
note 3, at 66-68.
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"most other economic activities [and] . . . provides substantial positive exter-
nalities."'' 8 The externalities include a host of social and personal goods often
overlooked under traditional, "old school" economic analyses." Stable, reli-
able, and ubiquitous network access also acts as a mechanism to reduce trans-
action costs for its users."' Broadband is indeed essential infrastructure."'
To employ a helpful metaphor, a chief purpose of broadband is to serve as a
platform for allowing end users to utilize the capabilities of the Internet. Of
course, broadband connectivity enables other online services, applications, and
content as well. However, it is the Internet access component above all that
makes broadband so compelling as a public policy matter."2
It is widely acknowledged that broadband Internet access is central to the
economic future of the United States."' The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") has found that broadband-enabled In-
ternet access "plays a critical role in the workings of the economy," because "it
connects consumers, business, and governments and facilitates social interac-
tion."".4 Numerous benefits have been touted for next generation broadband
networks, including enabling faster file transfers, video streaming applications,
real-time collaboration, cloud computing, and simultaneous use of multiple
bandwidth-hungry applications; these in turn will enhance the quality of health
care delivery, foster citizen participation in government and society, and im-
108 See Eli Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common Carriage,
18 TELECOMMC'NS POL'Y 435, 439 (1994) [hereinafter Noam, Beyond Liberalization]; see
also van Schewick, supra note 105, at 385.
109 A related concept is the "keystone species." Like other communications and transpor-
tation and financial industries, broadband-based Internet access has massive ramifications
for the economy as a whole. A failure of this keystone species to thrive will have devastat-
ing effects on the other species reliant on its success. See MARCO IANSITI AND RoY LEVIEN,
THE KEYSTONE ADVANTAGE: WHAT THE NEW DYNAMICS OF BUSINESS ECOSYSTEMS MEAN
FOR STRATEGY, INNOVATION, AND SUSTAINABILITY 40, 82 (2004).
110 Nachbar, supra note 64, at 108.
1 ROBERT CRANDALL, WILLIAM LEHR, & ROBERT LITAN, THE EFFECTS OF BROADBAND
DEPLOYMENT ON OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT: A CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF U.S. DATA,
BROOKINGS INST. ISSUES IN ECON. POL'Y, No. 6, at 6 (July 2007), available at
http://www3.brookings.edu/views/papers/crandallI2007061itan.pdf. See BRETT FRISCHMANN,
MEMO ON INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT 2 (2008) ("Infrastructure resources are means to
many ends in the sense that they enable, frame, and support a wide range of human activi-
ties. From a functional, systems-based perspective, infrastructure can best be understood as
the foundational resources that enable and/or structure more complex systems of human
activity.").
112 See discussion infra Part III.
113 Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra note 52, at 46-47 ("The centrality of
high-speed Internet access to the economic future of the U.S. has been acknowledged at
every level of government.").
114 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, BROADBAND




prove access to education and entertainment."' Major studies demonstrate that
broadband access to the Internet has a sizable positive impact on economic
growth in real and measurable ways."6 There is a significant causal link be-
tween broadband penetration in a country and economic growth."
7
Broadband networks are important as a policy matter because of what they
enable: conveyance of More Good Ideas. Broadband empowers "companies
and individuals to use more efficient processes and helps make information
technology-producing companies more competitive internationally."" 8 To be
clear, the concept of ideas is not limited to that which leads to material eco-
nomic benefits. Susan Crawford has explained how the most important aspect
of online communications is "complex human relationships," including "the
evolution of human connections and relationships online.""' 9 Per Romer, Craw-
ford believes that the freedom for more people to look for new ideas and new
technologies is fundamental to economic growth: "Bad ideas really do lead to
good ideas, in that the diversity of ideas as a whole allows exploration to dis-
cover what is useful."' 2° In essence, ideas potentially are far more valuable than
goods, the Intemet is potentially far more valuable than other forms of com-
munication, and broadband allows both to flourish. 2 ' Concomitantly, the suc-
cess of broadband as a platform for the conveyance of good ideas over the In-
ternet in turn improves the value of the broadband network to all of its users.
More particularly, as indicated above, infrastructure investment can increase
115 See STEPHEN EZELL ET AL., INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., THE NEED FOR SPEED:
THE IMPORTANCE OF NEXT-GENERATION BROADBAND NETWORKS 5-29 (2009),
http://itif.org/files/2009-needforspeed.pdf.
116 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. LEHR, CARLOS A. OSARIO, SHARON E. GILLETT & MARVIN A.
SIRBU, MEASURING BROADBAND'S ECONOMIC IMPACT 3-4 (2006), available at
http://www.eda.gov/PDF/MITCMUBBImpactReport.pdf ("The results [of the author's
study] support the view that broadband access does enhance economic growth and perform-
ance, and that the assumed economic impact of broadband are real and measurable.").
"17 See id. at 20; PANTELIS KOUTROUMPIS, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BROADBAND ON
GROWTH: A SIMULTANEOUS APPROACH 5, 23-24 (2008), available at
http://www.canavents.com/its2008/abstracts/102.pdf.
118 ROBERT ATKINSON & HOWARD WIAL, BOOSTING PRODUCTIVITY, INNOVATION, AND
GROWTH THROUGH A NATIONAL INNOVATION FOUNDATION 10 (2008).
119 Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55 UCLA
L. REV. 359, 380-81 (2007) [hereinafter Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Commu-
nications Law].
120 Id. at 384 (citing Paul Romer, Should the Government Subsidize Supply or Demand in
the Market for Scientists and Engineers? 14 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Pa-
per No. W7723, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=230163.
121 The Internet is also different from former communications modalities because it pro-
vides feedback, allows interesting new species and new ways to make a living, and provides
a central social place. The Net serves as a substrate that enables new ideas and new forms of
social organisms to emerge, created by many different decisions to pay attention. It serves as
the "human communications layer of the Internet." See Crawford, The Internet and the Pro-
ject of Communications Law, supra note 119, at 389, 404.
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economic growth in various ways, as "the important spillovers of broadband
networks results in externalities in the other sectors of the economy."'' Broad-
band networks have unique characteristics of "the information intensity and the
breadth of activities that can be supported by high level software applica-
tions-ranging from business critical processes to entertainment and e-
learning."''
As noted above, the social gains from broadband-based Internet connectivity
outweigh the private gains to its providers. 4 Broadband is an important basic
infrastructure that is expected to produce spillovers and wide-reaching benefits
across the economy. 5 Increased broadband deployment fosters a network ef-
fect multiplier, encouraging investment in industries that create new and inno-
vative applications and services.'26 Broadband also plays a vital role as a con-
nectivity platform, with numerous economic and non-economic benefits or
spillovers.' 7
Broadband is also characterized by what some call the "comedy of the
commons,"' 28 which describes how the overall social benefits of infrastructure
exceed their social costs because of the increasing returns to use.2 9 In essence,
there is a wedge between broadband providers' private interests and the na-
tion's social interests.3 A key question then is whether broadband providers
possess adequate economic incentives to invest in their networks when they
cannot capture the full economic benefit. The policies that policymakers adopt,
and in particular the types of institutions and projects employed, may depend
to a large extent on an analysis of the ability of market forces to send the
proper economic signals.
122 Koutroumpis, supra note 117, at 2.
123 Id.
124 See supra Part III.B.4; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 83, at 259-61 (discussing
spillovers).
125 CRANDALL, LEHR, & LITAN,supra note 111, at 2-3.
126 ROBERT D. ATKINSON, DANIEL CASTRO, AND STEPHEN J. EZELL, THE DIGITAL ROAD TO
RECOVERY: A STIMULUS PLAN TO CREATE JOBS, BOOST PRODUCTIVITY, AND REVITALIZE
AMERICA 7-9 (2009).
127 See Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 26.
128 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 723 (1986) (explaining that commerce as an exam-
ple of comedy of the commons "has been thought to enhance the sociability of the members
of an otherwise atomized society").
129 See Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Eco-





V. ENVISIONING BROADBAND AS AN OPTIMAL INTERNET
PLATFORM
There appears to be a solid consensus that broadband penetration, speed, and
price could be better in the United States. 3' By most measures the United
States is behind other nations in broadband performance, and its rank has been
falling since 2001.3 Even if one disagrees that the broadband market can yield
better results or whether there is any role for government to play in encourag-
ing the deployment of broadband networks, few can disagree that government
policy can and does have a major impact.'33 This is especially the case when
looking at next-generation broadband networks-also called "ultra-broadband"
in some quarters in the United States, and "super-fast broadband" in the UK-
operating at user download speeds of 40 Mbps or greater.'34 Therefore, we
should strive to better understand how government policy can maximize the
quality and quantity of broadband in ways that best support a robust Inter-
net-in other words, to understand how government policy can achieve opti-
mal connectivity for Internet over broadband. As Charlie Firestone puts it:
"The role of government should be to '[g]ovem so as to promote environ-
mental conditions conducive to maximizing the social bandwidth made possi-
ble by these technologies."" 35
131 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Broadband Coalition, A Call to Action for a National
Broadband Strategy 1-2 (Dec. 2, 2008),
http://www.newamerica.net/files/nbs%20call%20toaction.pdf; http://bb4us.net/id8.html.
The U.S. Broadband Coalition is comprised of "high technology companies, manufacturers,
consumers, labor unions, public interest groups, educators, state and local governments" and
other stakeholders. The group announced a framework for a National Broadband Strategy
and urged its adoption. See also ROBERT D. ATKINSON, DANIEL K. CORREA & JULIE A. HED-
LUND, THE INFO. TECH. AND INNOVATION FOUND., EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL BROADBAND
LEADERSHIP vii (2008).
132 See ATKINSON ET AL., supra note 131, at vii; see also INTERNET FOR EVERYONE, ONE
NATION ONLINE 3 fig. 2, available at http://www.freepress.net/files/IFE Brochure.pdf (not-
ing the United States' decline in broadband penetration ranking from 4th to 15th from 2001
through 2007, according to OECD data). But see GEORGE S. FORD, THOMAS M. KOUTSKY &
LAWRENCE J. SPIWAK, THE BROADBAND EFFICIENCY INDEX: WHAT REALLY DRIVES BROAD-
BAND ADOPTION ACROSS THE OECD?, PHOENIX CENTER POLICY PAPER NO. 33, at 1, 3-4,
(2008), available at http://www.phoenix-center.org/pcpp/PCPP33final.pdf.
133 "It's time to reject the view that somehow this is a zero-sum game between corporate
America and government. Both must clearly play a leadership role if we are to make head-
way on broadband performance." ATKINSON ET AL., supra note 132, at ix.
134 See generally EZELL ET AL., supra note 115, at 29-31; DELIVERING SUPER-FAST
BROADBAND IN THE UK: PROMOTING INVESTMENT AND COMPETITION 3 (Mar. 3, 2009),
available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/ngafuturebroadband/statement/statement.pdf.
135 Charles Firestone, Maximizing Social Bandwidth in the Gigabit Society 8,
Presentation at the Columbia Inst. For Teleinformation's 25th Anniversary Int'l Summit on




This section addresses the key characteristics of broadband as an optimal In-
ternet platform ("BAOIP"). Brett Frischmann and Barbara van Schewick effec-
tively summarize the unique role of the broadband-based Internet in generating
More Good Ideas, and the challenge of employing the market to generate the
economic incentives for a richer broadband experience of the Net:
As an infrastructure resource, the Internet generates significant value as an input into a
wide variety of productive activities engaged in by users. The Internet has had a trans-
formative impact on many different social systems, spurring widespread systematic
change not only in many different industries but also in many different nonindustrial
sectors of our society: It is transforming commerce, community, culture, education,
government, health, politics, and science-all information and communications-
intensive systems. The Internet spurs this transformation by empowering people to
participate and engage in socially valuable, productive activities. These activities pro-
duce significant external benefits that accrue to society as a whole and are not cap-
tured or necessarily even appreciated by the participants. As [broadband] network
providers cannot capture these externalities either, their decisions will not take ac-
count of society's interest in these uses.1
36
As addressed below, these crucial decisions made by broadband network pro-
viders include the availability of broadband infrastructure, the sufficiency of
Net capacity, and the integrity of Net access.
Optimal broadband Internet platforms can be defined as the right blend of
supply (more, bigger), demand (popularity), and support for Internet access
(robust and open). 37 I would submit that there are three general dimensions to
BAOIP. The first is the availability of physical infrastructure to support access
to the Internet. Policymakers and others raise questions about the relative lim-
ited availability of broadband, including few competitive options and limited
alternatives in terms of pricing, speeds, and geography.
3
1
Together the other two dimensions of BAOIP constitute the availability of
virtual infrastructure to support access to the Net. The first form of platform
support centers on a lack of constraints on the suitability of broadband plat-
forms to support Internet access.' 39 This corresponds to having adequate capac-
ity available on broadband platforms for robust Internet access. One can think
136 Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 129, at 427-28 (citations omitted).
137 The OECD similarly has looked at five main categories deemed important for assess-
ing broadband markets: penetration, coverage, services and speed, usage, and prices. OECD,
Directorate for Science, Technology, and Industry, Broadband Portal,
http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3343,en_2649_34225_38690102 1_1_1 _1,00.html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2009). Roughly, these categories of availability break down to actual
lines available, the capacity of those lines, and the actual lines in use-or more pipes, bigger
pipes, and popular pipes.
138 Utilizing the language of complexity theory, Barbara Cherry refers to "the desired
emergent properties of widespread availability, affordability, and reliability of critical com-
munications infrastructure." Cherry, Institutional Governance for Essential Industries Un-
der Complexity, supra note 86, at 7.
139 See Policy Post 13.8, June 01, 2007,
http://www.cdt.org/publications/policyposts/2007/8 (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
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of this as "sufficiency of Net capacity." To date, neither side in the network
neutrality debate has prominently addressed concerns about the sufficiency of
Net capacity.14
The second form of platform openness centers on a lack of constraints on
the availability of Internet access, which covers both consumers (discrimina-
tory pricing, blocking, and degradation), third party content and applications
providers (anticompetitive pricing, blocking, degradation, and prioritization).
This form of platform openness with respect to both consumers and third party
providers matches roughly to recent discussions around traditional network
neutrality, and can be thought of as "integrity of Net access. '14'
Integrity
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140 Generally speaking, network neutrality is:
"[t]he proposed principle that a network must nondiscriminately deliver packets, with
no awareness of what specific application, device, or end-user generated them. The is-
sue of network neutrality regulation has become a bone of contention between pipe-
owners (i.e., bandwidth providers), on the one hand, and application service providers
and content providers, on the other hand, whose services and/or content consume
bandwidth and may be in competition with the pipe-owners ......
HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 643 (23d ed. 2007).
141 Richard S. Whitt, Emerging Implications of Broadband: Wrestling with Convergence
and Communications Policy, Remarks at NARUC Winter Meetings 12-14 (Feb. 15, 2009),
available at
http://www.narucmeetings.org/Presentations/RSW%/ 20Google / 20Preso / 2ONARUC%/ 20C
onference%20Feb%202009%20FINAL%20021309.pdf, see also Atkinson, Framing A Na-
tional Broadband Policy, supra note 82, at 151-53, 162-66.
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Obviously judging factors like the prevalence, capacity, uptake, and open-
ness of broadband connections as a means of reaching the Internet is not an
entirely objective exercise, and each component will change over time.
Achieving BAOIP is an ongoing strategy, a process, with no finite end point.
Tensions also may exist between these various dimensions-such as capacity
versus openness or ubiquity, making policy tradeoffs inevitable.'42 Optimality
here is contextual. As Frank Pasquale puts it, optimization of access to the In-
ternet relates to "the ideal environment for self-expression, community forma-
tion, entertainment, and all the other cultural and political functions served by
online applications and services." '43 Old School Economics alone cannot prop-
erly value these attributes.'" However, properly aligning economic incentive
structures will enable these availability, sufficiency, and integrity dimensions
of broadband networks to balance and reinforce each other as technology con-
tinues to evolve.'45 The policy debate needs to shift to focus more on the para-
mount issue: getting as many U.S. households as possible using a plethora of
economically-viable, readily-available broadband networks to fully utilize the
rich capabilities of the Internet and other online resources.
A. Availability of Broadband Infrastructure
Some suggest that a choice necessarily exists between deployment of broad-
band networks and broadband as an optimal platform for Internet access.'
142 Atkinson, Framing A National Broadband Policy, supra note 82, at 165.
143 Frank Pasquale, The Promise of Comparativism: Expanding the Bases of Expertise in
Internet Policymaking 23 (Dec. 5-6, 2008),
http://lgst.wharton.upenn.edu/cmc/papers/2008/pasquale.pdf. I hasten to add that I do not
share the author's proposed extension of network bottleneck theory to Intemet-based appli-
cations such as search engines and social networks.
144 Id.
145 Physicist Stuart Kauffman explains how technological evolution is a process attempt-
ing to optimize systems riddled with conflicting constraints:
Optimal solutions to one part of the overall design problem conflict with optimal solu-
tions to other parts of the overall design. Then we must find compromise solutions to
the joint problem that meet the conflicting constraints of the different subproblems....
How should these conflicting requirements be jointly optimized? A tree may utilize
metabolic resources to make chemical toxins to ward off insects, rather than utilize the
same resources to build leaves to capture sunlight. How should the tree solve the con-
flicting constraints in its budget allocation?
STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR LAWS OF SELF-
ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY 179-80 (1995).
146 See, e.g., In re Broadband Industry Practices, Comments of Comcast Corporation,
WC Docket No. 07-52, at 11-12 (Feb. 12, 2008) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment
Filing System).
Notwithstanding the enormous capacity and flexibility of the cable infrastructure, there
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This appears to be a false choice. These broadband pipes are valued precisely
because they carry the Internet. By the same token, investment in telecommu-
nications infrastructure can be a skittish business, exacerbated by signs of
regulatory gridlock and uncertainty. 4 7 In short, policymakers should embrace
the virtual commons created by the Net, while avoiding or limiting the anti-
commons of telecom infrastructure investment. This can be addressed by seek-
ing to foster more, larger platforms and encouraging higher demand or popu-
larity of the platforms.
We do need to carefully consider what aspects of broadband infrastructure
constitute an optimal Internet platform from the end user's perspective. For
example, increasing ubiquity at a certain point tips to positive network effects,
increasing symmetry at a certain point tips to user-generated functionality, and
increasing speeds at a certain point tips to video-centric user experience.
Where each of those inflection points resides is a difficult task indeed, at least
for the policymaker, and certainly beyond the scope of this paper.'48 However,
we will consider below several components of the dimension of broadband
availability that, in varying measures, can help bring us optimal Internet plat-
forms.
1. More Broadband Internet Platforms
More-the first piece of the dimension of available broadband-can be in-
terpreted in at least three different ways: competitive platforms, ubiquitous
platforms, and mobile platforms.
The conventional free market wisdom that more options create more compe-
tition, which is better for consumers,49 is no less applicable in the market for
broadband. The more broadband options consumers have, it is argued, the
more effective competition is in driving down prices and driving up quality.5 '
are (and always will be) some throughput limitations. Thus, the question is not whether
all customers will be able to use shared bandwidth indiscriminately for any purpose
they choose regardless of the effects their use has on other customers but, rather, how
to optimize every customer's online experience and ability to access all Internet content
and use all Internet applications and services.
Id.
147 See HELLER, supra note 66, at 106-07.
148 It is well established that making the jump from dial-up modems to broadband speeds
"represented an inflection point making possible a myriad of services that were previously
impractical." EZELL ET AL., supra note 115, at 4.
149 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 1-2 (1985)
("Market economies are dedicated to the principle that people are best off if they can make
voluntary exchanges of goods and services in competitive markets .... If all exchanges take
pace at a competitive price, society as a whole will be wealthier ... ").
150 See, e.g., NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
NETWORKED NATION: BROADBAND IN AMERICA 2007, at iii (2008), available at
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To ensure adequate market competition, however, policymakers should want to
encourage the deployment of more platforms, both wired and wireless, owned
by different players with different business models. At the same time, there are
very real economic constraints on multiple competing facilities-based broad-
band networks. 5 '
Furthermore, if it is not already, ubiquitous broadband should be a primary
objective. Less than 10% of U.S. homes remain unserved by a terrestrial
broadband provider, but it is estimated to cost some $20 to 30 billion to deploy
broadband services to pass those six to eight million households.'52 The Na-
tional Academy of Sciences ("NAS") argues that ubiquitous broadband capa-
bility can be expected to do as much to drive innovation, the economy, and job
creation in the twenty-first century as did access to the telephone, interstate
highways, and air travel in the twentieth century."'' 5 3 As Kevin Werbach frames
the issue, "the real question is not how to provide ubiquitous wireless [broad-
band] connectivity in the abstract, but how to address concrete needs and mar-
ket opportunities."'54
Indeed, fostering ubiquitous access to broadband networks, and the perva-
sive, always-on experience of bandwidth-rich applications they provide, may
be more valuable than simply aiming for higher speeds or capacity. "5 This
view challenges the conventional wisdom that we simply need bigger pipes, at
least as the guiding principle for a national broadband policy. For example,
Mark Cooper and the Consumer Federation of America ("CFA") have pro-
moted grassroots-based community broadband networks that provide a com-
mon symmetric speed of 5 to 10 Mbps on a ubiquitous basis.'56 Scholars at the
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/2008/NetworkedNationBroadbandinAmerica2007.pdf
("Escalating competition among broadband platforms and service providers has yielded both
a proliferation of new communications and entertainment services and affordable broadband
pricing for American consumers.").
151 See infra Part VII.B.I.b-c.
152 S. DEREK TURNER, FREE PRESS, DOwN PAYMENT ON OUR DIGITAL FUTURE: STIMULUS
POLICIES FOR THE 21 ST-CENTURY ECONOMY 8-9 (2008),
http://www.freepress.net/files/DownPaymentDigitalFuture.pdf.
153 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ET AL., RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM:
ENERGIZING AND EMPLOYING AMERICA FOR A BRIGHTER ECONOMIC FUTURE 201-10 (2007),
available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?recordid=1 1463&page=201. In addition,
the NAS has determined that "Congress and the administration should take action-mainly
in the regulatory arena and in spectrum management-to ensure widespread affordable
broadband access in the very near future." Id. at 201.
154 KEVIN WERBACH, RADIO REVOLUTION 39 (2004),
http://werbach.com/docs/RadioRevolution.pdf.
155 In a similar vein, Andrew Odlyzko insists that the real value in broadband is not con-
tent, but connectivity. Andrew Odlyzko, Content Is Not King 1-2 (Jan. 3, 2001) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/-odlyzko/doc/history.communications2.pdf.
156 Mark Cooper, Building a New Communications System for America at the Grassroots
2009]
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Information Technology and Innovation Foundation ("ITIF") similarly argue
that the new broadband stimulus measures in the American Recovery and Re-
investment Act ("ARRA") should be used to support the deployment of mod-
erate speed broadband to homes or businesses in unserved areas of the coun-
try. "'57 It may well be that ubiquity should be our primary near-term goal, with
larger, ultra-broadband pipes as the longer term goal of a comprehensive na-
tional broadband plan.
Finally, policymakers should want broadband platforms that are mobile. As
George Ou has stated, "[i]n a world where wired broadband such as DSL, ca-
ble, and fiber are the last mile of the Internet, wireless technology is becoming
more important,"''.. even to the extent that "it's easy to envision a day when
wireless broadband access will surpass wired broadband services."'59 Mobility
certainly will provide a new dimension to the future of the Internet.6° Bringing
the Web to mobile platforms will completely transform the way consumers
interact with online services and each other. 6' Nonetheless there are immense
hurdles to making this potentiality a reality.'62
2. Bigger Broadband Internet Platforms
Bigger broadband pipes are the next major challenge in maximizing the
supply availability component in the optimal broadband equation. A recent
Communications Workers of America ("CWA") survey of broadband sub-
scribers across the United States shows that the median download speed in this
country is 1.9 Mbps.'63 Others put the number at somewhere under 5 Mbps.'"
By comparison, the median download speed in Japan is 63 Mbps, or over thirty
times faster.'65 The United States "also trails South Korea at 45 Mbps, Finland
at 21 Mbps, France at 17 Mbps, and Canada at 7.6 Mbps.' ' 66 As Mark Cooper
of the Consumers Union correctly points out, Asian nations such as Japan and
Level, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-
cooper/building-a-new-communicat b1 57899.html.
157 EZELL ETAL., supra note 115, at 35.
158 See generally GEORGE OU, MANAGING BROADBAND NETWORKS: A POLICYMAKER'S
GUIDE 35 (2008), http://www.itif.org/files/NetworkManagement.pdf.
159 See id.
160 Id.
161 EZELL ET AL., supra note 115, at 2.
162 See, e.g., id. at 36 (discussing the bandwidth constraints and infrastructure costs of
new wireless broadband technologies).
163 COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, SPEED MATTERS: A REPORT ON INTERNET
SPEEDS IN ALL 50 STATES 2 (2008), http://www.speedmatters.org/document-
library/sourcematerials/cwa reporton internetspeeds_2008.pdf.
164 EZELL ETAL., supra note 115, at 3.




Korea have faster speeds at less than half the prices of what U.S. consumers
pay. 1
67
As of June 2008, the United States was ranked fourteenth in broadband
speed among thirty OECD nations. 68 As Rob Frieden writes, "the United
States lags many developed and even developing nations using credible meas-
ures such as market penetration, cost, correlation with per capita Gross Domes-
tic Product, annual growth, deployment of fiber optics links, and average
speed.'1 69 Frieden attributes this failing to "politicized, distracted, and ineffec-
tual" policy-making by the U.S. government. 7 ° On the other hand, the ITIF
estimates that approximately three-quarters of this difference in deployment,
speeds, and price can be attributed to non-policy factors, such as population
density and copper loop lengths. 7 ' If accurate, this raises important questions
about the extent to which government can effectively bolster the remaining
policy quarter to tackle the technology possibility frontier.
For many, fiber is the ultimate technology to increase broadband capacity
and reduce servicing costs. Verizon's deployment of its all-fiber FiOS net-
work7 . is a good marker for the challenge of encouraging ultrabroadband in-
vestments in fiber-to-the-home. Verizon reportedly spends $4000 in capital
cost per individual home to deploy the fiber necessary for FiOS service, which
exceeds the $2500 to $3300 in projected incremental revenues and cost sav-
ings.7 3 If accurate, these numbers point to the conclusion that it may be uneco-
nomic for a private company to deploy fiber-to-the-home to many geographic
regions and markets. On the other hand, given the sunk investment in passing
approximately 18 million homes, greater revenues can be expected in the fu-
ture to offset some of the costs. 74 Interestingly, some 70% of the total costs of
fiber deployment is in the public works component, meaning the costs of utiliz-
ing labor, securing the rights of way, and digging trenches.'75
167 MARK COOPER, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, BROADBAND IN AMERICA 20
(2008), http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/pdf/broadband-america.pdf.
168 OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology, and Industry, Broadband Portal, Broad-
band Portal, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/45/395750l1 .xls (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
169 Rob Frieden, Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics: Developing a Clearer Assessment of
Market Penetration and Broadband Competition in the United States 27 (Dickinson School
of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-2008, 2008) [hereinafter Frieden, Lies, Damn
Lies, and Statistics], available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=l 159
727.
170 Id.
17' ATKINSON ETAL.,supra note 131, at 10.
172 Verizon, Fiber to the Premises and FiOS, supra note 38.
173 Hansell, A Bear Speaks, supra note 69. This number apparently does not include the
additional costs of middle mile and backhaul services, which a non-incumbent provider
would need to procure.
174 Id.
175 ATKINSON ET AL., supra note 13 1, at 27.
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3. Popular Broadband Internet Platforms
In 2007, roughly half of all American households did not subscribe to a
broadband service.'76 While the reasons for low subscribership are var-
ied--ownership of a computer,7 7 price, lack of perceived utility,'7 ' and other
factors--the larger point is the room to capture the significant economic upside
of increased broadband penetration. For example, according to the Brookings
Institute, "for every one percentage point increase in broadband penetration in
a state, employment is projected to increase by 0.2 to 0.3 percent per year," or
about 300,000 jobs. 79 This demonstrates the important economic impact of the
demand side of the equation.
Several nations surpass the United States in developing broadband access
for homes, schools, and businesses.' 0 According to the OECD, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Sweden, Korea and Finland lead
in broadband penetration, each surpassing 30 subscribers per 100 inhabi-
tants-despite the fact that the United States market is more than two-and-a-
half times the next largest: Japan. 8
As of 2008, the United States is ranked 18th in broadband pricing among
thirty OECD nations, as ranked by ITIF.'82 Further, the United States ranks
fifteenth in per capita broadband subscribership,'83 and broadband penetration
growth in the United States is now the second slowest in the OECD on a per-
centage basis.'84 In fact, Korea's fiber penetration of 12.2 per 100 inhabitants is
higher than total broadband penetration in five OECD countries.'85 Some ana-
lysts contend that "[t]he surest route to lower prices is provided by increasing
competition in the delivery of broadband services." '86
176 COOPER, supra note 167, at 13.
177 Only two-thirds of Americans have a computer at home. ATKINSON ET AL., supra note
131, at ix.
178 Apparently, the primary barrier to consumer uptake of broadband, more than avail-
ability or price, is relevance. See John R. Harrington, Obama's Online Opportunities II, at 2
(2008); see also Scott Wallsten, Broadband and Unbundling Regulations in OECD Coun-
tries 18 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 06-16,
2006) ("[I]t is clear that some Americans do not have broadband simply because they do not
want it, not because they cannot afford it or because it is not available.").
179 CRANDALL, LEHR,& LITAN, supra note 11, at 2.
180 RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM, supra note 153, at 12.
181 OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology, and Industry, Broadband Portal,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/35/39574709.xls (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
182 THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION FOUNDATION, 2008 ITIF BROAD-
BAND RANKINGS 1 (2008), http://www.itiforg/files/2008BBRankings.pdf.
183 Id.
184 ATKINSON & WIAL, supra note 118, at 10.
185 See OECD, Broadband Portal, supra note 181.
186 CRANDALL, LEHR & LITAN, supra note 11, at 14.
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B. Sufficiency of Net Capacity
Merely having the physical broadband infrastructure available is not suffi-
cient in itself to guarantee an optimal platform for consumer access to the In-
ternet. The broadband provider also must supply sufficient capacity on the
network to support robust Internet access to allow for the full exchange of
ideas and growth of commerce. This dimension can be thought of as the suffi-
ciency of Net carriage; in this role the broadband providers are carrying Inter-
net traffic on behalf of their end user customers.
The reality of the dynamic, multinet character of broadband is that it can be
used for more than Internet access. For example, cable modems typically use
only one of over 100 channels on a given cable system, 87 which arguably
leaves sufficient capacity, at least for now, for a robust Internet experience for
consumers. However, the countervailing economic incentives for broadband
providers to fill their pipes with other services that generate a maximum direct
return on investment must be acknowledged.'88 Newer technologies, such as
next generation networks ("NGN") and IP Multimedia Subsystem ("IMS"),
also make it easier for providers to partition their networks in ways that estab-
lish these private lanes separate and apart from access to the best-efforts public
Internet.'89
The notion of ensuring robust enough access to the Internet has not been
well explored. Weiser and Atkinson made it one part of their overall "Third
Way" strategy, acknowledging the incentives for broadband providers to limit
access to "a basic level of open, best-efforts Internet access."' 9 ° The objective
is to ensure that users can access the Internet at fast, commercially viable
speeds, while simultaneously sustaining the incentives for access providers to
improve capacity dedicated to Internet access. 9'
Importantly, protecting the openness of Internet access itself, which has
been the focus of the network neutrality debate,192 may not be sufficient to cre-
ate the right incentives for robust Internet access. For example, broadband pro-
187 Saul Hansell, Does Broadband Need a Stimulus?, N.Y. Times Bits Blog (Jan. 21,
2009), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/21/does-broadband-need-a-stimulus/.
188 See ANGELE A. GILROY, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, NET NEUTRALITY: BACK-
GROUND AND ISSUES 1-2 (2008) [hereinafter GILROY, NET NEUTRALITY: BACKGROUND AND
ISSUES], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22444.pdf (noting the financial
incentive for network providers to charge content providers to prioritize their content above
that of others and the problems and potential for abuse that such a multi-tiered system would
create).
189 See infra notes 270-271 and accompanying text.
190 Robert D. Atkinson & Philip J. Weiser, A "Third Way" on Network Neutrality, NEW
ATLANTIS, Summer 2006, at 55-56, available at
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/a-third-way-on-network-neutrality.
191 Id. at 2, 14.
192 See GILROY, NET NEUTRALITY: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES, supra note 188, at 1-2.
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viders could decide to offer a broadband pipe that includes one or more private
lanes of ever-expanding bandwidth, alongside an open Internet access compo-
nent that is limited to, say, 256 Kbps. The resulting bandwidth-starved open
Internet access service, even if it comports fully with whatever definitions of
network neutrality govern at the time, would be bad for Internet consumers,
competition, and innovation, and thus would not constitute an optimal broad-
band platform.
C. Integrity of Net Access
The final dimension of BAOIP is one that has garnered most attention in re-
cent years: an open Internet, also known as network neutrality.'93 Traditional
network neutrality refers to maintaining access to the totality of the public In-
ternet, so that the "best efforts" Internet can continue to flourish."94 Network
neutrality is a shorthand term for talking about open on-ramps to the Inter-
net-hat is, last-mile Internet access over broadband facilities.'95 The concept
of openness here means that broadband access providers should not be unduly
discriminating among applications and content of users' choice.
The FCC's formulation of network neutrality is that all users of the Internet
should expect, in an open and competitive marketplace, to retain the ability
freely to utilize connectivity to send, receive, and interact with any and all
combinations of applications and content, through any and all interoperable
devices.'96 To an extent openness is in the eye of the beholder. Some argue that
193 See generally id. (describing network neutrality and the debate with which it is sur-
rounded).
194 See id.; NEWTON's TELECOM DICTIONARY, supra note 140, at 643; see also Huston,
supra note 36, at 1 (defining "best efforts" network).
195 See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. OF TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. 141, 141-49 (2003).
196 In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities; Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommu-
nications Services; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company
Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of Computer
III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appro-
priate Regulatory Treatment of Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities,
Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 4 (Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Internet Policy State-
ment]. According to the Open Internet Coalition, openness should be defined in terms of
three complementary values. The first is consumer choice. End-users have the ability to
access the lawful applications and content of their choice, and broadband access providers
do not block, degrade, or impair users' access. The second is a level competitive playing
field. Application and content providers can reach all end-users on a level competitive play-
ing field, because broadband access providers do not unfairly discriminate among applica-
tions or content or provide faster access to some third-parties but not others. The third is
innovation without permission. Innovators can deploy and make available to end users new
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open means that a technology platform has either no restrictions or reasonable
and non-discriminatory restrictions.
97
One way to think about the concept of openness is to extend the philosophy
of the various architectural elements of the Intemet to broadband networks.
Thus, fostering the integrity of Net access means maintaining the e2e principle,
agnostic bearer protocols, and network interconnectivity, with no central plan-
ner.' 98 In particular, the technical rule of e2e seems to map well to the legal rule
of nondiscrimination, so that no network provider should disrupt the end-to-
end nature of traffic between users. As some correctly have pointed out, the
Internet is not a neutral place, at least in terms of market activities.' 9 But the
many exceptions to the e2e principle should not negate its simple power. The
larger point is that we are talking about broadband networks. As long as the
Internet remains robustly competitive, the various non-neutral elements should
not be cause for major concern." Thus, the proposed third BAOIP dimension
of integrity of Net access can be influenced by the Internet's own e2e architec-
ture, but need not reflect it completely.
applications, content, social communities, and other software-based creations without hav-
ing to get permission first from broadband access providers. In re Broadband Industry Prac-
tices, Comments of the Open Internet Coalition, W.C. Docket No. 07-52, at i-ii (June 15,
2007). See JOHN WINDHAUSEN JR., A BLUEPRINT FOR BIG BROADBAND 4, 74 (2008),
http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/ pdf/EPO080 I.pdf.
197 Thomas R. Eisenmann et al., Opening Platforms: How, When, and Why? 1 (Harvard
Bus. Sch., Working Paper 09-030, 2008), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-
030.pdf.
198 Whitt and Schultze, supra note 2, at 31-35.
199 See, e.g., Craig McTaggart, Was the Internet Ever Neutral? 1 (2006) (unpublished
manuscript prepared for the 34th Research Conference on Communication, Information, and
Internet Policy at George Mason University School of Law), available at
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2006/593/mctaggarttprcO6rev.pdf (the Internet is not a
neutral platform because of "preferential content arrangements, distributed computing, fil-
tering and blocking to control network abuse, differential interconnection and interconnec-
tivity, and the impact of resource-intensive applications and users"); John Crowcroft, Net-
work Neutrality: The Technical Side of the Debate-A White Paper, INT'L J. OF COMMC'NS
567-579 (2007), available at http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/159/84 (the
Internet has never been a level playing field, for many accidental and some deliberate rea-
sons). In particular, Geoff Huston argues that, while the basic transmissions and switching
functions of the Internet remain end-to-end, the edge of the Internet appears to be evolving
into a "middleware" system dominated by firewalls, filters, Network Address Translators
("NATs"), Web caches, DNS interceptors, load balancers, and various constrained edge
devices. The End of End to End?, http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2008-05/eoe2e.html (last
visited Apr. 18, 2009). Nonetheless, these many exceptions to the e2e principle do not yet
appear to have swallowed the principle outright.
200 On the other hand, there is fresh evidence that Internet backbone providers may be
prioritizing traffic flows coming from different sources, as well as discriminating against
UDP and BitTorrent traffic. See Ying Zhang, Z. Morley Mao, & Ming Zhang, Ascertaining
the Reality of Network Neutrality Violation in Backbone ISPs 6 (2008) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://conferences.sigcomm.org/hotnets/2008/papers/21 new.pdf.
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Communications networks should be open for fundamental economic and
non-economic reasons. Paul Budde explains that such networks are the most
basic and profound aspect of a nation's infrastructure, deliver better overall
economic performance than a more closed or restricted network, provide fertile
ground necessary for the next big-and not so big-ideas, and are necessary to
prevent network owners from exploiting end users.2"' In particular, some as-
suredness of an open Net-whether through the market, the state, or some
combination of the two--means that providers of applications and content will
be incented to create new innovations, resulting in a virtuous innovation cycle
that ultimately benefits end users."' Some assuredness of more and bigger
broadband pipes leads to broadband-optimized software, which broadband
consumers will then take up and use."3 Other consumers will want broadband
access in order to utilize the new applications and content, which drives broad-
band popularity, in turn driving broadband deployment.0 4
This paper will not wade deeply into current disputes over network neutral-
ity, at least on the familiar terms of that debate. Instead, the focus will be
shifted from the ends of an open Internet to the means. Even many opponents
of network neutrality regulation indicate that they favor an open Internet. 5
The issue for them is what, if anything, the government does to encourage an
201 PAUL BUDDE, BIG-THINK STRATEGIES: OPEN ACCESS 2-3 (2009),
http://www.buddle.com.au/presentations/content/2009_BigThink_-_OAP_-
Public Copy.pdf.
202 This also plays into the inherent uncertainties of markets, particularly highly dynamic
and disaggregated ones like the Internet. If policymakers and/or market players do not know
what users want-or worse, think they know, but incorrectly--the risk of making decisions
that will result in sub-optimal economic outcomes is high. An open broadband platform is
best equipped to deal with these uncertainties. Further, to employ the conceptual lens of the
evolving fitness landscape, e2e allows for the survival of the fittest, and not the favored. See
Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A User's Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69,
83-84 (2004).
203 See, e.g., AOL with Broadband, http:/Ibroadband.aol.com/broadband/aol-with-
broadband.adp (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
204 Jonathan Zittrain discusses how open systems are prone to abuse, which invites calls
to tighten or close the systems altogether. Our familiar toolkits for handling problems such
as abuses of open systems are not particularly attuned to maintaining generativity; tradi-
tional regulatory interventions are both under- and over-inclusive. ZiTrRAN, THE FUTURE OF
THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT, supra note 100, at 150.
205 In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Cor-
poration for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications; Broadband Industry Practices
Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application
Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for "Rea-
sonable Network Management," Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028,
13,088 (Aug. 1, 2008) (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting) [hereinafter Comcast Order] (dis-
senting to the Commission's decision to censure Comcast for undertaking unreasonable
management techniques, while stating: "The Internet should remain open and free").
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open Internet.2°6 An open Net is not a prescription; it is an environment. So it is
not the ends but the means employed that has become the source of most con-
troversy, and the topic explored later in this Article.
VI. A CLASH OF INCENTIVES: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE
FITNESS LANDSCAPE
Now we have reached the point of combining the components of the policy
design space with what we know of the broadband market. Like the economy
as a whole, the telecommunications sector constitutes a complex, evolving sys-
tem. 2°7 Telecom policy is embedded in multiple layers of social arrangements
such as constitutional provisions, statutory provisions, and specific regulatory
institutions.2 " By one formulation, public policy-making includes setting the
agenda, specifying alternative policy choices, selecting a policy, and imple-
menting the decision. 9 A successful policy outcome depends on success in all
these processes.2 Once policymakers decide that some form of government
involvement is warranted, choices are made among different organizations and
institutions."'
In this part, the conceptual tool of the fitness landscape is employed to as-
sess how the exisiting incentive structures of the market, and their potential
mismatch with our suggested public policy objective or BAOIP, raise unique
public policy concerns. In Part VII, the various institutional options for crafting
a framework for government oversight of broadband networks are examined.
Finally, Part VIII will complete the paper with a discussion of the prescriptive
and adaptive approaches to public policy, and suggest an assortment of adap-
tive tinkering"2 solutions for policymakers to consider.
As demonstrated in a previous paper, the FCC's decisions "do not always
match up well with the dynamic ecosystem with which it is coevolving. ' The
206 See, e.g., id. ("Our policies, and the policies of all governments everywhere, should
promote [an open and free Internet].").
207 See Barbara A. Cherry & Johannes M. Bauer, Adaptive Regulation: Contours of a
Policy Model for the Internet Economy 1-3 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://quello.msu.edu/complexity/ cherry-bauer.pdf.
208 See Johannes M. Bauer & Steven S. Wildman, Looking Backwards and Looking
Forwards in Contemplating the Next Rewrite of the Communications Act, 58 FED. COMM.
L.J. 415, 419 (2006).
209 See Barbara Cherry, Analyzing the Network Neutrality Debate Through Awareness of
Agenda Denial, 1 INT'L J. OF COMMC'N 580, 580 (2007) [hereinafter Cherry, Analyzing the
Network Neutrality Debate Through Awareness ofAgenda Denial].
210 See id.
211 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Per-
spective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2008).
212 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
213 Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 52.
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FCC's greatest challenge may be to discipline effectively market behavior with
a quick and light touch. In order to buttress the forces of current and unborn
innovation, spur economic growth, and safeguard all forms of social connec-
tivity, policymakers should invest in adaptive policies--those that are more
cautious, macroscopic, incremental, experimental, contextual, flexible, provi-
sional, accountable, and sustainable.
The operative question here is whether the market-without a governing le-
gal framework, institutional overlays, or policy projects in place-will incent
broadband companies to provide all three physical and virtual dimensions of
optimal Internet platforms to consumers. The mismatch of market incentives
and policy objectives may help to understand the postures of the major players.
There are at least four provisional answers to consider: the prospect of ruinous
broadband competition, the explosion of positive externalities from the Inter-
net, financial incentives for broadband providers to prioritize traffic both
within the Internet and via managed networks, and clashing mindsets of the
major market agents.
A. The Prospect of Ruinous Competition
Robert Atkinson reminds us "competition is a means to an end, not an end in
itself."2 '4 Among other things, this observation should lead policymakers to
examine the premise that fostering more facilities-based broadband competi-
tion should be a public policy priority. But is that necessarily the case?
There is reason to believe that additional competition in the broadband mar-
ket actually harms incentives to invest. This is based on the economics of
broadband discussed previously--high fixed costs mean few competitors,
while adding more competitors will increase everyone's costs relative to a lim-
ited pool of consumer revenues."5 Atkinson explains this as "the engineers'
view ' of competing broadband pipes:
If in the face of more competitors, broadband providers are forced to amortize the
fixed costs of their networks over significantly fewer customers, total broadband costs
will rise-and prices will almost certainly have to rise as well, even if profits are
squeezed and efficiencies maximized. The only way this situation could be averted
would be if a new entrant was not successful in gaining any broadband customers. In
this case, overall broadband costs would still increase but the costs would be borne by
the new entrant's bondholders and stockholders. If all new entrants gained customers,
however, then the incumbents by definition would have fewer customers and hence
214 See ATKINSON, supra note 67, at I ("[lI]t's a mistake for policymakers to assume that
if they simply 'push the competition lever,' all the problems with broadband policy will be
resolved.").
215 Seeid. at5.
216 Id. at 3.
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less revenue to amortize the costs of their networks.217
Thus, if multiple competing physical networks bring these kinds of costs,
competition actually can produce inefficient investment patterns, with compa-
nies making duplicative investment not needed in a more rational market-
place.218 Ultimately, it may not be efficient economically to have additional
competing providers in the broadband market. If so, then Christopher Yoo,
among others, is off-base when he claims that the central goal of broadband
policy is to improve the competitiveness of the last mile.1 9
The policy conundrum boils down to choosing between one or two cost-
effective pipes versus many non-cost-effective competing pipes. Atkinson says
that the policy solutions include keeping the current duopoly, creating more
pipes (which may be economically inefficient and even damaging), regulating
open pipes (network unbundling), or regulating duopoly pipes (network neu-
trality)."' ° The issue is to "attain the right balance between the cost-efficiency
of fewer networks and the competitive benefits of more networks," which is a
difficult task for all involved. 2
If robust multi-platform competition is unlikely-or even ruinous-other
public policy objectives should be examined. There may be related normative
commitments at stake in the policy debate, including the goal of More Good
Ideas and the objective of harnessing BAOIP.
B. Spilling Over from the Public Internet
Another potential clash between economic incentives and policy objectives
arises in the form of positive extemalities--or spillovers-generated by broad-
217 Id. at 5.
218 See ATKINSON, supra note 67, at 4-6; see also F.A. Hayek, Competition as a Discov-
ery Procedure, QUARTERLY J. AUSTRIAN ECON., Fall 2002, at 9, 10 (translation from Ger-
man of 1968 Hayek lecture Der Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren).
219 See Chistopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 43, 97-98
(Univ. of Penn. L. Sch., Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 08-40, 2008), available
at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1262845; see also Frischmann & van
Schewick, supra note 129, at 390 ("[Yoo's] analysis of network neutrality is grounded on
the view that the 'central goal of broadband policy' is 'improving the competitiveness of the
last mile.' This is too narrow a frame."). Spulber and Yoo argue that duplication of costs is
an inevitable part of the market-based economy, and in any event is not a rational basis for
governmental intervention. Daniel F. Spulber & Chistopher S. Yoo, Toward a Unified The-
ory of Access to Local Telephone Networks, 61 FED. CoMM. L. J. 43, 69-70 (2008) [herein-
after Spulber & Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of Access]. Nonetheless the upfront costs of
building local/regional telecom plant are considerable. In any event, the argument here is
not for or against regulation, but simply to examine the implications for broadband competi-
tion as a public policy objective. Id.
220 See ATKINSON, supra note 67, at 6-9.
221 See id. at 5.
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band platforms when they facilitate Internet access.222 There is a wedge be-
tween broadband providers' private interests and the larger social interests. 23
Of the various network externalities that emerge from broadband networks, the
direct effects pertain to benefits derived by subscribers from joining a network,
while the indirect effects pertain to broadband's empowerment of applications
and content.24 Even those who believe that platform owners have powerful
economic incentives to welcome all broadband applications acknowledge a
number of important exceptions to that claimed rule.225 This is one of the rea-
sons that some consider Internet content and applications companies to be free-
riders on the backs of the broadband providers.226 Broadband providers see the
tradeoff as "extract[ing] some if not most of the rent that might otherwise flow
to the developers of applications, innovations, in exchange for making these
available for use by their clientele." '227 However, the inability to discriminate
among users and uses precludes broadband providers from extracting a share
of the uncaptured spillovers.228
There are significant social welfare benefits to a spillover-rich infrastructure
environment, many of which would be lost if the infrastructure owners were
allowed to internalize them.229 As an infrastructure resource, the Internet serves
as an input to the production of a wide range of private, public, and nonmarket
goods. The positive externalities associated with the various productive activi-
ties that users enjoy and the positive spillovers associated with the public and
nonmarket goods they produce have the potential to create significant social
value.230
As Frischman and van Schewick suggest, "productive users will not inter-
nalize these externalities ... [and] network providers do not internalize these
222 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
223 Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 129, at 390.
224 EZELL ET AL., supra note 115, at 29.
225 See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence ofAntitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 89, 105 (2003).
226 Paul A. David, Economic Policy Analysis and the Internet: Coming to Terms with a
Telecommunications Anomaly 9 (Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, SIEPR
Discussion Paper No. 06-04, 2006), [hereinafter David, Economics Policy Analysis and the
Internet], http://www.stanford.edu/group/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/06-
04.pdf (describing how Skype VolP freerides on Broadband).
227 Id.
228 Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 83, at 294 (describing how broadband providers
"cannot base access decisions or pricing on who is sending packets or how those packets
may be used; nor can they optimize the infrastructure for a particular class of end uses or
end users").
229 See id. at 277-79.
230 See, e.g., id. at 257-58 (explaining, as a starting point, that "[t]here is abundant evi-
dence that the social value of innovations far exceeds the private value" and that there "is
also good evidence that ... these spillovers actually encourage greater innovation").
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externalities either. '231' Further, "network policymakers face the classic tradeoff
of securing the immediate benefits of closed standardization by sacrificing the
technological flexibility that is conducive to future radical innovations. 232
Conversely, broadband providers who curtail innovation on their networks
prove the existence of externalities: the provider does not pay the full social
costs of reduced innovation and growth, which is the inverse of not capturing
full positive spillovers.233
Broadband providers may not be a direct part of the Internet value
chain-aside, of course, from providing their own broadband-based applica-
tions and content-and yet they need financial incentives to build and upgrade
infrastructure.2 " Due to this combination of broad shared benefits and narrow
private costs, it is entirely possible that "the economically and socially optimal
network will never be financed and built by private entities. '23' A recent ITIF
paper puts it more directly: given the significant positive externalities, "market
forces alone will not deliver the societally-optimal level of next-generation
broadband.2 36 This situation invites some compelling questions. How do we
integrate positive-and negative-externalities into our economic system?
How do we find a way to give spillovers positive economic value so broadband
providers will have an incentive to protect them? How do users internalize the
true benefits of the Internet, while also accounting for the actual costs of
broadband infrastructure? Or as Brett Frischmann asks, how do we compensate
infrastructure capacity producers for their investments?23 Is it the proper role
of the government to find ways to fill in that gap?2 38 These questions merit
some attention in the discussion of the current and projected fitness landscape.
Further, the issue of capturing or creating positive spillovers is implicated in
another issue regarding broadband providers: the right to prioritize.
231 Frischman & van Schewick, supra note 129, at 424.
232 David, Economics Policy Analysis and the Internet, supra note 226. When consider-
ing the property rights of broadband providers, the property rights of applications providers
normally are not included.
233 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 83, at 298.
234 See id. at 296 (explaining that with respect to broadband deployment, "[t]here is little
doubt that investment incentives matter").
235 BUDDE, supra note 201, at 10.
236 EZELL ET AL., supra note 115, at 29.
237 Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of lnfrastructure and Commons Manage-
ment, 89 MINN. L. REv. 917, 1021 (2005).
238 Per Kenneth Arrow, a neoclassical economist, when social returns exceed private
returns, government should consider an investment role, but not necessarily a more direct
role. Arrow's point merits closer consideration. KENNETH J. ARROw, ECONOMIC WELFARE
AND THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR INVENTION 20 (1959).
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C. Prioritizing within the Public Internet
The overarching policy objective of optimal broadband deployment--bigger
and better on-ramps to the Net--may benefit from leveraging market incen-
tives. If BAOIP is an important policy objective, which policy best produces
the necessary market incentives to invest in such networks: one that allows
traffic prioritization, or one that does not?.239
Prioritization is a term generally used to describe the preferential treatment
of some Internet traffic over other traffic, typically by moving to the head of
the line those packets with certain IP or Ethernet header information. 4 Routers
equipped with deep packet inspection ("DPI") technology are but one way of
achieving this technical goal.2 4 Engineers disagree vehemently over whether or
not prioritization of certain Internet traffic is necessary as a form of network
management. 42 For the purpose of this Article, the claim that prioritization is
not inherently an unreasonable network management practice when applied to
Internet traffic is accepted as true.243 In particular, there is evidence to suggest
that adding more capacity by itself is insufficient to obviate the need for traffic
management, and that prioritization mechanisms like "DIFF-SERV' 2" can op-
timize the end user's ability to utilize network services based on the three inter-
related characteristics of low packet delay, high bandwidth, and high volume.245
Moreover, given the varying network topologies and configurations among
239 This discussion will not address the possibility that allowing broadband providers to
engage in traffic prioritization can amount to harmful tampering in the market's evolution-
ary process.
240 See Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV.
273, 277-78 (2008) [hereinafter Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality].
241 M. CHRIS RILEY & BEN SCOTT, DEEP PACKET INSPECTION: THE END OF THE INTERNET
As WE KNOW IT? 13-14 (2009).
242 Compare Hearing on Net Neutrality Before S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transp., 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Gary R. Bachula, Vice President, Internet2),
with Ou, supra note 158, at 38.
243 See Ou, supra note 158, at 10-13. It is certainly the case that broadband providers
today manage their networks and enhance user experience via various mechanisms such as
VPNs, CDNs, and local caching. To the extent these functionalities are replicable by others
in a competitive market, there should be significantly less concern about them than with
router-based prioritization mechanisms.
244 See Diffserv vs. MPLS, http://www.protocols.com/papers/diffserv.htm (last visited
Jan. 28, 2009). Diff-serv is an Internet Protocol which "relies on traffic conditioners sitting
at the edge of the network to indicate each packet's requirements." Id.
245 Ou, supra note 158, at 22. Some observe that broadband providers must have the
ability to manage their networks in order to preserve Internet innovation and creativity.
CHARLES M. DAVIDSON & MICHAEL J. SANTORELLI, NETWORK EFFECTS: AN INTRODUCTION
TO BROADBAND TECHNOLOGY & REGULATION 12 (2008),
http://www.ncta.com/DocumentBinary.aspx?id=774. One can accept this argument and still
question whether and when network management can morph into paid prioritization or other
practices unrelated to the task of alleviating overall network congestion.
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different broadband providers, it likely would be difficult to fashion a one size
fits all network management policy.
246
The more interesting question is whether to allow broadband providers to
prioritize Internet traffic not for reasons of reasonable network management,
but rather to gain additional revenues from third party applications or content
providers. 247 Broadband providers claim they need additional resources from
paid commercial deals to prioritize Internet traffic, via Quality of Service
("QoS") and other techniques, to finance the further build-out of their net-
works, and ultimately to provide beneficial new services to consumers. 48
Christopher Yoo and others argue that prioritization is consistent with the na-
ture of the Internet as a two-sided market; with consumers on one end, and
applications and content providers on the other end.249 In essence, prioritization
can allow the broadband provider to capture at least some of the spillovers of
their network investments.
Proponents of network neutrality disfavor prioritization, because of the re-
sulting economic incentives structure.25 ° One argument they raise is that traffic
prioritization in the form of third party agreements threatens innovation and
competition online; under this view, access providers can use priority to advan-
tage certain application or content providers irrespective of user preferences.251
246 Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 179, 201. For example, in hybrid fiber coaxial architecture, traffic is aggregated so
that consumers share bandwidth with traffic from their neighbors. By contrast, DSL traffic
typically is not aggregated until it reaches the central office ("CO"), so the local connection
between the consumer and the CO is not subject to congestion at the neighborhood level.
See id.
247 Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 190, at 47, 49-50. Some call this form of paid priori-
tization "access tiering." Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233,
1273 (2007) [hereinafter Werbach, Only Connect].
248 It is noteworthy that many of the same telephone companies used the "incentives to
invest" argument successfully, first to significantly reduce competitive carriers' regulatory
rights to broadband network inputs, and then to eliminate independent ISPs' regulatory
rights to nondiscriminatory network access. One can posit whether the mere fact that such
threats can be made-and apparently believed--confirms the fact that there are few if any
competitive broadband alternatives available. As Schumpeter points out repeatedly, robust
competition normally creates its own healthy incentives to invest. See ATKINSON, THE ROLE
OF COMPETITION IN A NATIONAL BROADBAND POLICY, supra note 67, at 7 (citing JOSEPH
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942)).
249 See Yoo, supra note 246, at 203. One response is to ask why this two-sided market is
not divided as between the consumer and end user fees, and the Internet backbone provider
and peering or transiting fees. One also could argue that establishing a private relationship
between the broadband provider and a third party changes the unique nature of the Net it-
self. Perhaps one answer is that the best efforts public Internet-however defined--is a one-
sided market, while private networks are two-sided markets.
250 See Nachbar, supra note 64, at 120, 123 (discussing network neutrality proponents'
arguments that prioritization will harm competition and stifle innovation).
251 Moreover, broadband providers who can define the economic and technical arrange-
ments for reaching its users are "unlikely to optimize for the unexpected and uncertain bene-
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The broadband providers assume a gatekeeper role, picking those who will
succeed and fail based solely on what they pay.
A second argument made by proponents of network neutrality against priori-
tization is that the ability to get paid to prioritize certain traffic also threatens to
undermine the incentive to invest in expanding overall broadband capacity.252
By definition one cannot have a fast lane without a slow lane. Once prioritiza-
tion becomes a profit center for the broadband provider, that provider has less
incentive to eliminate the capacity constraints that justify QoS fees to custom-
ers. Relying on QoS for a return on investment thus can deter broadband pro-
viders from building bigger, faster, ubiquitous broadband pipes. Prioritization
quickly can become an unspoken rationale to maintain artificial broadband
scarcity. The resulting market structure also would be inconsistent with an en-
vironment of innovation without permission that has fostered so much of the
Internet's success.
Some believe the broadband market is robustly competitive, with private in-
vestment of literally hundreds of billions of dollars. 53 If true, this level of in-
vestment suggests that there is no need for subsidies, and further, no need for
prioritization to support infrastructure investment. On the other hand, it is also
unclear whether a ban on paid prioritization pushes the broadband providers'
incentives to deploy infrastructure "below a socially efficient level." '254 A fur-
ther argument is that "[u]ltimately, the level of profits needed to guarantee ef-
ficiency incentives is unknown, making it difficult to assess the extent of the
problem.""25
Non-prioritized broadband connections actually may create their own en-
hanced incentives to invest in broadband facilities. For example, a recent
econometric study found that cable and telephone companies providing broad-
band services are more likely to further develop their infrastructure-resulting
in higher data speeds-if they do not charge Web-based content companies for
preferential treatment.256 Another study concludes that non-neutral networks
fits of new market entrants." Werbach, Only Connect, supra note 247, at 1275.
252 See Nachbar, supra note 64, at 120.
253 See JEFFREY A. EISENACH, BROADBAND POLICY: DOES THE U.S. HAVE IT RIGHT AFTER
ALL? 1 (2008), http://www.itif.org/files/EisenachUSbroadbandpolicy.pdf (stating that
broadband providers invest tens of billions of dollars annually).
254 Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 129, at 420.
255 Id. at 421.
256 HsING KENNETH CHENG, SUBHAJYOTI BANDYOPADHYAY & HONG Guo, THE DEBATE
ON NET NEUTRALITY: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 30 (2007), available at
http://www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/thedebatenonetneutrality.pdf. As the au-
thors concluded, based on detailed economic analysis, "the incentive for the broadband ser-
vice provider to expand under net neutrality is unambiguously higher than under the no net
neutrality regime." Id. Obviously this outcome "goes against the assertion of the broadband
service providers that under net neutrality, they have limited incentive to expand." Id. Cer-
tainly the fact that Verizon has pursued its expensive investment in fiber-to-the-home net-
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are not a prerequisite to the promotion of network infrastructure investment,
but instead "will ultimately stifle the creation of a rich competitive eco-system
consisting of both infrastructure and downstream service/content providers. 257
That same study explains that end users are more satisfied in a neutral Internet
access environment, due to the inherent market uncertainty created by the In-
ternet.2 58 Further, if the broadband provider must rely on the public Internet to
reach consumers like everyone else, that provider may be more likely to want
to ensure that network capacity is built-out more quickly to accommodate its
own service offerings.
Finally, above and beyond the need for some form of network management,
broadband providers argue that they need the flexibility to create network-
based innovations and pro-consumer offerings.259 This is a valid point and
should not be discounted. Government's proper place is not to throttle innova-
tion, whether at the edge or in the core of the network. The key question is
whether there are prioritization deals between network owners and application
providers that do not undermine investment incentives in broadband capacity,
and still promote robust and open Internet access."6 Certainly the possibility
should not be dismissed outright, although the bar would appear to be set
rather high.26' Regardless, these kinds of highly technical and nuanced engi-
neering issues suggest that detailed prospective regulation of market behavior
may not be the best course of action.262
works, even without third-party prioritization deals, lends additional support to this view.
257 Mark Gaynor & Scott Bradner, Statistical Framework to Value Network Neutrality,
17 MEDIAL. & POL'Y 24, 24 (2007).
258 Id. at 26, 28 ("Market uncertainty is the inability of service and content providers to
predict what users will like and how users value the features of a service or the selection of
content. This uncertainty exists partly because users often don't know what they want until
they see it.").
259 See Yoo, supra note 246, at 217.
260 For example, Atkinson and Weiser suggest a standard that requires the broadband
provider to convincingly justify that any such arrangement is a pro-competition and effi-
ciency-enhancing business practice. Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 190, at 57.
261 At least one study claims that allowing broadband providers to provide paid "pre-
mium transmission" for content providers increases innovation at the network edge incents
greater infrastructure build-out, and increases subscribership. Mark A. Jamison & Janice A.
Hauge, Getting What You Pay For: Analyzing the Net Neutrality Debate 2, April 20, 2008,
http://www.cba.ufl.edu/purc/purcdocs/papers/0705_Jamisongetting what you.pdf. Nota-
bly, as the study's authors admit, the economic model includes assumptions and limitations
including: (1) the broadband provider is not also providing content; (2) the broadband pro-
vider commits to maintain "standard transmission service" speeds; (3) "lower value" content
sites have the incentive and ability to outbid "higher value" content sites for premium ser-
vice; and (4) the effects of peer-to-peer communications are not analyzed. Id. at 12-20.
Each of these assumptions appears open to challenge, which in turn may undermine the
model's efficacy.
262 As Yoo points out, for example, various broadband technologies differ widely in their
susceptibility to local congestion. Yoo, supra note 246, at 199. At least some of the techni-
20091
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
In sum, economic incentive arguments with respect to prioritization must be
considered seriously, but not just one set of arguments from one set of entities.
There are two general types of incentives involved: investing in broadband
networks generally--to support all types of applications and content, including
private networks and proprietary content, and investing in Internet access--to
support all Net-based applications and content. Further, to capture the full pic-
ture of market incentives, our worldview should include incentives to invest in
applications, content, and devices as well. The next subsection addresses an-
other facet of the incentive structure for broadband providers.
D. Favoring Managed Networks
Aside from avoiding ruinous competition, capturing externalities, and sign-
ing paid prioritization deals, broadband providers are faced with at least one
further element of their incentive structure: building private, managed net-
works to carry non-Internet traffic. These new networks hold the potential to
generate significant revenues without the feared constraints of network neutral-
ity, but do raise other pertinent policy concerns.263
This scenario is likely and already occurs in practice."6 Of course different
types of networks employ different private network revenue models. Cable
operators in the United States typically reserve more than 90% of the fre-
quency spectrum over their cable infrastructure for their own phone and televi-
sion service, "leaving only a few channels to their Internet service." '265 AT&T's
cal, and hence market, reasons to utilize prioritization to combat latency (time required to
move packets across a network) may go away at sufficiently high broadband capacities.
Nonetheless, jitter (bursting traffic competing for space in the arrival queue) remains a diffi-
cult issue, even in relatively high-capacity networks. See Douglas A. Hass, The Never-Was-
Neutral Net and Why Informed End Users Can End the Net Neutrality Debates, 22 BERKLEY
TECH. L.J. 1565, 1627 n.339 (2007).
263 This section does not address the separate but important challenge of defining "pri-
vate networks" versus the "public Internet." For example, should a definition focus on the
use of networking resources like IP addresses, or the fact that the content or applications in
question originated at some point on the Internet? Indeed, as the policy implications of pri-
vate networks become clearer, whether and how we can draw and police this line will take
on more urgency.
264 See, e.g., HughesNet, Private Networks Via Broadband Satellite,
http://business.hughesnet.com/resources/brochures/private-networks (last visited Apr. 9,
2009) (describing HughesNet's service offering as an "easy-to-deploy private network that
doesn't touch the internet" and allowing "multilevel prioritizations" so that "mission-critical
applications can be set to high priority to ensure whatever applications require the highest
priority get though all the time").
265 ANDREA RENDA, I OWN THE PIPES, YOU CALL THE TUNE: THE NET NEUTRALITY DE-




U-Verse266 shares bandwidth with its best-efforts public Internet access, 267
while Verizon employs different lasers for the Internet and its own private
network.268 The commonality is the incentive to use a considerable portion of
broadband capacity for these managed, private networks.
Business models based on prioritization can be implemented either in the
public Internet, or through separate private networks. Again, the broadband
providers' incentives are important. George Ou finds, for example, that prohib-
iting or limiting paid prioritization on the public Internet compels broadband
providers to move to a private network partition, using circuit-switching net-
works on the same physical cables. 26 9 On the other hand, one can imagine the
broadband providers prefer the public Internet, and its ready audience of bil-
lions of eyeballs, as the platform for their proprietary content and applications,
rather than relying on new service platforms. The interrelationship between the
two business models, and how public policy can affect them, should not be
discounted.
One possible way that broadband providers could institute a managed net-
work is through NGN technologies. For example, IMS is the "overlay to end
all overlays," a new network layer that creates a foundation of future service
delivery infrastructure.276 IMS essentially enables service providers to create a
"stateful network" that moves intelligence into the transport layer to support
new service functionalities. More ominously, according to one commentator,
the emerging consensus is that broadband providers could begin using IMS to
monetize certain traffic flows by "put[ting] a control layer and a cash register
over the Internet and creatively charge for it."
'27'
However one views the advent of NGN technologies like IMS, there is little
266 AT&T U-Verse is a residential interactive digital video recording and television ser-
vice. AT&T U-Verse TV, https://uma.att.com/components/VideoBasic/104297-5-AMSS-X-
DMA I-IFRAME.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
267 AT&T U-Verse, Internet Protocol Television (IPTV),
https://uma.att.com/general/1684-AMSS-X-DMAI-IFRAME.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2009).
268 Verizon, Fiber to the Premises and FiOS, supra note 38.
269 Ou, supra note 158, at 41 ("When that happens, they'll use fixed bandwidth alloca-
tion to the Internet service and the television service so . . . the bandwidth cannot be dy-
namically shifted to the Internet service and the consumer gets less Internet bandwidth.").
270 JOE MCGARVEY, IMS STATUS REPORT: A PROTRACTED ADOPTION (2008),
http://www.currentanalysis.com/m/ericsson/CurrentAnalysis-IMS.pdf (last visited Apr. 18,
2009).
271 John G. Waclawsky, IMS 101: What You Need to Know Now, Bus. COMM. REv., June
2005, 18, 23. The title of one recent Cisco white paper seems to encapsulate this darker
view: Managing "Over-the-Top " Web-Based Content and Services. See Cisco, Managing
"Over-the-Top" Web-Based Content and Services,
http://www.cisco.com/en[US/solutions/collateral/ns34 1/ns525/ns537/ns549/ns746/net-imple
menttionwhitepaper0900aecd8066427bns537Networking SolutionsWhitePaper.html
(last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
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dispute that they challenge the ability of end user devices and software to rep-
licate the network's own functionality. That challenge may only represent the
progress of better technology, which policymakers should be loathe to discour-
age, but it also may be more (or less) than that. For example, if IMS-hosted
applications servers are more efficient and better performing than servers de-
ployed to carry best-efforts Internet traffic, should we care? Perhaps if Net
servers are deliberately not upgraded, or end user Net capacity is noticeability
constrained, or all Net traffic must traverse the private network first.
Jonathan Zittrain suggests that network neutrality advocates to date gener-
ally have disregarded what he sees as blatantly non-neutral walled gardens,
consisting of "traditional and emerging appliancized services that are not open
to third-party tinkering.""27 It seems unlikely that public policy will attempt to
restrict unduly the ability of broadband providers to adopt these private net-
work models. Nonetheless, providers have concrete ways to create incentives
for consumers to shy away from the public Internet in favor of using proprie-
tary services provided over private networks. For example, providers recently
have begun experimenting with imposing bandwidth limits, download limits,
and pricing limits, such as tiered and metered pricing, ostensibly as acceptable
ways to manage congestion on their networks.273 These same practices, inad-
vertently or not, can have the effect of deterring consumer use of Internet ap-
plications and content, and concomitantly, Internet-based competitive options.
E. Locking in Mindsets
Emergence economics suggests that when analyzing a market structure,
there are other factors to consider beyond how agents respond to financial in-
centives.274 Behavioral economics and game theory show that firm managers
approach market situations with certain mindsets, based in part on levels of
trust with third parties.275 Sometimes these views are irrational, adversely af-
272 ZIrrRAN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT, supra note 100, at 181.
Because these closed services often seek to exploit the benefits of third party contributions
generated via the Internet, Zittrain suggests regulation of this "bait and switch." Id. at 183.
273 See, e.g., Grant Gross, Comcast Sets Monthly Bandwidth Limit for Customers,
PCWORLD, Aug. 2008,
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/150451/comcast sets monthly _bandwidth_
limit for customers.html
274 See generally Peter H. Huang, How Do Securities Laws Influence Affect, Happiness,
& Trust?, 3 J. Bus. L. TECH. 257, 259-60 (2008) (arguing for a cost benefit analysis in secu-
rities regulation that focuses on "measuring investors' confidence, happiness, and moods").
275 See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for
Law from Behavorial Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL.




fecting market behavior.276 Regardless, an important maxim of game theory is
to "understand the other player's perspective . . . what they know, what moti-
vates them, and even how they think about yoU. 1277 With regard to broadband-
related policy issues, perhaps each side in the debate simply is trapped within
its own cognitive biases. For some "Net heads," '278 the Internet is perfect as is,
and broadband providers should be content to serve as dumb pipes. For many
in the broadband provider camp, by contrast, the Internet is inherently imper-
fect and requires various degrees of ordering, prioritizing, and channelizing to
best serve consumer needs.
In addition, agents' responses can depend on their sense of trust in other
players in the market. One major problem separating the Net and Broadband
communities is that neither one fully trusts the other. The Net community fears
that the broadband providers are not committed to an open Net, while the
Broadband community fears that the Net community is not committed to de-
ployment of robust and multi-faceted broadband networks.279 Whether one be-
lieves these claims or not is beside the point; the issue is whether the market
agent itself is committed to that viewpoint. If the players themselves believe,
the fear-generated incentives surely will follow. For instance, if senior man-
agement at a broadband provider is convinced that any government regulation
inevitably thwarts its incentives to invest in broadband networks, that mindset
will dictate behavior, regardless of the veracity of the belief.28
Market uncertainty is a critical factor in determining the relative value of
BAOIP because providers of network-based services exhibit a high level of
uncertainty predicting "what users will like and how users value the features of
276 ARINASH K. DIxIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THE ART OF STRATEGY: A GAME THEO-
RIST'S GUIDE TO SUCCESS IN BUSINESS & LIFE 26-27 (2008) (pointing out that in many stra-
tegic interactions, the "invisible hand" of prices is unavailable to guide behavior, leading to
actions based on pride, spite, and irrationality).
277 Id. at 28.
278 "Net head" is a term used frequently to describe people who are "so passionate about
the [I]ntemet that [they] know[] how to operate almost all of the programs and uses them for
business or pleasure on a daily basis." Net Lingo, Nethead,
http://www.netlingo.com/lookup.cfm?term=Net%20head (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
279 One example of the differing perspectives between the two sides is the definition of a
"best efforts" Internet. To those who come from the Net community, that phrase tradition-
ally has meant to "do your best." However, there is concern that to those who come from the
Broadband community, that phrase may mean something like "do your least."
280 See Philip J. Weiser, Exploring Self Regulatory Strategies for Network Management,
Remarks Before the Flatirons Summit on Information Policy 11 (2008) [hereinafter Weiser,
Exploring Self Regulatory Strategies], http://www.silicon-
flatirons.org/documents/publications/summits/WeiserNetworkManagement.pdf (in the face
of "rent extracts" by broadband providers, applications providers may decline to develop
new applications; in the face of prohibitions on any new business opportunities, broadband
providers' business strategies may be constrained).
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a service or the selection of content."2 ' Another way of looking at it is that the
dynamic market forces of consumer selection and amplification are best un-
leashed in an environment where consumers have maximum flexibility to
choose. From this perspective, an open network is the best market to capture
all aspects of user demand.
There may be no easy answers to deal with these different market incen-
tives, mindsets, and trust levels. Perhaps these are merely normal responses,
symptomatic of disparate market sectors fighting for ultimate supremacy.
However, the market evidence appears to point in another direction. After all,
multiple innovation platforms ideally should feed off each other in positive
ways, creating generative spillovers in many directions.282 The broadband plat-
form both leads to the Net-which incents innovation--and acts as its own
means of innovation. The issue is whether broadband providers actually see the
world this way; as Eli Noam points out, infrastructure providers should be as
open as possible for their own good, so as to encourage the development of
new rich content. 83 In turn, different kinds and degrees of openness create dif-
ferent means for innovation.
Further, a change in mindsets could lead to the recognition by both sides that
they need each other. Paul Ormerod observes that a certain level of cooperative
behavior within a competitive industry is necessary for the overall fitness of
the industry. 84 Weiser also notes that coordination between broadband provid-
ers and Internet companies is important to the continued development of the
Internet itself.85
Of course the larger issue is whether and how to unite these two objectives.
Telecommunications industry analyst Blair Levin has described what he calls
the "value chain tug-of-war" between Internet applications and content provid-
ers, and the broadband providers.286 He claims that future years will witness an
intensified struggle between these two sides for premium returns on the eco-
281 Gaynor & Bradner, supra note 257, at 26.
282 Games don't have to have winners and losers. Some combination of commonality of
interests and conflict coexist in most games of business, politics, and social interactions.
DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 276, at 40.
283 See Webcast: Eli Noam, If Fiber is the Medium, What is the Message? Next-
Generation Content for Next-Generation Networks, available at
http://webcast.oii.ox.ac.uk/?view=Webcast&ID=20081113_267.
284 PAUL ORMEROD, WHY MOST THINGS FAIL: EVOLUTION, ExTINCTION AND ECONOMICS
234 (2005).
285 Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N.
KY. L. REV. 822, 824-25 (2001). He notes that the tools available to "enforce" such coordi-
nation include private contracts, social norms, public regulation, and self-regulatory frame-
works. Id.




nomic value generated by the Internet and its broadband on-ramps." 7 Levin
presents a compelling view of the current market, but a more optimistic sce-
nario is based on a different viewpoint, what I term "value net synergies." Here
the value is derived from a network, seen metaphorically as a pie, which grows
exponentially and synergistically for everyone's recognized benefit. Ideally
each side sees its own incentives system satisfied by the growth and success of
the other side.
In Adaptive Policymaking I explained how the policy framework should in-
vite government involvement only where necessary, and then through utilizing
the appropriate institutional and organizational overlays.8 Traditional pre-
scriptive regulation tends to lead to over-regulation in some instances, and un-
der-regulation in others. By better understanding the current fitness landscape
of the broadband industry, policymakers can focus on relevant challenges like
ruinous competition, positive externalities and spillovers, traffic prioritization,
and existing mindsets. The next part examines in more detail the potential in-
stitutional foundations to help ensure optimal broadband networks, and begins
to sketch out some ways to apply those foundations going forward.
VII. INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING OPTIMAL
BROADBAND INTERNET PLATFORMS
Previous sections of this Article laid out the several interrelated components
of the public policy design space. This part will focus on one particularly fruit-
ful area: legal institutions as the underpinnings of the government's authority
to take certain actions in the marketplace. Legal institutions have a critical role
to play in ensuring that markets can function properly by establishing the rules
of the road for market players and policymakers alike. 9 This part will examine
institutions with regard to how prior conceptions for regulating communica-
tions and transportation infrastructure can help understand which, if any, of
such rationales should survive in modem-day U.S. broadband policy. In other
words, a better understanding of past justifications for a government role hope-
fully can lead to a sounder approach to a framework for broadband law and
regulation, one that results in optimal broadband platforms.
Why should policymakers even consider subjecting broadband to any form
of government regulation? As we have seen, a proper reading of economics
287 See id.
288 See Whitt, supra note 3, at 2.
289 See generally Marion A. Layton, Is Private Securities Litigation Essential for the
Development of China's Stock Markets?, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1948, 1950-52 (2008) (suggest-
ing that strong legal institutions are a precondition to the success of large financial markets);
Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 951, 964-65
(2008) (arguing that market competition requires legal institutions, among other things).
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suggests that broadband providers, if left solely to their own designs, probably
will not produce optimal Internet platforms.29° Together, the challenges of fa-
cilities-based competition, the existence of substantial spillovers, the desire to
establish services based on prioritizing and managing network traffic, and cur-
rent industry mindsets and mistrust suggest that broadband provider motiva-
tions do not match up precisely with some important public policy objectives.
In particular there are doubts that the key dimensions of BAOIP-availability,
sufficiency, and integrity-will be fully realized without some role for gov-
emiment policy.29' As economist Daniel Bromley puts it more generally: "[f]or
public policy the pertinent question becomes, will a commitment to the present
institutional structure get us where we wish to be in the future? If the answer to
that question is not promising, then a new institutional setup is called for." '292
Broadband is infrastructure; the transportation of ideas versus the ideas
themselves. 93 So what is the institutional basis for adopting and employing a
public policy for achieving BAOIP? What is the legal or regulatory hook to
whatever remedies may or may not be employed? A proper reading of the roots
of communications and competition law, with the historic rationales for regu-
lating infrastructure, can help us with these threshold inquiries.9
A. An Introduction: The Current Legal Conundrum
Recent history is relevant to an understanding of broadband infrastructure.
Notably, at least three general broadband policy frameworks currently are util-
ized around the world. In Asia, heavy public investment appears to have led to
superior deployment and speed metrics, albeit at the risk of possible misman-
agement and waste.2" In Europe, a mixed public/private investment scheme
290 See supra Part III.B.2.
291 See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 934 (2001). Put
more generally "[t]he market is based on the idea of individual pursuit of self-interest. At
the same time, however, a market system will work best if there is a clear limit to self-
interest .... In short, the market must exist within an institutional and civic-value context
that transcends individual self-interest and encourages actions that have a wider benefit for
the common good." ROBERT H. NELSON, ECONOMICS AS RELIGION: FROM SAMUELSEN TO
CHICAGO AND BEYOND 268 (2001).
292 DANIEL W. BROMLEY, SUFFICIENT REASON, VOLITIONAL PRAGMATISM AND THE MEAN-
ING OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 13 (2006).
293 See supra Part III.A.1.
294 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 291, at 934-35 (arguing that the view that the best
way to stimulate broadband is less regulation "ignores the history that gave the Internet its
birth and threatens to reproduce the calcified network design that characterized [the] tele-
communications network prior to the Internet").
295 See OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology, and Industry, Broadband Subscrib-
ers per 100 inhabitants (June 2008) [hereinafter OECD, Broadband Subscribers per 100
Inhabitants], http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/35/39574709.xls (last visited Apr. 21, 2009);
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that includes mandated access to incumbent networks has yielded generally
good deployment figures and average speeds, 296 but mostly has been limited to
copper deployment.2 97 By contrast, in the United States, significant private in-
vestment in facilities-based competition has resulted in two parallel fixed wire
platforms, which lag comparatively on deployment and speed metrics. 98
The United States has made the fundamental choice to leave communica-
tions networks-including broadband-largely in the hands of the private sec-
tor, while subjecting the networks to certain statutory and regulatory require-
ments.2 9 This Article does not challenge that historical decision, and the path
dependency that has brought us to in this particular time and place in telecom-
munications history. Nonetheless, in the words of Kevin Werbach, "[modem]
communications policy has rarely been so muddled or uncertain.""3 ° The heart
of the issue is whether traditional communications law should be applied to
privately-owned broadband networks and how to do so. As will be seen, it is
constructive to walk through the historical path to uncover some common
themes and insights. In so doing, we may be able to begin mapping the perti-
nent learnings of the past onto the pressing issues of today.
1. The Common Law Roots
The common law is part of the historical and contingent view of life. As Al-
lan C. Hutchinson contends, it "has a present authority and significance ... in
resolving current disputes and negotiating future meanings. . . . [The past]
binds because it has its own normative force .... [T]he most appropriate use of
the legal past is ... a dynamic and expansive meditation on the underlying ra-
tionales and structure. '0'
There are several potentially pertinent candidates to serve as the legal insti-
OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology, and Industry, Average Advertised Download
Speeds by Country (Oct. 2007) [hereinafter OECD, Average Advertised Download Speeds
by Country], http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/53/39575086.xls (last visited Apr. 21, 2009);
see Hannibal Travis, Wi-Fi Everywhere: Universal Broadband Access as Antitrust and
Telecommunications Policy, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1697, 1790-94 (2006).
296 OECD, Broadband Subscribers per 100 Inhabitants, supra note 295; OECD, Average
Advertised Download Speeds by Country, supra note 295.
297 OECD, Broadband Subscribers per 100 Inhabitants, supra note 295; OECD, Average
Advertised Download Speeds by Country, supra note 295.
298 OECD, Broadband Subscribers per 100 Inhabitants, supra note 295; OECD, Average
Advertised Download Speeds by Country, supra note 295.
299 See OECD, Broadband Subscribers per 100 Inhabitants, supra note 295; OECD, Av-
erage Advertised Download Speeds by Country, supra note 295; see also Nachbar, supra
note 64, at 76 ("Many nondiscrimination obligations traditionally imposed by common law
are today controlled by statute.").
300 Werbach, Only Connect, supra note 247, at 1237.
301 ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, EVOLUTION AND THE COMMON LAW 4-5, 9 (2005).
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tutions to govern broadband networks. Most of these candidates are derived
from the common law of common carriage, which goes back some 800
years." 2 This common law grew organically, over time, as a result of concrete
cases considered individually by judicial authorities. In particular, there are
three intertwined aspects of common carriage that show up at various times
and places: the state of competition, the nature of the business, and holding
oneself out as a carrier.3 The market power component reappears later in the
context of competition law, while the nature of the business and holding out
components reappear later in statutory communications law.
Common carriage law has exisited in the English-speaking world since ap-
proximately 1250 as a part of common law and tort law.3" The term "common"
originally meant "open to public service" or "general.""3 5 As Eli Noam notes,
the notion of common carriage often is identified with several other entities
that frequently are used as synonyms such as "public utility" and "regulated
monopoly," or concepts such as "universal service obligation" or "affordable
rates."3 6 As a result, common carriage can and has meant different things at
different times to different people.0 7
In Europe, there was a lengthy list of "public callings" subject to common
carriage requirements, eventually including all sorts of tradesmen: ship owners,
innkeepers, stable keepers, bakers, brewers, cab drivers, freight carriers, ferry-
men, millers, smiths, surgeons, tailors, and wharfingers.00 By the 19th century
in the United States, common carriage obligations were applied primarily to
the infrastructure services of transportation and communications, such as dock
owners, toll bridge operators, and telegraph network operators.0 9 Later, rail-
roads were regulated in the United States under various strands of common
carriage law.3
302 See TERRENCE P. MCGARTY, THE PERSISTENCE OF COMMON CARRIAGE: CAN THE
ILECs CHARGE BY THE VALUE OF A BIT? 1, 4 (2006),
http://www.telmarc.com/Common%20Carriage%202006%2002%2015.pdf.
303 Nachbar, supra note 64, at 76.
304 MCGARTY, supra note 302, at 1; see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
165, 180(1881).
305 Noam, Beyond Liberalization, supra note 108, at 436.
306 Id.
307 See Susan Dente Ross, Bell Had a Hammer: Using the First Amendment to Beat
Down Entry Barriers, in INTERCONNECTION AND THE INTERNET: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE
1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE 259 (Gregory L Rosston &
David Ubiterman eds., 1997) (citing "unenlightening" definitions from, among other
sources, the FCC that defined common carriers as "any person engaged in rendering com-
munications services for hire to the public").
308 See Adam Candeub, Network Interconnection and Takings, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV.
369, 381 (2004); Noam, Beyond Liberalization, supra note 108, at 436; Nachbar, supra note
64, at 76-77.
309 See Nachbar, supra note 64, at 103.
310 Id. at 76, 106, 124-25.
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Authorities have found several related duties for common carriers, most
premised on an obligation to serve all customers upon reasonable request, and
on a nondiscriminatory basis."' Carriers also were held to a high duty of care
for the property entrusted to them.3n12 Even a cursory glance at the historic role
of communications technologies in United States history uncovers numerous
examples where carriers of information were utilized in a discriminatory fash-
ion, leading to government response."3 One result was Congress' adoption of
the Interstate Commerce Act and its eventual treatment of telegraph and tele-
phone companies as common carriers, who were required to accept messages
from any willing paying customer.314 Similarly AT&T's resistance to allowing
customer premises equipment ("CPE") interconnection in the 1950s and
1960s--the Hush-a-Phone and Carterfone controversies 3 3-- led to the Com-
puter Inquiry rules,3 6 and eventually the Modification of Final Judgment
311 Id. at 89, 104, 117-18.
312 Noam, Beyond Liberalization, supra note 108, 437. This obligation arguably grew out
of the common law principle of bailment or assumpsit. See Nachbar, supra note 64, at 87
n.138.
313 In 1753, for example, Benjamin Franklin was appointed to the Post Office to develop
"mail pouch" privacy protections against the prying eyes of the British. PAUL STARR, THE
CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORGfNS OF MODERN COMMUNICATION 95-96 (2004). In
1876, Western Union and the Associated Press took advantage of their respective telegraph
and press monopolies to try to tilt the U.S. presidential election towards the Republican
Party. Id. at 185-87. In that particular case, the content industry controlled the carrier. HAL
ABELSON ET AL., BLOWN TO BITS: YOUR LIFE, LIBERTY, AND HAPPINESS AFTER THE DIGITAL
EXPLOSION 314 (2008).
314 Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 309, 24 Stat. 379, sec. 7 (1887).
315 See In re Hush-A-Phone Corp. and Harry C. Tuttle, Complainants, American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co., et al., Defendants, Decision, 20 F.C.C. 391, 1-2 (Dec. 21,
1955), rev'd, Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956), on re-
mand, In re Hush-A-Phone Corp. and Harry C. Tuttle, Complainants v. American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co., et al., Defendants, Decision and Order on Remand, 22 F.C.C. 112,
3-4 (Feb. 6, 1957); In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Ser-
vice; Thomas F. Carter and Carter Electronics Corp., Dallas, Tex. (Complainants), v.
American Telephone and Telegraph Co. Associated Bell System Companies, Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co., and General Telephone of the Southwest (Defendants), Decision, 13
F.C.C.2d. 420 (June 26, 1968); see also Michael T. Hoeker, Comment, From Carterfone to
the iPhone: Consumer Choice in the Wireless Telecommunications Marketplace, 17
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 187, 191-92 (2008).
316 In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communication Services and Facilities, Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d. 267
(Mar. 10, 1971) [hereinafter First Computer Inquiry]; In re Amendment of Section 64.702
of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77
F.C.C.2d 384 (Apr. 7, 1980) [hereinafter Second Computer Inquiry]; In re Amendment of
Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry); and
Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities
Authorizations Thereof, Communications Protocols under Section 64.702 of the Commis-
sion's Rules and Regulations, Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d. 958 (May 15, 1986) [here-
inafter Third Computer Inquiry]. Collectively, the Computer Inquiry rules imposed certain
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("MFJ"), 317 all of which relied in part on the concept of nondiscriminatory ac-
cess to basic network interfaces.3 8
What most draws attention today are the reasons for government oversight
and regulation of common carriage. Over the centuries governments employed
competing and sometimes inconsistent rationales for common carriage. Early
accounts generally offer two justifications for subjecting particular enterprises
to these nondiscrimination requirements: they were "affected with the public
interest," per Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale," 9 or they were natural mo-
nopolies.32 ° Public utility law later sprang up from the confluence of develop-
ments in common carriage law; once codified in federal or state law, the con-
cept became something of a contractual relationship between public utilities
and government, based on a quid pro quo for using rights of way and other
government-derived benefits. 2' There was an inherent tradeoff between obliga-
tions and privileged, one whch many companies actively sought. For most part,
public callings were deemed undertakings to serve the public.2
Susan Crawford argues that common carriage has its roots in the law of
bailment, and the separate laws of franchise and monopoly.323 Crawford also
explains that nondiscrimination rules have been imposed on industries when
they have been "affected with the public interest," and that such "industries
usually are related to physical transportation or communications networks. 324
Tim Wu agrees that common carriage and nondiscrimination mandates histori-
cally were tied to the type of business in question, and not necessarily to the
limits on incumbent local exchange carriers seeking to enter the data processing market. See
Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, supra note 240, at 311.
317 Modification of Final Judgment, United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp.
131 (D.D.C. 1982) (No. 82-0192).
318 Barbara Cherry believes that nondiscrimination in dealing with retail customers was
the hallmark requirement in the common law, derived from the Roman law notion of inher-
ent fairness; this general concept then carried through to the statutory world of communica-
tions regulation. Barbara A. Cherry, The Political Realities of Telecommunications Policies
in the U.S.: How the Legacy of Public Utility Regulation Constrains Adoption of New Regu-
latory Models, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REv. 757, 762-63 [hereinafter Cherry, The Political
Realities of Telecommunications Policies in the U.S.].
319 SIR MATTHEw HALE, DE PORTIBUS MARIS (1670) (transportation carriers are private
businesses which are "affected with the public interest").
320 See Werbach, Only Connect, supra note 247, at 1246 n.53.
321 Cherry, The Political Realities of Telecommunications Policies in the U.S., supra note
318, at 761-62.
322 Id. at 763.
323 Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra note 52, at 8. Crawford also believes
that the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, which established the Interstate Commerce
Commission-and were themselves the basis for the Communications Act and the FCC,
respectively--brought "the label 'common carriage' without its strict liability baggage from
bailment," but still retained its central nondiscrimination obligation. Id. at 11.
324 Id. at 14.
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presence of market power.325
Kevin Werbach argues to the contrary that, while common carriage rests
primarily on a nondiscrimination approach, interconnection also has been an
important aspect at various times.3 26 Both Werbach and Noam believe the non-
discrimination aspect of common carriage should be discarded in favor of an
approach built around the interconnection of different networks.327 Noam sug-
gests that policymakers replace common carriage altogether with a new princi-
ple of neutral interconnection; a carrier could be selective in its direct custom-
ers, but if it undertakes to interconnect and accept traffic from some, it must do
the same for all.328 Werbach makes a similar plea to substitute interconnection
requirements for nondiscrimination mandates.
3 29
From this twisting history, the economic function of a common carriage re-
gime can be distilled. There appear to be three distinct components to the
common law doctrine of common carriage, each of which is stressed in differ-
ent ways at different times: the state of competition (market power); the nature
of the business (transportation or communications infrastructure); and the hold-
ing out (traditional bailment).33 ° The concept of nondiscrimination plays a vary-
325 Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in
Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 30-31 (2006). See also F.M.
Scherer, The Historical Foundations of Communications Regulation, at 2 (Harvard Kennedy
School Faculty Research Working Papers Series, RWP08-050, 2008) (asserting that at
common law "the availability of communications at modest prices was believed to foster
commerce and hence to help build national strength").
326 Werbach, Only Connect, supra note 247, at 1246. Cherry asserts that interconnection
was a later statutory addition to deal with wholesale relationships, which the common law
did not address. Cherry, The Political Realities of Telecommunications Policies in the U.S.,
supra note 318, at 762.
327 Noam, Beyond Liberalization, supra note 108, at 435. Counter-arguments by provid-
ers of communications infrastructure sound similar through the ages. As one example, Gug-
lielmo Marconi refused to "intercommunicate" with other wireless companies: "In Mar-
coni's view, since other companies did not pay for maintenance of his marine network, they
ought not to be able to use it; as others saw his policy, he was trying to create a monopoly
not just over a business, but over the use of the electromagnetic spectrum." STARR, supra
note 313, at 216.
328 Noam, Beyond Liberalization, supra note 108, at 452. This concept resembles to the
notion of bailment: once you carry for some, you must carry for all.
329 See generally Werbach, Only Connect, supra note 247 (arguing for interconnection
rules to govern modern communications networks in place of antidiscrimination rules). Tim
Wu argues somewhat differently that interconnection duties entail another form of nondis-
crimination mandate that had been imposed on AT&T since the early 20th Century. Wu,
Why Have a Telecommunications Law?, supra note 325, at 32.
330 In 1980 Professor William Jones submitted an essay to the FCC in which he dis-
cerned two general sources of common carriage law: (1) the law of bailments (for the safe
delivery of goods in the entity's possession); and (2) the law of franchises (for holders of
public franchises using public thoroughfares). While the law of bailments rested on the con-
cept of fiduciary responsibility of entities holding themselves out as a general carrier of such
goods, the law of franchises depended on the entity having special privileges to use public
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ing role in each component. The Article next will briefly survey the state of the
statutory law in the United States, and then consider each of these three com-
mon carriage prongs in hopes of matching up the right legal rules to the right
public policy concerns.
2. The Strange, Circular Fate of Title 11
Various strands of the common law of common carriage found their way
into the Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA") of 1887, which was designed to
regulate the railroad industry."' The ICA became the model for public utility
regulation in other industries as well, including communications. 32 The Com-
munications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") inherited the common carriage concepts
and the public interest standard from the ICA. 3" The statute employs a circular
definition of common carriers: those entities who perform common carriage
duties."' Key to Title II of the 1934 Act, which delineates the duties of tele-
communications carriers, is a prohibition against "unjust or unreasonable" dis-
crimination in charges or practices by such carriers.335
In the 1970s the D.C. Circuit was presented with the FCC's longstanding
view that the statute treats as common carriers those who are engaged in ren-
dering to the public communication services for hire. 36 The D.C. Circuit
agreed, in the process fashioning what has since become known as the "NA-
RUC holding out" test.3 A service is classified as common carriage because
either: (1) the statute or regulation, in furtherance of the public interest, man-
dates that the service be offered on a common carrier basis; or (2) the provider
holds itself out as providing transmission services indiscriminately to the pub-
lic. 338 In the 1970s, the category of communications providers referred to
thoroughfares (like an exclusive franchise) or monopoly power. William Jones, The Com-
mon Carrier Concept as Applied to Telecommunications: A Historical Perspective (1980),
http://www.cybertelecom.org/notes/jones.
331 An Act to Regulate Commerce, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); see Crawford, Trans-
porting Communications, supra note 52, at 11 (observing that "the ICC's job was primarily
railroad regulation").
332 James Speta, Resale Requirements and the Intersection of Antitrust and Regulated
Industries, 31 J. CORP. L. 307, 310 (2006).
333 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064.
334 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (2000).
335 § 201(b).
336 See generally Nat'i Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC (NARUC 1), 525 F.2d.
630, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1976) cert denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976); Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util.
Comm'rs v. FCC (NARUC 11), 533 F.2d. 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
337 NARUCI, 525 F.2d. at 642; see In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service,
Order on Remand, 16 F.C.C.R. 571, 8 n.20 (Dec. 26, 2000); Cybertelcom Federal Internet
Law & Policy, An Educational Project,
http://www.cybertelecom.org/notes/telecomcarrier.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2009)
338 NARUC 1, 525 F.2d. at 641-42; NARUC II, 533 F.2d at 609. Interestingly, the D.C.
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AT&T and its regional Bell Companies, the smaller independent local ex-
change carriers ("LECs"), and newer long-distance upstarts like MCI. 39 As late
as 1994, the D.C. Circuit was articulating its finding in NARUC H that "the
primary sine qua non of common carrier status is a quasi-public character,
which arises out of the undertaking to carry for all people indifferently," as
well as "customers transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing." 4°
However, this common carriage test would not hold, as Susan Crawford has
recently explained.34" '
Just a few years after the NARUC decisions, the FCC significantly altered
the regulatory conception of common carriage.342 In a 1981 order, the FCC
adopted a new test, using market power as the essential element.3 4' The agency
essentially applied the first prong of the test-public interest reasons for deem-
ing an entity to be a common carrier-in the narrowed context of existing mar-
ket power. In specifying the legal dividing line between common carriers and
private carriers, the FCC argued that the essential purpose of common carriage
is to constrain market power abuses.3" Under this revised test, traditional
common carrier duties, such as tariff approval and market entry and exit re-
quirements, were necessary only for "dominant" providers of communications
services.345 This market power rationale appears now to be the only remaining
factor in the doctrine of common carriage as enunciated by the FCC under Ti-
tle 1I of the Communications Act.346
Circuit panel dismissed the notion that the concept of common carriage is vague, observing
that "the common law definition of common carrier is sufficiently definite as not to admit of
agency discretion in the classification of operating communications entities." NARUC 1, 525
F.2d at 644.
339 NARUC I, 525 F.2d. at 634, 637, 647; see JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J.
WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY IN THE INTERNET
AGE 55-64 (2005).
340 Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1994). David Sie-
radzki and Winston Maxwell aptly point out that this two-pronged approach by the D.C.
Circuit views common as offering to serve for all, while carriage means transmitting goods
(or data) without altering its contents. David L. Sieradzki & Winston J. Maxwell, The
FCC's Network Neutrality Ruling in the Comcast Case: Towards A Consensus with Eu-
rope?, 72 COMMC'NS AND STRATEGIES 73, 78 (2008).
341 Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra note 52, at 12-13.
342 See id.
343 Id. at 12-13.
344 In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services
and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84
F.C.C.2d 445, 42 (Dec. 16, 1980) ("While this construction is not totally free from doubt.
. Congress intended to create a regulatory system to constrain the abuses market power
portends."); see Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra note 52, at 13.
345 ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 221-22 (1983).
346 See, e.g., In re Qwest Petition for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Title II
and Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to Broadband Services, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 12,262, 3 (Aug. 5, 2008).
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3. Title I: The Great Sucking Sound
Beginning in the 1960s, the FCC considered ways to separate, for regulatory
purposes, the nascent customer equipment and online data services from the
underlying communications services on which the data services relied."7 The
FCC's "Carterfone" rules, adopted in 1968 and codified in Part 68 of the
agency's rules, required that the Bell System allow independent providers of
customer premises equipment ("CPE") to interconnect with the network.348 In
1980 the FCC adopted the second of a series of decisions in the Computer In-
quiries, where the basic and enhanced service distinction was first enunci-
ated.349 Basic services were the regulated communications services provided by
common carriers, while enhanced services were the nascent data processing
services or online services provided by companies like IBM, and later EDS,
CompuServe, Prodigy, and America Online.35 The Commission's rationale for
adopting this distinction was twofold: to fence off the online world from un-
warranted carrier-style regulation; and to establish structural (and later non-
structural) separation between the two worlds, so that providers of enhanced
services had nondiscriminatory access to the underlying communications ser-
vices."' The basic and enhanced regulatory dichotomy was mirrored in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), with its definitional distinction
347 See In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter and Communication Services and Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, 11-12
(Nov. 9, 1966) (seeking comment on what regulatory obligations, if any, should be applied
to "services by which the computers and the user are given instantaneous access to each
other").
348 In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service; Thomas F.
Carter and Carter Electronics Corp., Dallas, Tex. (Complainants), v. American Telephone
and Telegraph Co., Associated Bell System Companies, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
and General Telephone Co., of the Southwest (Defendants), 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 420-24
(1968) (codified at 47 CFR 68.01 et seq. (2008)).
349 Second Computer Inquiry, supra note 316, 86-92. The FCC later relaxed the struc-
tural separation between basic and enhanced services, based on a nondiscrimination access
requirement called Comparably Efficient Interconnection ("CEI"), and an unbundling of
basic access arrangements called Open Network Architecture ("ONA"). In re Amendment
of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry);
and Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Fa-
cilities Authorizations Thereof; Communications Protocols under Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations, Report and Order, 104 F.C.C. 2d 958, 4-6 (1986).
350 Id. 93, 107 (defining communications service but refraining from offering an ex-
plicit definition for enhanced services); see In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 88 F.C.C. 2d. 50, 1 2-3 (Oct. 28, 1980) [hereinafter Computer II Memorandum
Opinion and Order]
351 See Computer 11 Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 350, 122. There
would have been no Internet-at least as we now understand it-without this prescient pol-




between telecommunications services and information services.352
It did not take long for the incumbent broadband providers to benefit di-
rectly from the FCC's application of the telecommunications/information ser-
vices distinction. In 2002, the Commission determined that cable companies
should not be treated as common carriers when they provide consumers broad-
band service conjoined with Internet access service,3" a conclusion that ulti-
mately led to the Supreme Court's Brand X decision.5 Instead, the FCC stated
that in such a situation cable companies should be regulated under what is
known as the agency's ancillary jurisdiction, pursuant to Title I of the Com-
munications Act.355 Once the Supreme Court upheld the agency's discretion to
adopt such a dichotomy,356 the Commission moved in the Wireline Broadband
Order to extend that same legal finding to telecommunications companies pro-
viding broadband service and Internet service. 53 As a result, Susan Crawford
claims, the Bell System now "is providing almost nothing but non-common-
352 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), (44). Information services are those services involving "ge-
nerating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making avail-
able information via telecommunications." § 153(20).
353 In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for
Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 7 (Mar. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem
Declaratory Ruling] ("[W]e conclude that cable modem service ... is property classified as
an interstate information service, not as a cable service ..... ); National Cable and Tele-
comm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv. (BrandX), 545 U.S. 967, 977-78 (2005).
354 See BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1000-04.
355 See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 353, 75-79; see also Rob
Frieden, What Do Pizza Delivery and Information Services Have in Common? Lessons
From Recent Judicial and Regulatory Struggles with Convergence, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 247, 276 (2006) [hereinafter Frieden, Lessons from Recent Judicial and Regu-
latory Struggles] (discussing the Commissions use of its ancillary jurisdiction over informa-
tion services for the imposition of E91 1 obligations on interconnected VolP providers).
356 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1001-03. Rob Frieden has conducted a nuanced and critical
examination of the Brand X decision. See Frieden, Lessons from Recent Judicial and Regu-
latory Struggles, supra note 355, at 252-57.
357 In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities; Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers; Review of Regulatory
Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommunications Services; Computer III
Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services;
1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Re-
quirements; Conditional Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Forbearance
Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) with Regard to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to the
Premises; Petition of the Verizion Telephone Companies for Declaratory Ruling, or Alterna-
tively, for Interim Waiver with Regard to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to the
Premises; Consumer Protection in the Broadband Era, Report and Order and Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 1 (Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband
Order]. My previous articles critique the FCC's decision at some length. See Whitt &




The FCC's rationale for adopting this new regulatory regime is that the mo-
nopoly basis for regulation no longer applies to "competitive" broadband ser-
vices.359 Although one may disagree with the Commission's assessment of the
competitive state of the broadband market, relying solely on that particular
prong of the traditional common carriage regime has important consequences.
Other potential reasons for maintaining some form of common carrier status
for broadband providers-whether as providers of communications infrastruc-
ture, as users of government resources, or as entities holding themselves out as
common carriers-were thrown out as well. With the end of the common car-
riage regime came, among other things, termination of the nondiscrimination
duty for broadband providers.
Barbara Cherry argues persuasively that the Wireline Broadband Order was
a radical departure from modem FCC precedent. Cherry explains that the deci-
sion eliminated both the traditional common law concept of nondiscrimination,
and the interconnection strand that had developed under the 1934 Act to deal
with wholesale relationships between service providers.36 Both common car-
riage and statutory interconnection were stripped away without a firm explana-
tion.3 ' As Cherry explains, "the elimination of common law principles applied
to broadband through deregulation, but without replacement by some other
legal rules to fulfill a similar function, may render the development of critical
communications infrastructures unsustainable with the desired emergent prop-
erties.'"362 In other words, the time has come to develop an understanding of the
legal institutions that can best foster BAOIP.
Unfortunately, the FCC has yet to provide a coherent and fulsome institu-
tional basis for devising public policy for broadband providers under Title I of
the Act. In its 2008 order denouncing Comcast's treatment of BitTorrent traffic
over its broadband networks, the Commission relied on seven separate provi-
sions of the Communications Act-among them Title I--to establish its legal
358 Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra note 52, at 14. This observation may
well be true for more advanced consumer-oriented services, but the incumbents still provide
basic telecommunciations services, like local exchange and interstate interexchange, on a
regulated basis.
359 See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 357, 3.
360 See Cherry, Institutional Governance for Essential Industries Complexity, supra note
86, at 8-9.
361 See Barbara A. Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality to Eliminate Common Carriage
Threatens Free Speech and the Postal System, 33 N. Ky. L. REv. 483, 497-98 (2006); Wire-
line Broadband Order, supra note 357, 12-16.
362 Cherry, Institutional Governance for Essential Industries Complexity, supra note 86,
at 9. Kimberly Claffey calls network neutrality "an understandable post-traumatic reaction
to the recent jettison of at least eight centuries of legal doctrine from our primary communi-
cations fabric." Claffey, supra note 638, at 9.
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authority to enforce the Internet Policy Statement principles."' It remains to be
seen whether the D.C. Circuit will agree with this latest effort by the Commis-
sion to redirect the statute to justify regulating providers of broadband infra-
structure. Nonetheless, the original rationale for regulating physical telecom-
munications infrastructure is essential to an understanding of the appropriate
institutions to govern broadband networks.
B. The Three Strands of Common Carriage
The three strands of common carriage-what I will term private concentra-
tion, public callings, and bailment-are further examined below. Regardless of
whether and how we decide ultimately that policymakers should impose some
form of regulation of broadband networks, we still need a cogent legal theory
for why we even care about broadband in the first place. In essence the com-
mon law has found ample reasons to impose policy mandates on communica-
tions infrastructure because it is relatively scarce, profoundly important, and
reliant on public resources. Each of these strands of scarcity, value, and pub-
licness relate in various ways to the three dimensions of BAOIP raised earlier:
availability of broadband infrastructure, sufficiency of Net capacity, and integ-
rity of Net access.3" Thus the institutions of the common law of common car-
riage offer us important building blocks for the foundation of a viable broad-
band policy under Title I.
1. Private Concentration
a. Market power in the era of broadband scarcity
Emergence economics can lead us to question both the presumption that per-
fect competition can be a stand-in for public welfare and the idea that self-
interested actors invariably arrive at an ideal equilibrium.365 As such, while
government intervention can be unwarranted simply to strike down any hint of
market power, policymakers do have a plausible role in shaping the market
environment to foster innovation and promote free expression, leading to More
Good Ideas. The agent behaviors that arise in a networked market are exceed-
ingly difficult to predict. Compared to idealized markets, agents in network
industries make decisions subject to many exceptions,366 exceptions to those
363 Comcast Order, supra note 205, 12-27.
364 See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
365 See Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 5-8.
366 See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 225, at 126-27.
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exceptions,367 and other unique dynamics.36 This suggests that policymakers
must analyze whether and how companies are subject to adequate market
forces to discipline their behavior, but not necessarily whether the market is
perfectly competitive.369
Many commenters point to concentration in the broadband market as a ra-
tionale for government intervention.37° There should be little doubt that broad-
band market concentration is significant in the United States. No less an au-
thority than the Congressional Research Service describes the current market
as a "broadband duopoly," where telephone and cable companies face little real
competition.37" ' Applying the Department of Justice guidelines for measuring
market concentration, the FCC found that the broadband market is highly con-
centrated.372 Others using these formulas to conduct their own more recent
367 van Schewick, supra note 105, at 342-63.
368 See generally Nicholas Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industries: An
Introduction 3-4 (NET Institute Working Paper No. 04-23, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=386626 (discussing unique features of networked industries includ-
ing technical standards, consideration of the relation between number of firms and social
benefits, and innovation races, among others).
369 See, e.g., James Alleman & Paul Rappoport, Regulatory Failure: Time for a New
Policy Paradigm, 60 COMM. & STRATEGIES 105, 106-12 (2005), available at
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2517 (discussing the general misapplication of competition
policy in the telecommunications industry). The authors observe that communications mar-
kets are not perfectly competitive, and thus should not be relied on to produce the results of
perfect competition. Id. at 117. Instead, they state "[a] more nuanced approach needs to be
taken which accounts for market power, the substitution of alternatives (and who controls
them), how will the dynamics play out etc. and how this will impact investment decisions."
Id. at 117-18.
370 See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion,
94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1893 (arguing that the broadband market, with the proper market de-
fined, is "too congested for vertical integration to pose a threat to competition"); CHARLES
B. GOLDFARB, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ACCESS TO BROADBAND NETWORKS 17 (2006).
371 GOLDFARB, supra note 370, at 17.
372 In re Amendment of Parts 1, 21, 73, 74 and 101 of the Commission's Rules to Facili-
tate the Provision of Fixed and Mobile Broadband Access, Educational and Other Advanced
Services in the 2150-2162 and 2500-2690 MHz Bands; Part 1 of the Commission's Rules-
Further Competitive Bidding Procedures; Amendment of Parts 21 and 74 to Enable Multi-
point Distribution Service and the Instructional Television Fixed Service Amendment of
Parts 21 and 74 to Engage in Fixed Two-Way Transmissions; Amendment of Parts 21 and
74 of the Commission's Rules With Regard to Licensing in the Multipoint Distribution Ser-
vice and in the Instructional Television Fixed Service for the gulf of Mexico, Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 6722, % 123-24
(Mar. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Fixed and Mobile Broadband Access]. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index ("HHI") is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration, which
is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then
summing the resulting numbers. United States Department of Justice, The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/hhi.htm (last visited Jan. 28,
2009). As the FCC has noted, "under the DOJ/FTC Guidelines, a market with a [HHI] ...
that exceeds 1800 is considered highly concentrated." In re Application of EchoStar Com-
munications Corporation (a Nevada Corporation), General Motors Corporation, and Hughes
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analysis have determined that regional broadband Internet markets are very
"highly concentrated." '373 Four companies-AT&T, Verizon, Comcast, and
Time Warner-control almost 70% of residential Internet access in the United
States.374
However, market share alone should not be the end of the story. One key to
any analysis of market concentration is to focus on the source of the market
power, and not just its mere existence. Does concentration stem from a suc-
cessful innovation? Does concentration occur in a market characterized by low
barriers to entry (so other would-be innovators can contest them through dif-
ferentiation) or low switching costs (so consumers and other agents can freely
exercise their evolutionary ability to select and amplify the innovations they
prefer)? 375 Or are there other reasons, such as legacy placement due to govern-
ment-derived advantages, high entry barriers, or high switching costs?376 What
is the source of the entry barriers: bandwagon effects with consumers; network
effects with other agents; cost of research; cost of physical plant? Does it re-
flect the economics of things (relative scarcity), or the economics of ideas (rel-
ative abundance), or a mix of both? 377
Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich van Hayek, both renowned economists,
stress that innovation can and does create monopolies.3 78 In a truly dynamic
market, the argument runs, monopolies attained through innovation will remain
in place only as long as the unpredictable forces of the market allow. This tem-
porary market power is the reward of innovation at the individual level, but
also creates real benefits to the entire system. 79 Indeed, some believe that the
Electronics Corporation (Delaware Corporations) Transferors; and Echostar Communica-
tions Corporation (a Delaware Corporation) Transferee, Hearing Designation Order, 17
F.C.C.R. 20,559, 134 (Oct. 9, 2002). In 2003, the FCC calculated the HHI for a variety of
broadband market scenarios; those figures ranged from 5200-6000. Fixed and Mobile
Broadband Access, supra, at 123.
373 See Bill D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutral-
ity, 59 FED. COMM. L. J. 103, 126-27 (2006) ("The typical broadband market has an HHI
roughly three times that required for a market to be considered highly concentrated.").
374 Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra note 52, at 40 n. 132.
375 ATKINSON, THE ROLE OF COMPETITION IN A NATIONAL BROADBAND POLICY, supra
note 67, at 6-7.
376 Id. at 5.
377 Id. at 3-6.
378 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF
A FREE PEOPLE 72-73 (1979); JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOC-
RACY 82-83 (3d ed. 1942); see also Thomas K. McGraw, Schumepter's Business Cycles as
Business History, 80 Bus. HIST. REv. 231, 240-41 (2006); Some get the causality of this
formula exactly backwards. See, e.g., DENNIS L. WEISMAN, ON MARKET POWER AND THE
POWER OF MARKETS: A SCHUMPETERIAN VIEW OF DYNAMIC INDUSTRIES 4 (2008),
http://www.freestatefoundation.org/images/Power-of Markets.pdf ("[H]igher market con-
centration (less competition) may give rise to higher levels of innovation.").
379 ORMEROD, supra note 284, at 232. Ormerod takes from the reality that monopolies
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dynamic efficiency and "creative destruction" of certain capitalistic systems
apply equally to broadband communications plant, with its high fixed costs and
reliance on government resources.38 However, while in principle it sounds rea-
sonable to eschew static snapshots of market concentration--the "myopic cal-
culus of 'market-share-equals-market-power,' 38' as one analyst puts
it-concentration in the broadband market has not changed appreciably in at
least the last ten years.382 Ironically, while these same commenters typically
deride the use of market concentration snapshots, they fail to appreciate the
longer view of when and how the concentration originates, and whether it is
abiding. 83
Another variable to consider in assessing the extent of market concentration
is the relative reach of whatever competition might exist. Does it come from
what could be called "shallow competition," based largely on prices and profit
margins, or from "deep competition" grounded more on new technologies and
business models? Schumpeter points to competition based on innovation as
generating "creative destruction," possessing the ability to upend incumbent
players. 84 Policymakers should tend to prefer the deeper type of market activ-
ity, which represents true transformative competition. 5
attained via innovation typically are short-term that, "[als long as the institutional rules un-
der which the system operates encourage innovation, we should not worry about market
power being exercised by individual firms, for eventually they will be undermined by the
process of competition and innovation." Id.
380 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 378, at 83-84 ("[The] process of Creative Destruction is
the essential fact about capitalism."); see also WEISMAN, supra note 378, at 4-5.
381 WEISMAN, supra note 378, at 3.
382 Herman, supra note 373, at 129 (noting that cable modem and DSL service control
94.5% of the broadband market in 1999).
383 See WEISMAN, supra note 378, at 3. Jonathan Nuechterlein makes the point that Web
companies like Microsoft and Google have greater market share than the broadband compa-
nies, and then implies that they may deserve greater scrutiny. Jonathan E. Nuechterlein,
Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute 41 (Reg-Markets Center, Working Paper No. 08-
07, 2008). This version of antitrust law is a facile one. Simply put, physics, economics, and
history matter. The broadband market is different from the search market, which is different
from the operating system market. The source of the market power, and how it is used, are
the real issues to be examined, a nuance which Nuechterlein ignores.
384 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE 22 (2002). Baumol
agrees with Schumpeter that innovation rather than price is the primary competitive dimen-
sion in a capitalist economy. Id. at 11. Joel Mokyr puts it well: "The concept of competition
... is not so much the neoclassical concept of price competition offirms in the marketplace
as it is Schumpeter's concept of competition between different techniques struggling to be
adopted ...." JOEL MOKYR, THE GIFTS OF ATHENA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE KNOWL-
EDGE ECONOMY 220 (2002).
385 Michael Katz and Howard Shelanski have written an extensive paper suggesting a
"dynamic merger policy" that attempts to resolve the potential tension between innovation
and competition. See Michael Katz & Howard Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 AN-
TITRUST L.J. 1, 14-15 (2007). Without necessarily taking a position here on the efficacy of
their specific approach, it is notable that the authors are attempting to update antitrust law to
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A third variable to consider is whether the market generates network effects.
In a network-based industry like communications, the value of the network to
each user increases with the addition of other users.386 What is the source of
various network effects of different types, and with what impacts-positive
and negative-in the market? Does the entity spring from the ideas economy
where both monopolies and innovation pressures are expected, from the physi-
cal economy, or some blend of the two?
A company's external behavior is also a key consideration.387 Dominant
market share "is only a starting point for deternining whether a competitor
possesses monopoly power." '388 For example, is the firm ultimately using its
position in a network to stifle creativity and slow the discovery of new ideas?
Finally, many scholars have written about the concept of path dependency,
which describes how specific details of history govern the unfolding course of
development.389 Path dependency is a "dynamic process whose evolution is
governed by its own history.""39 While some perceive path dependence as har-
boring the contention that markets fail--a perception that leads to dangerous
economic policy prescriptions--4he concept carries no such implication.' One
actual lesson for economic policy is to "preserv[e] open options for a longer
period than impatient market agents would wish." '392
b. No obvious future competition
Since at least 1999, "wired access technologies such as fiber and broadband
over power line ... and wireless access technologies such as Wi-Fi, WiMax
and satellite, have been promoted as would-be [broadband] competitors in the
foreseeable future." '393 However, the U.S. consumer market "is still character-
ized by a dominant-fringe model" consisting of two dominant leaders in each
accommodate the realities of the sources of usefulness of innovation.
386 See Regan, supra note 22, 477-78.
387 For example, monopoly itself is not a violation of the Sherman Act; bad acts also are
required. See United States v. Aluminium Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-31 (2nd Cir.
1945); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
388 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT viii, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/23668l .pdf.
389 See, e.g., Paul A. David, Path Dependence-A Foundational Concept for Historical
Social Science 1 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 06-08,
2007), available at http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/workp/swp06005.pdf.
390 Id.
391 See id. at 12-13.
392 Id. at 20.
393 Eun-A Park & Richard Taylor, Barriers to Entry Analysis of Broadband Multiple




local market?94 Near monopoly control manifests itself as relatively high pric-
ing and lower quality in the United States compared to countries such as South
Korea. 95 Other barriers to entry include scale economies, customer switching
costs, tying, lobbying, and brand loyalty." 6 The economic realities of deploy-
ing broadband networks also affect competitors' ability effectively to contest
new markets.
Even the Department of Justice under President Bush appears to have had
some doubt about the likelihood of future broadband competition.397 Satellite
broadband and BPL provide good examples of the lack of new competition in
the broadband market from different technologies. For instance, BPL has not
achieved much success, with only thirty-five BPL deployments as of June
2007, twenty-seven of which were "pilot or trial deployments." '398 Satellite ser-
vices are more expensive and offer lower speeds than wireline alternatives, and
as of June 2007 "less than one percent of all broadband users subscribe to sat-
ellite service." '399 It is not obvious how today's mobile wireless services can
compete with wireline competitors on price, quality, and delivery speeds.4"' In
the Department of Justice's words: "It is unclear whether wireless broadband
providers will have a substantial impact on the marketplace. New entrants may
have a limited impact due to restraints on available spectrum, limitations of the
technology, and the difficulty of competing against better-positioned incum-
bents that have first-mover and scale and scope advantages.
Perhaps most significantly, the largest national wireless high speed Internet
providers-and perhaps best-situated potential competitors-represent two
incumbents from the wireline market and two longstanding telecommunica-
tions providers. 2 The appropriate way to add up the available consumer op-
394 Id.
395 See id. at 3.
396 Id. at 7.
397 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VOICE, VIDEO, AND BROADBAND: THE CHANGING
COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE AND ITS IMPACT ON CONSUMERS 1-2 (2008),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/239284.pdf.
398 In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capabil-
ity to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate
Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Fifth
Report, 23 F.C.C.R. 9615, 23 (Mar. 19, 2008).
399 Id. at 26-28.
400 Id. at 21.
401 Id. at 88.
402 Verizon Wireless and AT&T Wireless grew out of the wireline market, while T-
Mobile and Sprint have provided wireless service since 1994 and 1987 respectively. Veri-
zon Corporate History, http://investor.verizon.com/profile/history/ (last visited Apr. 9,
2009); Milestones in AT&T, http://www.corp.att.com/history/milestones.html (last visited





tions is not by simply counting individual broadband technology platforms, but
rather independent platforms. Thus, on its face, the potential for future compe-
tition from independent platforms is not considerable.
c. Contestability: The Daunting Economics of Infrastructure
Many economists believe that potential competitors effectively can constrain
market power, making antitrust and regulatory attention largely unnecessary." 3
William Baumol advanced the theory of contestable markets in the early 1980s
as a generalization of the theory of perfectly competitive markets. 4 Because
contestable markets are competitive markets, he claimed, "a perfectly competi-
tive market is also perfectly contestable.""4 5
Baumol himself made clear that the results of the theory are of a "strictly
static and equilibrium nature," based in large part on the possibility of rapid
market entry and exit by would-be competitors.4"6 As Baumol put it: "A con-
testable market is one in which entry is absolutely free, and exit is absolutely
costless."4 7 This analysis renders a market contestable if an entrant has access
to all production techniques available to the incumbents, is not prohibited from
wooing the incumbents' customers, and entry decisions can be reversed with-
out cost.400 Importantly, "[f]irms don't actually have to enter a contestable mar-
ket to generate the classical natural price. Often, potential entry and credible
threats of entry will force the incumbents to adjust [their pricing decisions]."4 9
Conversely, if incumbents do not believe that entrants can realistically engage
in rapid and reversible entry, "potential entry does not constrain the actions of
the incumbents.""4 ' Further, the theory cannot apply properly to markets where
economies of scale are important, or sunk costs are present.4"
The broadband market does not appear to meet the fundamental criteria for
contestability. As discussed by Mo Xiao and Peter Orazem,
tory (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
403 William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Contestability: Developments Since the Book,
in STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR AND INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION at 9, 22 (D.J. Morris et al. eds.,
1986).
404 See Stephen Martin, The Theory of Contestable Markets 5 (2000), available at
http://www.mgmt.purdue.edu/faculty/smartin/aie2/contestbk.pdf.
405 Michael E. Bradley, Adam Smith's System of Natural Liberty, Competition, Con-
testability and Market Process (Oct. 12, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract =1021305.
406 Martin, supra note 404, at 9.
407 Id. at 10; see Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory
of Contestable Markets, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 111, 120 (1984).
408 See Bailey & Baumol, supra note 407, at 120-21.
409 Bradley, supra note 405, at 26-27.
410 Martin, supra note 404, at 10.
411 See id. at 24.
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"[t]elecommunications networks can be characterized by high threshold levels
of investment, which causes the existence of substantial sunk costs and a high
fixed to variable cost ratio."4 2 Broadband networks also exhibit significant
economies of scale and scope, require access to patents, rights of way, and
spectrum, and exhibit network externalities.4"3 In particular, costs generated
from installing networks, establishing billing and support systems, and acquir-
ing customers constitute substantial barriers to entry. 4 Incumbents can control
these cost-generating activities in various ways.4"'
The requirements of investing in the telecommunications industry are
unique because "they are significant and to a large extent sunk or irreversi-
ble." '416 New entrants must make substantial investments in wireline or wireless
infrastructure that may never be recovered.4 7 Would-be new entrants in par-
ticular may face barriers "because of incumbents' pre-occupation over sub-
scribers and first-mover advantages."4 8
Moreover, subsequent analysis suggests that once a market has one to three
firms, the next entrant has little effect on competitive conduct."9 As discussed
above, Atkinson also provided important work on why it may not be economi-
cally viable for a third, fourth, or fifth broadband competitor to emerge.42 °
Taken together, these observations suggest that the market alone probably
will not produce additional viable competitive broadband platforms. Nor is it
clear that policymakers should try to spur investment where the economics
dictate that multiple competing providers will undermine scale economies.
Nonetheless, it cannot be ruled out that future spectrum-based competitors,
operating at somewhat reduced costs and offering the lure of user mobility,
could alter this picture and improve the prospects for facilities-based competi-
tion in the broadband market. Even if broadband markets become contestable,
however, the likelihood of positive effects from competition is far from certain.
412 Park & Taylor, supra note 393, at 9; see Mo Xiao & Peter Orazem, Do Entry Condi-
tions Vary over Time? Entry and Competition in the Broadband Market: 1999-2003 3
(2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=895177. In the broadband market, sunk costs
are a main factor in determining whether entry occurs and how successful it can be. Id. at 3.
413 Park & Taylor, supra note 393, at 9.
414 See id. at 9-10.
415 See id.
416 Alleman & Rappoport, supra note 369, at 114.
417 See generally Park & Taylor, supra note 393, at 27 (discussing the various sunk costs
involved in deploying a broadband network).
418 Id.
419 Xiao & Orazem, supra note 357, at 3.
420 ATKINSON, THE ROLE OF COMPETITION IN A NATIONAL BROADBAND POLICY, supra




d. The Potential Inadequacy of Competition
Even assuming that broadband markets are contestable and competition
eventually emerges, there are troubling signs that the addition of several other
broadband competitors may not be sufficient to constrain undesirable business
practices in a vertically-integrated market. According to some economic ex-
perts, competition may even increase the likelihood that existing broadband
providers will exercise market power to exclude or discriminate against com-
petitors in the complementary Internet services market."'
In the Internet context, the ability of broadband network providers to ex-
clude competitors from complementary markets does not depend on a monop-
oly position in the primary market, but instead is enabled by network manage-
ment technologies. 2 According to Barbara van Schewick, a variety of excep-
tions to the "one monopoly rent" rule apply in the high-speed Internet mar-
ket." 3 These exceptions include the ability to generate "more outside revenue,"
and the desire to "preserv[e] competitive position in the primary market."424 In
the first exception, the broadband provider seeks to exclude or discourage ac-
cess to complementary products in an effort to capture higher profits by selling
directly to its consumers. 5 In the second exception, the broadband provider
seeks to preserve a competitive position in the primary market by differentiat-
ing itself through exclusive content and applications, and by degrading or
blocking competitive services that threaten to reduce the differentiation of the
provider's applications. 6 The costs of exclusion actually are diminished con-
siderably when the provider competes with at least one other network pro-
vider.4 7
Joe Farrell and Phil Weiser explored a related concept termed internalizing
421 See van Schewick, supra note 105, at 371-75. A single monopolist may refrain from
such tactics due to the so-called "one monopoly rent" rule. On the other hand, a highly com-
petitive marketplace with dozens of competitors may well discourage such behavior, as with
the initial online dial-up ISP market (bolstered by common carriage rules). Unfortunately,
neither scenario applies in the context of today's broadband market. The presence of multi-
ple competitors may be insufficient to discourage exclusion, discrimination, and other anti-
competitive behavior. See id. at 334-35, 371-75.
422 Id. at 371-72.
423 See id. at 334-35, 378-82.
424 Id. at 357, 367, 373-75.
425 Id. at 373-74.
426 See id. at 356.
427 See id. at 375. Specifically, exclusionary conduct can serve to strengthen market
power by driving competitors from the adjacent market; witness current battles over VolP
and other applications. It can also increase switching costs by making it difficult to migrate
data and hardware from one platform to another. Most importantly, discriminatory practices
rather than direct blocking can give the customer a falsely negative perception of the quality
of a rival's offering. Id. at 375-77.
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complementary efficiencies ("ICE").42 ICE emphasizes that network providers
typically benefit from an efficient complementary market. 29 In most concen-
trated markets, this reality would argue for laissez-faire vertical policies, be-
cause under ICE, the platform provider generally can be trusted to allow open
access when it is efficient to do so. However, there are several important ex-
ceptions where incumbents are likely to act in an anticompetitive or inefficient
fashion, several of which apply to some degree in the high-speed broadband
market:
* Platform monopolists may practice price discrimination on both ends of this
two-sided market. For example, a cable provider may block VolP calls made by con-
sumers in order to charge a premium on their own voice service.
* Incumbents may engage in exclusionary practices because their competitors in
the secondary market threaten the primary monopoly. Such threats are by their nature
speculative, meaning incumbents are likely to behave irrationally or inefficiently to
exclude secondary market competitors.
* Bargaining problems can discourage innovation "if the platform provider threat-






* Incumbents simply may not understand the financial benefits of ICE and behave
irrationally for a variety of reasons. Weiser and Farrell argue that "the less we can
count on a monopolist to be efficient even on its own terms, the more we should value
platform-level competition, perhaps especially diverse competition. '' 31
While non-ruinous competition brings significant benefits, the presence of
these exceptions to ICE makes it unlikely that all harmful exclusionary prac-
tices will be discouraged successfully. Specifically, the ability and incentive to
exclude rivals through discriminatory practices could have a significant impact
on application-level innovation by Web companies, leading to an overall de-
crease in social welfare.4 32 Application providers will have less confidence that
they will be able to reach customers and efficiently access the market, while
consumers will lose the network effects generated by an open Internet.433
Thus, it appears at least plausible that vertically integrated broadband com-
panies, whether in a concentrated or a more competitive space, face market
428 See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 225, at 89 (describing internalizing complementary
efficiencies as the concept that "even a monopolist has incentives to provide access to its
platform when it is efficient to do so, and to deny such access when access is inefficient").
429 See id. at 101.
430 Id. at 113.
431 Id. at 1 16.
432 van Schewick, supra note 105, at 382-89.
433 See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 225, at 116. Farrell and Weiser argue that while the
presence of the platform provider in the applications market does act as a barrier to entry for
competitive application providers, the existence of ICE should discourage the platform pro-
vider from entering the applications market. From an antitrust perspective, it is also difficult
to justify exclusionary practices simply because firms claim that they are necessary in order
to obtain more profit to build out their networks. Id. at 112-14, 119.
[Vol. 17
Evolving Broadband Policy
signals that may not lead them to embrace robust and open on-ramps to the
Internet. So we are left with something of a mixed bag: concerns about the cur-
rent and near-future state of competition, but some hope that the threat of even-
tuality of new entrants eventually may discipline the market behavior of the
incumbent broadband providers. In short, since we cannot rule out completely
such competition, institutional analysis should rule it in.
2. Public Callings
Most policymakers and scholars simply assume that scarcity-market con-
centration-is the sole rationale for regulating local telecommunications infra-
structure, including broadband networks.434 The long history of common car-
riage tells us that this is not necessarily the case. Aside from the private con-
centration concerns that are intertwined with traditional common carriage,
other legal institutional theories may be more suitable to justify common car-
riage when applied in modem day scenarios. This includes the common law
elements, here called "public callings," which go to the nature of the business,
the use of public infrastructure resources and subsidies, and certain common
law expectations.435 Taken together, these alternative but related legal doc-
trines-which roughly correspond to the public utility/franchises history of
common carriage-can constitute a completely independent justification for
regulatory oversight and enforcement. Under this alternative rationale, a
broadband provider can become subject to some form of government over-
sight, and even outright regulation, when the provider transports communica-
tions over its physical infrastructure, relies on public infrastructure inputs,
and/or utilizes public subsidies.
First, as discussed, the nature of the business has been a traditional basis for
subjecting an entity to common carriage duties.436 Industries found to be "af-
fected with the public interest ... usually are related to physical transportation
434 As one notable example of this view, Daniel Spulber and Christopher Yoo describe
the four possible rationales for regulation as natural monopoly, network economic effects
(demand side economies of scale), vertical exclusion (leveraging into competitive markets),
and ruinous/managed competition. Spulber & Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of Access to
Local Telephone Networks, supra note 219, at 57-77. While each of these elements warrants
careful consideration, and as explained above do not inevitably warrant calls for government
regulation, the other traditional common law elements of common carriage are conspicu-
ously absent from the analysis.
435 Tim Wu notes that "common-carriers were historically defined by their economic
function: the carriage of goods or information, open to the public, without substantial trans-
formation of those goods or information." Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law?,
supra note 325, at 30.
436 See Nachbar, supra note 64, at 106 n.261.
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or communications networks." '437 The primary rationale for imposing common
carriage obligations on these entities appears to be that this infrastructure is too
important as a critical input to leave solely to the market. As Patricia Longstaff
argues, "[c]ommunications assets always have been regarded as a critical re-
source for the economic, cultural, and military success of any nation." '438 To
more modem ears, Tim Wu observes that these types of common carriers are
by definition input industries, providing catalysts for other sectors.439 The busi-
ness of moving goods is in itself a social good, above and beyond any market
power concerns."
Importantly, the public interest in transportation and communications infra-
structure appears not to have arisen and taken hold just because of limited
market competition." Even where markets have been relatively competitive,
the "affected with the public interest" rationale still holds. Thomas Nachbar
believes that market power is "neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition"
for imposing nondiscriminatory access on an industry; rather, the inherently
public nature of privately owned transportation and communications net-
works-their traditional publicness-has generally justified their regulation
even without the benefit of economic reasoning."2 Under one interesting inter-
pretation, Susan Crawford finds that the critical input nature of network infra-
structure constitutes potent political symbols of a stable and successful state,
which she believes has led policymakers over the years to pay special attention
to these industries.
443
Regardless of the historical source, it seems clear that governments through-
out history universally have applied certain policy goals to communications
networks, typically in the guise of regulation.4" Longstaff classifies these as
universal access, diversity of senders and messages, competition, quality of
service, consumer protection, economic efficiency, security, and government
437 Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra note 52, at 14.
438 LONGSTAFF, supra note 88, at 187.
439 Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law?, supra note 325, at 16.
440 Kevin Werbach also observes that "network industries," such as telecommunications,
electricity, and trucking, tend to be subject to significant regulation; he cites two reasons for
this: network effects creating market trends towards monopolization, and the massive fixed-
costs of infrastructure build-out, which give attributes of natural monopoly. Kevin Werbach,
Higher Standards: Regulation in the Network Age, 22 HARV. J. L. & TECH. (forthcoming
2009) (manuscript at 8), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/5013/paper.cfm?abstractid= 1369962.
441 Nachbar, supra note 64, at 79-109; Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra
note 52, at 13-14.
442 Nachbar, supra note 64, at 61, 97-99. Nachbar also claims that it is problematic to
make the case for nondiscrimination based only on market power grounds. Id. at 115-117.
443 Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra note 52, at 16.
4" LONGSTAFF, supra note 88, at 214-21.
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revenue."5 From the discussion here, an additional public policy interest in
communications infrastructure is maximizing the positive spillovers from use
of the network, leading to-among other benefits-the creation and promulga-
tion of More Good Ideas.' In particular, transportation and communications
infrastructure, such as broadband networks, "are necessary to national competi-
tiveness, generating spillovers that are not necessarily quantifiable." 7
A second potential basis for imposing regulation on public callings relates to
the general regulatory power to condition the use of public resources. The most
obvious historic example is the railroads of the 19th century, where companies
were granted authority over public and private property through eminent do-
main and other legal institutions." 8 In the context of modem day communica-
tions networks, providers rely on rights-of-way across public property, access
to telephone poles and underground conduits, and access to spectrum held in
the public trust."9 These property rights are granted so that the larger society
can benefit from the infrastructure that will utilize those resources. It is fair to
say that modem communications networks could not exist absent access to
these public resources.
Direct Government financial support-in the form of subsidies, tax and de-
preciation incentives, and other instruments- is a third potential basis for
common carriage duties and has been used over the years to aid the deploy-
ment of infrastructure. 5 ' From this perspective, at least, no local communica-
tions network can be said to be completely "private" in nature. In any event,
445 Id.
446 See Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 129, at 423-25. Pool also finds an ele-
ment of civil liberties protection in common carrier doctrine, observing that "the law of
common carriage protects ordinary citizens in their right to communicate .... Though First
Amendment precedents are largely disregarded in common carrier law, still this one element
of civil liberties is central to that law." POOL, supra note 345, at 106.
447 Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra note 52, at 16.
448 See generally, Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the
Trust Problem, 17 HARV. L. REv. 156, 156-57, 168-69 (1903). One interesting question is to
what extent these property rights actually derived from willing buyers and sellers in the
marketplace, as opposed to property seized or made available by government fiat.
449 Thomas W. Hazlett, Cable TV Franchises as Barriers to Video Competition, 12 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 2, 41-43 (2007). As one example, in 1866 Congress included in the Post
Roads Act the authority for telegraph companies to run their lines "freely along post roads
and across public lands ... [and] to fell trees for poles on public lands gratis. To be eligible
for these privileges, the companies had to provide service like a common carrier, namely to
all comers without discrimination." POOL, supra note 345, at 95.
450 Longstaff points out that public resources historically have been devoted to transpor-
taion, energy, and communications networks precisely because they are regarded as crucial
to public welfare. LONGSTAFF, supra note 88, at 206. The most recent high profile example
is the debate over the broadband components of the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 ("ARRA"), and the resulting proceedings at the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration ("NTIA"), the Rural Utilities Service ("RUS") of the De-
partment of Agriculture, and the FCC, to disburse economic stimulus money.
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the power to impose regulation depends on the state's ability to condition the
use of public resources.45" '
A final potential basis for governmental authority over broadband commu-
nications networks comes from other areas of the common law. Jonathan Zit-
train points out that the common law recognizes obligations where certain be-
havior is consistently practiced, including: the law of adverse possession,
where open occupation of property eventually can lead to legal acquisition; the
law of prescriptive easements, where rights-of-way across property can de-
velop; and promissory estoppel, where reasonable reliance can result in a
quasi-contract between parties.452  Also, the common law provides
torts-intentional harms to another-which could be interpreted to include
intentional interference with the commercial relationship between the end-user
and its chosen provider of Internet-based content or applications.453
3. Voluntary Bailment Duties
A third and often overlooked prong of common carriage-4he doctrine of
bailment--suggests yet another way to approach concerns about the market
role of broadband providers. Bailment imposes certain obligations on entities
that "hold themselves out" as a provider of service.454 The word bailment
comes for the "French word 'bailer' which means to deliver." '455 The concept
dates back to Salic Law,456 when bailments governed "the legal ownership and
property provisions for cows wandering fields obtaining feed." '457 The notion of
bailment is that of an implied contract and implied engagement, where the car-
rier of a third party's goods is treated as an insurer responsible for the goods he
carries.458 In the case of inns, once the innkeeper hangs his sign, the implied
engagement applies. Carriers had an obligation to transport goods without
"breaking bulk," or tampering with the cargo entrusted to them, or else face
criminal liability.459 Rather than deal with cows in fields or inns by the side of
451 See WINDHAUSEN, supra note 196, at 16.
452 See ZITTRAIN, THE FuTuRE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT, supra note 100, at
183-84.
453 See id. at 184-85.
454 The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, imposes various duties on "common
carriers," defined in circular fashion as "any person engaged as a common carrier for hire."
47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2000).
455 John J. O'Brien, The Bailment Subrogation Claim,
http://www.subrogation.net/edu/edu4.doc (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
456 McGARTY, supra note 302, at I n.2. Salic Law is the codification of Frankish Law
under direction of King Clovis I in the end of the fifth century or beginning of the sixth
century. THE LAWS OF THE SALIAN FRANKS 5-8 (Katherine Fischer Drew trns., 1991).
457 MCGARTY, supra note 302, at I n.2.
458 Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra note 52, at 8-9.
459 David L. Sieradzki & Winston J. Maxwell, The FCC's Network Neutrality Ruling in
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the road, bailment today could provide an important form of legal support for
the concept of maintaining Internet access as a means of reaching and utilizing
the generative platform of the Internet.
Under one analysis, carriers have an obligation to serve all, and to do so in-
differently. A bailment-related concept would allow entities voluntarily to as-
sume a bailee role, and then to undertake certain obligations, or meet certain
expectations once that bailor-bailee relationship has been consummated.46°
These obligations imposed on the bailee include the duty to exercise due care
when handling the bailor's property. 6' If there is a question as to the bailee
executing his duties, "[t]he burden is on the bailee to show that he exercised
the degree of care required by the nature of the bailment." '462 Furthermore, a
presumption of negligence arises when a bailee fails to deliver goods "unless
he satisfactorily explains the reason for such a failure or the loss, damage, or
disappearance of the item." '463 On the other hand, "the duty to carry does not
mean that a carrier cannot refuse service, such as in circumstances of potential
damage, unreasonably high risk, or beyond a reasonable capacity."4
Rather than the more well-known common carriage duty of nondiscrimina-
tion, under bailment a broadband provider could have an obligation to meet its
customer's legitimate expectations about safe delivery of the package or pack-
ets.465 An exchange of goods can be equated to an e2e exchange of digital
packets, or the analog "payload" of expressions, information, or ideas. The
customers' expectations could be imposed unilaterally by a third party--such
as a regulatory agency-or by mutual agreement based on the terms of service
between the two contracting parties.
C. Antitrust Law: Necessary but not Sufficient
An inquiry into the appropriate institutional underpinnings to broadband in-
frastructure would be incomplete without considering antitrust law. Tradition-
the Comcast Case: Towards a Consensus with Europe?, 72 COMMC'N STRATEGIES 73, 79
(2008).
460 The common law also recognizes the concept of a "quasi-bailment," where in the
absence of an explicit agreement the existence of a mutual benefit is all that may be neces-
sary to establish a bailment for hire relationship. O'Brien, supra note 455. Generally, "most
bailments are for the mutual benefit of the parties." Id.
461 See id. This duty of care can apply, for example, to both the holding and the transport
of Internet packets by broadband providers.
462 Id.
463 Id.
464 Noam, Beyond Liberalization, supra note 108, at 438.
465 Words like "goods" and "packages" perhaps play too much in the content world, and
consequently overlook the social community role in broadband connectivity to the Net. But
if the package is seen as the packet, which obviously can carry any and all forms of informa-
tion, the analogy still can hold.
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ally, competition law seeks to ensure that buyers and sellers can interact in a
competitive market.4 The law focuses on the existence of market power, and
employs analyses to determine when and how the state or market actors should
intervene with proactive legal measures. 6 7 Typical competition analysis carried
out by the Department of Justice or Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") relies
on specific market definitions, case-by-case assessments of what makes for
anticompetitive business practice, and measurements of how much competition
is sufficient. 68
As Kingdon reminds us, categories matter, and define our way of looking at
problems.469 Some insist that the question of open broadband networks is not a
communications policy matter, but instead an antitrust law matter. Certainly
"[t]he question of who sets these powerful standards and on what basis is one
of the most important public policy questions relating to the Internet. '4 7' An-
drew Pollack adds that "the gears of the digital revolution [are] turning faster
than the wheels of justice. 471 In some cases the delay may be an acceptable
outcome as a matter of competition policy; in other cases, justice delayed is
justice denied.
Under old school economics, competition is the end state of the market's
"hidden hand" process, but without an ongoing process of rivalrous, dynamic
behavior.7 ' By contrast, emergence economics sees competition as an "evolu-
tionary hand" process in real-time, involving technological innovations used
by firms as major tools to try to gain a competitive advantage.473 Moreover,
466 David P. Cluchey, Competition in Global Markets: Who Will Police the Giants?, 21
TEMP. INT'L & CoMp. L.J. 59, 86 (2007) ("[lIt is widely accepted that bestowing benefit on
consumers by ensuring prices tending toward the marginal cost of production and by pre-
venting excessive transfers of wealth from consumers to enterprises are both important ob-
jectives of [competition law].").
467 See 15 U.S.C. §1 (2006).
468 See Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Opening Remarks at the
AEI/Brookings Joint Center Workshop on the Role of Competition Analysis in Regulatory
Decisions (May 15, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/070515uel.pdf.
469 JOHN KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 111 (2003).
470 Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward, supra note 34, at 632 (citing Craig McTaggert, A
Layered Approach to Internet Legal Analysis, 48 MCGILL L.J. 571, 586 (2003), available at
http://lawjoumal.mcgill.ca/documents/McTaggart.pdf.
471 Andrew Pollack, Debate Grows Over the Role an Operating System Plays, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 1998, at DI ("[T]he current pace of change could leave the legal system
performing surgery on a beast that evolves from one species to another on the operating
table.").
472 See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1694 (1996).




competition constitutes a means to an end: maximizing consumer welfare.474
Competition policy, in the form of antitrust litigation, played a central role
in opening the United States telecommunication market, beginning with anti-
trust suits brought in the late 1940s and culminating in the breakup of AT&T
in the early 1980s.47 However, these days the application of antitrust laws to
regulated markets arguably has become more legally suspect.476 Moreover, an-
titrust laws were written in an era when scarcity determined economic value. In
the modem networked technology world, often it is ubiquity, not scarcity, that
sets value. Laws based on traditional economic assumptions seem to work less
well when applied to new technologies.477 As a result, Paul Ormerod claims
that some conventional economists would choose to undermine market power
even if it arises from successful innovation.478 These economists would con-
tinue to seek to create a world approaching perfect competition, as traditional
theory instructs them to do.479
Regulation and antitrust are complementary methods for controlling power,
and not complete substitutes.8 Even former FTC Chairman Tim Muris noted
474 See Cluchey, supra note 466, at 86.
475 See generally United States v. Am Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 231-32 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
476 The Supreme Court made clear in the Trinko decision that even monopolies are under
no general duty to deal with others, much less deal on a non-discriminatory basis. In general
terms, FCC jurisdiction trumps antitrust actions. Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 415-16
(2004); see Credit Suisse v. Glen Billings, 551 U.S. 264 (2007). The "essential facilities"
doctrine, whereby monopolists have a duty to make their facilities available to third parties,
also remains an uncertain tenet of antitrust law. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410-11 ("We have
never recognized such a doctrine ... and we find no need to either recognize it or to repudi-
ate it here."). The recent Linkline decision casts additional doubt on "price squeeze" claims
by competitors, even where "a vertically integrated firm's wholesale price happens to be
greater than or equal to its retail price." Pacific Bell v. linkLiNE Commc'ns, 555 No. 07-
512, slip op. at 6 (Feb. 25, 2009).
477 Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 129, at 389-90. As one example, Frisch-
mann and van Schewick discount Christopher Yoo's claim that the central goal of broad-
band policy is to improve the competitiveness of the last mile. Id. at 427. While laudable,
this view appears inconsistent with the broadband market's apparent lack of potential com-
petitors, lack of contestability, and potential economic wastefulness of any subsequent in-
vestments by new entrants.
478 ORMEROD, supra note 284, at 232. There is a larger empirical point here as well: in-
truding into the market with an antitrust enforcement mandate often can interrupt the "nor-
mal" course of evolution. In the context of merger reviews, for example, it may be too much
to expect policymakers to be able to determine correctly which mergers should go forward
to best serve the market and which should be compelled to fail. In rare instances, clear and
compelling evidence of harm to innovation and economic growth may lead appropriately to
policymaker action. Otherwise, agents on all sides should be left to make their own mis-
takes, and learn their own lessons.
479 Id.
480 See Timothy J. Brennan, Essential Facilities and Trinko: Should Antitrust and Regu-
lation Be Combined?, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 133, 135 (2009).
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the limits of modem day antitrust law to remedy pertinent market power con-
cerns.481 Muris explains that antitrust law, if correctly used, should utilize the
New Institutional Economics ("NIE") approach, including "a careful, fact-
based economic analysis grounded in a thorough understanding of the relevant
institutions." '482 As Muris framed the problem: "Economics tells us that mo-
nopolies can be 'bad,' but that is the 'easy' part. How do we know when we
have a monopoly? How do we know which conduct by a monopolist is 'bad?'
Even when we know it is 'bad,' what can we do about it?" '483 Further, "modem
imperfect competition theory that fails to take [transaction cost economics]
principles into account is likely to lead to poor legal rules and remedies." '484 As
Muris reasoned, "there is a substantial risk of errors by courts deciding anti-
trust issues.485
Moreover, despite calls to transform all communications policy into compe-
tition law,486 it is not clear that antitrust law alone can achieve certain social
goals outside of overall consumer welfare. Nor is it the case that network neu-
trality is at bottom an antitrust debate only about market power and vertical
leveraging.487 Because it only focuses on harm to consumers, James DeLong
argues, "antitrust law is fairly useless" when it comes to protecting intermedi-
ate dependent producers, such as applications companies, from harm from plat-
form companies, such as broadband providers.488 Whether one agrees or not
with that characterization, it should be clear by now that antitrust law does not
adequately address the vital role of broadband as supportive infrastructure, nor
481 Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Improving the Economic Founda-
tions of Competition Policy, Remarks at the George Mason University Law Review's Win-




484 Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 95 (2002).
485 Muris, supra note 481.
486 See Jonathan E. Nuechterlein & Philip J. Weiser, First Principles for an Effective
Rewrite of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 3 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regula-
tory Studies, Working Paper No. 05-03, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssm.com.sol3/papers. cfm?abstract id=707124 ("[W]e argue that, when it sets
about to rewrite telecommunications Law, Congress should require the FCC to adhere more
closely to ... basic antitrust principles in developing the substance of its competition pol-
icy.").
487 See Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An Institu-
tional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate 24 (AEI-Brookings Joint Reg-Markets Cen-
ter, Working Paper 08-07, 2008), available at http://www.reg-
markets.org/publications/abstract.php?pid= I 257&printversion= 1.
488 James V. DeLong, Avoiding a Tech Train Wreck, THE AMERICAN, May/June 2008, at
72, 77. Barbara Cherry agrees that current network neutrality discussions over-rely on anti-
trust to address network access problems. Cherry, Analyzing the Network Neutrality Debate
Through Awareness ofAgenda Denial, supra note 210, at 590.
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the generative, emergent benefits it generates. In particular, antitrust law does
not account for the personal, social, and democratic spillover benefits of com-
munications infrastructure like broadband networks.
Indeed, no less an authority than J. Thomas Rosch, Republican commis-
sioner at the FTC, has cautioned that Internet access invokes broader public
policy goals than economic efficiency, which is the touchstone of antitrust
law. '89 More to the point: "Speaking as an antitrust litigator, I doubt that anti-
trust can address many, if any, of the problems cited by the network neutrality
proponents.""49 Rosch's keen observation is that antitrust statutes arguably do
not operate to prevent or control single firm conduct, do not address questions
of network access, and do not accommodate broader policy concerns like con-
tent diversity.49'
As we have seen, the emergent aspect of networks can create substantial real
benefits--even including transient monopolies-but only to the extent that
they take place in an open system that facilitates growth.492 This suggests the
need for a more thoughtful approach to the public interest in setting the policy
goal of More Good Ideas, and the objective of optimal broadband platforms.
That objective does not appear to be compatible with, or at least represented
adequately in, a pure antitrust regime.493
VIII. EVOLVING AND APPLYING ADAPTIVE POLICY SOLUTIONS TO
ACHIEVE OPTIMAL BROADBAND PLATFORMS
From the preceding discussion there are at least three distinct rationales for
government oversight regarding the commercial providers of broadband net-
works: private concentration, public callings, and voluntary bailment. Each
strand may lead in different directions in terms of the policy projects to be con-
sidered and the statutory underpinnings for common carriage under Title L"'
489 J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Broadband Access Policy:
The Role of Antitrust, Remarks at Broadband Policy Summit IV: Navigating the Digital
Revolution 2, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/080613broadbandaccess.pdf.
490 Id. at 6.
491 Id. at 6-10. Additionally, there are also legitimate questions whether the antitrust
laws are even available when the industry already is subject to federal regulation. See id. at
10.
492 See supra Part III.A. 1-2.
493 I do not discuss here the relative roles of the FCC and FTC in assessing and imple-
menting competition law, except to note that each agency has its own institutional strengths
and weaknesses.
494 Interestingly, we also have three components of the optimal broadband platform:
broadband infrastructure availability, Net carriage sufficiency, and Net access integrity. A
fruitful future treatment could examine whether, for example, infrastructure availability
concerns should be matched with the private concentration prong, Net carriage concerns
with public callings obligations, and Net integrity concerns with the bailment prong.
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We have also reviewed a number of plausible reasons why broadband provid-
ers, left to their own devices, would resist providing broadband as an optimal
Intetrnet platform, based on pecuniary incentives related to ruinous competi-
tion, Internet-derived economic spillovers, prioritizing Internet traffic, and
providing managed networks. The question now becomes what, if anything,
policymakers should do at this crucial juncture to utilize a mix of legal institu-
tions and policy projects to try to ensure BAOIP-and ultimately, More Good
Ideas-as the ultimate market outcome.
As with almost any policy-related situation, a straightforward silver bullet
solution does not exist to help achieve the chief objective of BAOIP. Ac-
knowledging that reality, however, simply opens the door to a variety of policy
options--ranging from the prescriptive to the adaptive--that in various ways
can lead to more optimal broadband networks. Public policy should not be pre-
sumed as a binary world of "to regulate or not to regulate." In this final part, I
will explore the range of possible policy approaches, recognizing that a careful
mix of options likely is best within the context of well-understood market con-
ditions.
A. Rummaging Around in the Toolkit: Institutional Overlays
At this point, two obvious questions arise: what are the various regulatory
mechanisms available for intervention to ensure optimal broadband Internet
platforms, and how do we weigh their relative merits? While one's policy
goals and objectives can be the same, the adaptive toolkit described earlier can
yield a very different set of proposed remedies. A toolkit does not supply an-
swers; it helps you to build or fix things.495 As I suggested in Adaptive Policy-
making, policymakers should aim to adopt a broader view that utilizes a blend
of governmental, quasi-governmental, and private actors, employing a broad
spectrum of policy options, operating under the express or implied authority of
the government.496 Institutions can be thought of as the conduits through which
public policy content flows.4 9 7 The key challenge is to blend the right propor-
tions of formality, coercion, and accountability with flexibility, adaptability,
and trust.498
495 LONGSTAFF, supra note 88, at 23 1.
496 Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 9.
497 William Kovacic, Acting Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Presentation at Silicon
Flatirons Conference, Boulder, CO (Feb. 8, 2009); see, e.g., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen.
Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 749 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (explaining that the
government establishes institutions that assist in creating public policy).
498 See Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 26. I will not address here the
many important issues concerning the right organizational structures to help carry out our
chosen policy projects. It is worth noting, however, that the FCC is well-equiped to handle
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For example, policymakers deferring to market forces in a particular situa-
tion versus formal, legally binding requirements still carry the imprimatur of
government in achieving a particular policy objective. Not just laws and regu-
lations, but other formal and informal instrumentalities, and not just govern-
ment, but third party groups-gradations and degrees of institutions and or-
ganizations-collectively can produce something called "public policy." Some
examples follow of the institutional overlays that can be applied to the specific
policy projects to be suggested in the final section. These overlays involve
choosing between government and other regulation, rules and principals, and
common carriage strands like public callings and bailment, and utilizing the
bully pulpit and social norms. When determining the extent of its reach under
Title I of the Communications Act, the Commission should consider the full
panoply of institutional overlays.
If an open Internet environment is the optimal outcome, the critical task is to
determine the appropriate legal, regulatory, and market mechanisms to achieve
that result; the means to the ends. The issue comes down to whether and how
broadband connectivity providers should be subject to incentives that effec-
tively steer those providers to adopt Internet-friendly business practices.
1. Government Regulation Versus Other Regulation
The most fundamental institutional and organizational overlay goes to the
appropriate role of the State, versus market or industry-centered bodies. Al-
though either co-regulation or self-regulation can be a more efficient and flexi-
ble way to manage public policy concerns, such forms also risk the appearance
or actuality of industry players avoiding government compliance and enforce-
ment.4 Of course, the question remains whether broadband providers can or
should be constrained by either regulatory model.
The stronger version of the two is co-regulation, where the government and
the private sector each carve out a specific role for themselves. By contrast,
self-regulation involves industry doing one or more of the government's tradi-
the industries that held sway before the age of digital convergence-broadcasters, telephone
companies, cable companies-but, conversely, is poorly equipped to take on the more
modular market environment spawned by the Internet. One suggested approach is to elimi-
nate the existing industry silos represented by the Wireline Competition Bureau, the Wire-
less Bureau, and the Media Bureau, and replace them with a more layered organizational
scheme that employs monikers like the Bureau of Communications Infrastructure for lower
layer activities, the Bureau of Network Connectivity for wholesale activities, and the Bureau
of User Empowerment for retail activities. I have suggested elsewhere several other ways
for the FCC to structure itself to elevate pro-innovation policies. Id. at 51-52.




tional functions-legislation, enforcement, or adjudication."° Phil Weiser, for
example, argues that the industry should organize a self-regulating organiza-
tion ("SRO") to handle broadband network management issues."' Existing
self-regulation models in the communications field include amateur radio ser-
vice and spectrum frequency coordinator. 2 For example, Ofcom, the British
telecommunications regulator, recently undertook a comprehensive survey of
when and how to employ co-regulation. 3 Just as the Network Reliability and
Interoperability Council ("NRIC") serves as an advisory council to the FCC,
the Broadband Stakeholder Group was created as a third-party enforcement
mechanism in the UK. 4 Independent third-party regulators created and exe-
cuted by companies themselves can be a powerful co-regulation mecha-
nism--in this case to set up broadband industry standards, designed by compa-
nies themselves, which encourage the industry to aspire to certain policy objec-
tives.
In the right context, self-regulation can be an effective tool. The claimed
benefits include greater efficiency, flexibility, incentives to comply, and cost
savings; as compared to government regulation.5 Conversely, claimed costs
include industry subversion of the process, inadequate enforcement and sanc-
tions, lack of compliance, and anti-competitive conduct by bad actors. 6 The
success of self-regulation depends on industry incentives and expertise, the
ability to audit activities, objective standards, a fair process, and public partici-
pation. 7
500 See Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 23.
501 Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, supra note 240, at 298 (an SRO
should be charged with interpreting and enforcing "reasonable network management" stan-
dard); see Weiser, Exploring Self Regulatory Strategies, supra note 280, at 33.
502 Weiser, Self Regulatory Strategies, supra note 280, at 4.
503 OFFICE OF COMMC'NS (OFCOM), CONSULTATION, INITIAL ASSESSMENTS OF WHEN TO
ADOPT SELF- OR CO-REGULATION 1.1-1.9 (Mar. 27, 2008), available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/coregulation/condoc.pdf.
504 NETWORK RELIABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL, CHARTER OF THE NETWORK
RELIABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL (2004),
http://www.nric.org/charter-vii/NRICVIICharter_FINALAmended_2004_3 12 04.pdf;
Broadband Stakeholder Group, What is the BSG?,
http://www.broadbanduk.org/content/view/236/7/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
505 See Campbell, supra note 499, at 715-17.
506 Id. at 717-19.
507 Id. at 757-61. Similarly Kyle Dixon and Ray Gifford discuss the "private trust sys-
tems," which include ongoing industry consortia, standard-setting organizations, and other
entities designed to build trust among typically antagonistic parties for their mutual benefit,
and to create a framework to channel business tensions productively and predictably, even
as compared to public regulation. Kyle Dixon & Ray Gifford, Complementing Advocacy
with Private Trust Systems and Other Long-Term Collaboration, CONVERGENCE COMPASS,





2. Rules Versus Principles
The next fundamental dichotomy is between a legislative (rules) approach
and an adjudicatory (principles) approach. In a traditional rules-based system,
lawmakers and regulators seek to prescribe in varying degrees of detail what
individuals and entities must or must not do to meet certain obligations. 8
Many politicians and regulators appear to prefer relying on what Phil Weiser
terms "the call of the categorical rule,"5 9 because often it is deemed simpler to
make and to enforce prescriptive regulations.
By contrast, in a principles-based system, regulators worry less about defin-
ing the specifics in advance and instead evaluate entities' behavior according
to broader, less rigorously defined standards of conduct.50 A principles-based
system provides companies more leeway in devising and implementing busi-
ness plans, and also grants regulators more leeway in judging whether, for ex-
ample, a company is acting in the best interests of shareholders and consumers.
Because of the greater degree of flexibility in the application of principles, in-
cumbent companies generally prefer them to rules since they can adapt more
readily to the business on a case-by-case basis without state interference.
However, coercion can be difficult to exercise without regulation to back it
up. While more flexible than ex post regulations, principles may not carry the
same coercive effect. For example, in August 2008, the FCC decided that
Comcast's traffic-shaping techniques violated net neutrality principles."' How-
ever, Comcast disputes that the FCC has the requisite legal authority to take
enforcement action pursuant to the principles. The enforceability of the FCC's
principles is an open legal question that should be decided on appeal.
The temporal distinction between ex ante and ex post regulation is a further
decision point. Many commenters suggest that a principles-based approach
would match up well with an adjudicatory process, premised on a case-by-case
analysis of the relevant facts. Interestingly, this approach largely mirrors the
common law process of deciding controversies.5 2 Rather than a single standard
set by a policymaker for an indefinite period of time, judges in the common
law process render decisions which form governing precedent in an accretive,
organic fashion. Perhaps this joining of relevant common law principles and
common law processes can provide the best institutional approach in a dy-
508 See INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 64 (2006)
[hereinafter INTERIM REPORT], available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/I1.30CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf.
509 Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, supra note 240, at 311.
510 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 508, at 8.
511 Comcast Order, supra note 205, at 1.
512 See, e.g., Jonathan Sallet, "New Product At Every Stage"-The Application of
Common-Law Reasoning in an Age of Innovation 1-3 (Jan. 5, 2009) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://fcc-reform.org/sites/fcc-reform.org/files/sallet-20090105.pdf.
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namic and unpredictable market space.
3. Public Callings and Bailment
As previously established, private concentration constitutes one of the tradi-
tional prongs in the common carriage test."' Where it is not entirely clear that
concerns about market power alone should be the basis for government over-
sight and regulation, policymakers have the option of looking to the alternative
prongs of what I have termed public callings and voluntary bailment as poten-
tial institutional overlays. In other words, even where broadband is not particu-
larly scarce, it is still vitally important infrastructure reliant on public re-
sources-a public calling. The deliberate physical movement of atoms (trans-
portation) and electrons (communications) is crucial to all aspects of human
life, including but certainly not limited to commerce. Broadband shows every
sign of occupying a similar central place in our society.
Similarly, once a company takes it upon itself to provide best efforts Internet
access to consumers, one can argue that it has entered into a quasi-bailment
relationship with both the end user customer and the content or application
provider. Under common law, that relationship triggers an obligation to deliver
the goods--here, Internet packets-without harming the contents." 4 Indeed,
"[i]f you want to put a computer-or a cell phone or a refrigerator-on the
network, you have to agree to the agreement that is the Internet.' '515 This could
be seen as an Internet carriage obligation. Bailment is one example of using a
different institutional form to provide the legal underpinning for policy to-
wards broadband providers; it offers a more flexible common law standard that
relies not on nondiscrimination, but a certain duty of care for voluntarily pro-
viding Internet access. Preserving e2e, rather than preserving nondiscrimina-
tion, also can be a more precise technical concept for policymakers to under-
stand.
Of course, one potential downside under an e2e bailment approach is that
broadband providers simply decide not to carry Internet traffic. Policymakers'
calculated bet would be that the Internet now has grown too popular for the
carriers to cease providing Internet access. This may or may not be the case.
There are signs that some carriers are devising a new form of Internet, with
513 See supra Part VII.B.1.
514 Private carriers can be distinguished from common carriers by owning and control-
ling the infrastructure platform, as well as owning the traffic that carries through it. Provid-
ers of natural gas are one example of a private carrier. LONGSTAFF, supra note 88, at 75.
515 Doc Searls & David Weinberger, World of Ends: What the Internet Is and How to
Stop Mistaking It for Something Else, http://www.worldofends.com (last visited Jan. 29,
2009) (explaining that the Internet is an agreement, which is derived from the Internet Pro-
tocol: "A protocol is an agreement about how things work together").
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built-in privacy, security, and monetization schemes."' Other new features be-
ing added to so-called next generation IP networks, like Integrated Multimedia
Subsystem ("IMS"), also would allow for a more differentiated Internet ex-
perience."7 One can imagine a scenario where over time at least some carriers
may choose to provide access to their own, non-open version of the Internet.
Nonetheless, this common law bailment prong, along with the public callings
option, seems promising enough to warrant further consideration as institu-
tional overlays for achieving an optimal broadband platform.
4. Bully Pulpits
Policymakers often shape public opinion merely by speaking out. Typically
this is accomplished through speaking engagements, but can also include inter-
views, studies, workshops, hearings, consultations, and white papers-any
public forum for informally communicating a preferred market outcome.
Sometimes what a policymaker says can influence the eventual norm adopted
by the market, without actually involving the more coercive tools of govern-
ment."8 The regulatory threat implicit behind the bully pulpit can serve as a
kind of signaling function to the market." 9
In 2004, then-FCC Chairman Michael Powell announced what he called the
"Internet Four Freedoms." 2 In his stated view, these freedoms need not be
actual, enforceable regulations, but instead salutary principles that the industry
would respect. 2' Subsequently, the FCC secured a consent decree from a small
local exchange carrier, Madison River, for blocking access to Vonage, a VoIP
provider.22 The Commission then adopted its Internet Policy Statement in Sep-
516 For example, the IP Internetworking Alliance, which includes leading incumbents
like AT&T, BT, and telefonica, is developing a global IP network based on a new "IPX"
standard that will ensure quality of service and security of VolP, video over IP, and other
IP-enabled services. See, e.g., GSMA, IP INTERWORKING: UNLOCKING THE VALUE OF IP
SERVICES (2007), http://www.gsmworld.com/documents/ipi-brochure.pdf (discussing the
IPX).
517 See supra section VID; see also Werbach, Only Connect, supra note 247, at 1292-
93. IMS developers seek to make the Internet more like a private network, with improved
monetization, security, and privacy features. Id.
518 See, e.g., Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Video Games: The Oddly Familiar Terms of De-
bate About Telco Entry into the Video Services Market, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L.
1, 9-10 (2006) (discussing an article by former FCC Chairman Michael Powell regarding
network neutrality and its effect on market participants).
519 Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A User's Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH.
L. 69, 87-88 (2004).
520 Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the Indus-
try, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5, 11-12 (2004).
521 See id. (calling the principles a challenge for the industry to seek to achieve).
522 In re Madison River Communications, LLC and affliated companies, Consent De-
cree, 20 F.C.C.R 4296, 3-5 (Mar. 3, 2005). Madison River was investigated for allegedly
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tember 2005, which largely mirrored Chairman Powell's Internet freedoms. 23
Interestingly, at the time the Policy Statement was announced, the agency indi-
cated it was an unenforceable and non-binding document. 24 Aside from a dis-
pute involving the question of Comcast's "reasonable network management,"
to date there have been no major concerted attempts by wireline broadband
providers to breach the Internet Policy Statement.
One can view the subsequent network neutrality debates from 2005 through
2008 in much the same way. In the face of the threat of legislation or regula-
tion, the incumbent broadband providers may have believed themselves con-
strained in their activities, including possible third party prioritization deals or
unreasonable network management practices. The raised eyebrow-in concert
with pending legislative and regulatory vehicles--may have been sufficient at
least to this point to discipline the market behavior of the broadband providers.
5. Norms and Standards
Social control often can be achieved through social norms-informal, de-
centralized systems of consensus and cooperation-rather than through law. 25
Indeed, laws can inform norms, and vice versa.26 One scholar even argues that
"there is no sharp difference between social norms and law; rather, all rules
begin as norms of some sort, and as complexity grows some norms become
enforced as laws." '527 Nonetheless, the very real difference between a norm and
a rule is the presence of a formalized sanction enforced by the State: the "or
else" condition. 28 The force of informal constraints is derived from the beliefs
"blocking ports used for VoIP applications, thereby affecting customers' ability to use VolP
through one or more VolP service providers." Id. at 3.
523 Internet Policy Statement, supra note 357, % 4-5.
524 At the time of the Statement's adoption, then-FCC Chairman Kevin Martin explained
that its principles "do not establish rules nor are they enforceable documents." Press Re-
lease, Chairman Kevin J. Martin Comments on Commission Policy Statement (Aug. 5,
2005); see Tech Law Journal, FCC Adopts a Policy Statement Regarding Network Neutral-
ity, http://www.techlawjouranl.com/topstories/2005/20050805.asp (last visited Apr. 18,
2009) (Tom Navin, Chief of the Wireline Competition Bureau, responded to questions at a
post-meeting news conference by explaining that the policy statement includes only "princi-
ples" and "they are not enforceable").
525 Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is
the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2027, 2030 (2001).
526 See Cherry, Institutional Governance for Essential Industries Under Complexity,
supra note 86, at 13.
527 Paul H. Rubin, The State of Nature and the Evolution of Political Preferences, 3 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 50, 73 (2001).
528 See David Schwab & Elinor Oshrom, The Vital Role of Norms and Rules in Maintain-
ing Open Public and Private Economies, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VAL-
UES IN THE EcoNoMy 204, 214 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008).
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of the citizens of the State.5 29 Guilt and shame can become norm enforcement,
and in turn leaders can use those emotions to enforce norms.
As David Nye points out, the Net may be gaining its own "technological
momentum," so that at least some users are beginning to understand and expect
its basic architectural components. 3 ° Susan Crawford argues that users of In-
ternet access services believe that broadband providers fundamentally are in
the transport business in order to carry all traffic without discrimination; thus,
"the existence of a powerful, populist countervailing force" may be able to
resist the FCC's non equal-access policies.53" ' Timothy Lee similarly notes that
the "vigilance and technical skill of the online community" is enough to thwart
efforts to transform the Internet into a proprietary network, even in the absence
of government regulation. 32
This seems loigical; after all, the Net's infrastructural elements rest upon so-
cial norms embodied in those standards.533 Obviously those norms, and those
standards, are subject to change.534 In particular, the principle of end-to-end
connectivity over the "network of networks" arose in the academic communi-
ties of the 1960s and 1970s. That particular norm only managed to take hold
when the U.S. government compelled adoption of the TCP/IP protocols, man-
dated a regulated separation of conduit and content, and granted nondiscrimi-
natory network access to computer device manufacturers and dial-up online
companies. These authoritative "nudges" by the state pushed the market to
embrace a novel way of looking at networks, albeit one mirrored in earlier
regulated infrastructure such as tollbooths and telephones. It remains to be seen
whether the norm of e2e-powered openness can live on, and even flourish, ab-
sent government compulsion, in future industry-driven standards develop-
529 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 40 (1990) (describing informal constraints as "socially sanctioned forms of
behaviour" and "internally enforced standards of conduct").
530 DAVID E. NYE, TECHNOLOGY MATTERS: QUESTIONS TO LIVE WITH 210-11 (2006)
(explaining that technological momentum "acknowledges that once a system such as a rail-
road or electrical grid has been designed to certain specifications and put in place it has a
rigidity and direction that can seem deterministic to those who use them").
531 Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra note 52, at 3.
532 Timothy B. Lee, The Durable Internet: Preserving Network Neutrality Without Regu-
lation 2-3, 35-36 (Cato Institute Policy Analysis, No. 626, Nov. 12, 2008). Lee notes that
"network owners' efforts to manipulate users' online activities are far more likely to gener-
ate ill will and spur the development of workaraounds than they are to foster docile accep-
tance and higher profits." Id. at 14.
533 See, e.g., Stephen D. Crocker, How the Internet Got Its Rules, N.Y. TIMES, April 7,
2009, at A29 (a "culture of open processes" led to the development of standards and proto-
cols that became building blocks for the Internet).
534 Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management,
supra note 237, at 1007. Frischmann believes pressure to change the Net's architecture
should be resisted to protect it as an information commons. Id. at 1008.
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ment."' With these possible institutional overlays established, the specific de-
cision points between an adaptive and prescriptive framework now can be ex-
amined.
B. Two Possible Stances: The Prescriptive and the Adaptive
1. Silver Bullets and "Hodge-Podge Solutions"
Without perfect answers, or even perfect questions, policymakers, consum-
ers, and market participants must live in Jonathan Zittrain's world of "hodge-
podge solutions."'36 As Zittrain puts it, "silver bullets belong to the realm of the
appliance." '37 The familiar toolkits for handling problems are not particularly
well suited to maintaining generativity, as most regulatory interventions are
either under- or over-inclusive.'38 The challenge is to generate market incen-
tives for the three dimensions of BAOIP. Is putting the government in a regu-
lating posture necessary in those instances, or can some other mix of institu-
tions and organizations achieve a better end result?
In Adaptive Policymaking, it was accepted for purposes of argument that
line drawing between tampering and tinkering in the communications sector
generally is appropriate, primarily because the overall market arguably can be
susceptible to competitive forces of varying reach and effectiveness.'39 The
paper also accepted as given the path dependency in the United States that has
led us to private ownership of broadband pipes to the home. 4 These earlier
concessions aside, the evidence to date seems to support the view that last-mile
broadband networks operate in a relatively concentrated market, lack signifi-
cant contestability, and rely on infrastructure that is economically inefficient
and even harmful to replicate. Nonetheless, in this last part the range of possi-
ble tampering options--such as structural separation, large-scale subsidy sys-
tems, and blanket, detailed nondiscrimination mandates-will be set aside for
now, in favor of a more searching examination of some salutary tinkering al-
ternatives.
I have argued that, on balance, some form of robust or sufficient Net car-
535 Kevin Werbach has argued persuasively that the FCC should rely less on traditional
regulations in favor of industry standards, derived (in the example of broadband network
management) through a certified industry body that meets threshold procedural criteria.
Werbach, Higher Standards, supra note 535, at 49.
536 ZITTRAiN, THE FuTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT, supra note 100, at 152.
537 Id.
538 Id. at 150 (using "banning the creation or distribution of harmful code" as an example
of under- or over-inclusiveness).
539 See Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 31.
540 Id. at 65, 67.
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riage and open or integral Net access are appropriate dimensions for govern-
ment to seek to protect in the broadband space. The basis for state involvement
rests in part on the market concentration concerns articulated above, but also
for the unique public calling of communications infrastructure, for the use of
public resources, and for the voluntary agreement to carry Internet traffic for
one's customers. However, these weighty considerations should be balanced
against the desire not to tamper unnecessarily with market-based solutions, and
the need for greater availability of broadband infrastructure platforms and in-
novative business models. The challenge, then, is to properly align the eco-
nomic and non-economic incentives on both sides, so that all important inter-
ests can be served.
2. Adapting Over Prescribing
In Adaptive Policymaking, projects were defined as the proposed specific
policy remedies, which in turn become market inputs, whether direct or indi-
rect." ' Generally speaking, there are two ways that policymakers can devise
and implement policy projects: the prescriptive and the adaptive. 42 These cate-
gories naturally are not absolutes; they tend to bleed one into the other. None-
theless, for purposes of a rough analysis, they will do.
What I call here the "prescriptive stance" would use direct government in-
tervention in the broadband market, premised on a certain theory of market
failure and a certain faith in government's effectiveness. By contrast, the
"adaptive stance" seeks to explore a range of options, including indirect eco-
nomic incentives, which fall short of direct regulation of broadband providers'
behavior. The end goal is the same--disciplining the market behavior of
broadband providers-but the means can be markedly different, depending on
both the policy project itself and the institutional overlay employed.
The prescriptive stance to optimal broadband Internet platforms could lead
to several different policy prescriptions. One assumption is that substantial
structural mandates or subsidy flows are necessary to constrain or enhance var-
ious forms of market behavior. Examples include structural separation,543 and
government outlays for all-fiber networks.5"
For example, Susan Crawford has called for structural separation of the
541 Id. at 77-78.
542 See supra Part VI.
543 See Joseph Farrell & Phillip J. Weiser, Molecularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulations in the Internet Age,
17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 85, 122 (2003).
544 Discussion of various prescriptive and adaptive policy proposals related to using
spectrum as way to create or bolster wireless broadband networks deserve its own detailed
analysis that is beyond the scope of this Article.
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broadband providers by unbundling last-mile facilities for nondiscriminatory
use by third parties.45 Under this proposal, the transport network would be
physically separate from the services and carried content.5" Crawford con-
cludes that "[t]he risks of letting private regional monopolies control access to
the idea-generation facilities of the human communications layer of the Inter-
net are far greater than the risks of getting government involved in ensuring
divestiture." '547 Indeed, based on the British Telecom ("BT") experience, 48
there is some evidence to suggest that structural separation not only benefits
competing carriers and ISPs, but also provides greater return to shareholders
than a unified broadband platform. 49
EDUCAUSE, a non-profit group seeking to advance higher education
through technology,5 sees the same market failure, but provides a different
remedy. Its plan would rely on large-scale subsidy systems to build fiber facili-
ties to every home in America.5 ' Using a new universal broadband fund, this
plan would foster consumer fiber connectivity of 100 Mbps, at a total cost of
some $97 billion. 52 The EDUCAUSE proposal assumes that the market is in-
sufficient to provide universal connectivity. 53
Whether based on significant structural changes or significant subsidy flows,
these two approaches assume the worst about the current broadband market,
and rely instead on optimistic assumptions about the efficacy of the coercive
power of government. The thinking underlying both proposals ultimately may
be correct about the failure of the market to deliver optimal broadband Internet
platforms. The question for now is whether the proposals are premature. On
the market analysis side, assumptions about the inability of potential competi-
tion to take hold and discipline the incumbents' market behavior may not be
545 Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra note 52, at 61-62; see Crawford,
The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, supra note 119, 407 (stating that gov-
ernment should "act decisively to separate control over transport from control over provi-
sion from communications").
546 Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra note 52, at 67.
547 Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, supra note 119, at
406.
548 See Press Release, Ofcom Accepts Undertakings from Board of BT Group Plc on
Operational Separation, I (Sept. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media/news/2005/09/nr_20050922 (announcing the structural
separation scheme agreed to by BT and Ofcom whereby BT may only offer wholesale ser-
vices through a structurally separate entity called Openreach).
549 See, e.g., David Braue, Weighing the Price of Separation, ZDNET AUSTRALIA, Sept.
28, 2008, http://m.zdnet.com.au/339292277.htm (analyzing BT's steady pattern of growth
since separation).
550 See About EDUCAUSE, http://www.educause.edu/about/16006 (last visited Jan. 29,
2009).
'5' WINDHAUSEN, supra note 196, at 69-76.
552 Id. at 73.
553 See id. at 66-67.
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accurate. In particular, spectrum-based broadband from independent platforms
such as Clearwire, or new wireless ventures utilizing the TV "white spaces,"
may pose enough of a potential competitive threat that it may be prudent to
defer the assumption that consumer broadband is a natural monopoly. This
means, among other things, declining to act based only on the scarcity prong of
common carriage.
As explained previously, government officials must take considerable care
in fashioning policy, given the realities of a complex and dynamic market, and
the inevitable cognitive constraints of even the best-intentioned policymaker 54
In this particular case, I see four specific risks in proceeding with prescriptive
policy projects-such as structural separation mandates, or massive subsidy
schemes-intended to protect and promote the physical broadband dimension
of avalaibility of infrastructure, and the virtual broadband dimensions of suffi-
ciency of Net carriage and integrity of Net access. Each of these concerns is
premised on the FCC's current organizational and institutional challenges.
First, there is the risk of over-regulating the broadband providers. Paul
Budde warns for example that some potential forms of network neutrality leg-
islation "would cripple ISPs' ability to manage their costs, customize their of-
ferings, and deal with usage that violates their terms of service." '555 Most struc-
tural remedies, for example, will require government involvement in separating
wholesale and retail functions, setting wholesale rates, and establishing net-
work interfaces-activities normally left to the market.
Second, there is the opposite risk of under-regulating the broadband provid-
ers. Simply put, there is no plausible way to account ahead of time for all de-
sirable and undesirable behavior by incumbent broadband providers. 56 From
the necessity to draw lines, the FCC may end up with a less effective regula-
tory solution. Paul Kouroupas insists, for example, that having extensive rules
in place for the FCC to consider Comcast's treatment of BitTorrent actually
would have required a lengthier process, and real risks of regulatory capture by
the incumbent, as opposed to the final outcome.557
Third, there is the risk of mission creep, where those at the FCC and other
554 Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 18-19.
555 PAUL BUDDE, BIG-THINK STRATEGIES: OPEN AcCESS 11 (2009),
http://www.buddle.com.au/presentations/content/2009_BigThink_-_OAP_-
-Public Copy.pdf.
556 Kevin Werbach observes that any anti-discrimination rule inevitably will involve
behavioral determinations and engineering tradeoffs that are nearly impossible for policy-
makers and others to assess correctly in the current technological and market environment.
Werbach, Only Connect, supra note 247, at 1277-78.
557 Paul Kouroupas, Vice President, Global Crossing Ltd., Process over Substance: Why
Regulatory Process Is More Important than Substantive Regulatory Decisions, Presented to




regulatory bodies may have the irresistible temptation to expand their jurisdic-
tion over Internet activities. As Lee states: "once the FCC has gotten comfort-
able in its role as Internet neutrality cop, it might seek expanded authority to
regulate the 'neutrality' of search engines, operating systems, middleware plat-
forms, e-commerce services, and the like."5 8 As just one example, the FCC's
recent Comcast Order includes a raft of legislative provisions which the
agency claims grants it the authority to regulate the network management prac-
tices of ISPs such as Comcast 59 Some of those same provisions could be cited
(wrongly, in my view) as the basis to assert jurisdiction over purely Internet-
based activities, and providers of Internet content and applications. Already we
have seen this story play out in the VoIP context. Of course the Commission
created this very situation by rejecting Title I regulation of broadband net-
works, and relying instead on the legally tenuous, yet temptingly blank slate
nature, of Title I.
Finally, and underlying it all, we lack sufficient knowledge at the present
time to move confidently in any certain direction. Our policy apparatus to date
has not provided us solid data about broadband deployment and uptake, or
sound analysis of market conditions, or good theories about broadband as
unique physical infrastructure. While attractive on the surface, the massive
subsidy approach would assume that only government-directed fiber builds
will help us achieve BAOIP. That may well be true, but the price of being
wrong is substantial. The concept of path dependency tells us that initial
choices in establishing and enforcing public policy matter enormously. The
major gaps in our present understanding point to regulatory caution, and thus
away from the prescriptive stance. 6
One obvious problem is that we must take the market and policy realms as
they exist today, warts and all. Tempting as it might be simply to roll back the
hands of time and re-establish the prior regulatory regime, we should resist that
temptation. Recent history has bequeathed us a legacy we cannot simply
erase. " ' Instead, we should use this opportunity carefully to sort through what
558 Timothy Lee, The Durable Internet: Preserving Network Neutrality Witout Regula-
tion 31 (2008), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-626.pdf.
559 Comcast Order, supra note 205, at 12, 13, 15-21.
560 Interestingly, each of these regulation risks correlates to the network layers model,
and the danger of crafting, implementing, and enforcing rules that are not well tailored to
deal with the offending practice. Professor Lawrence Solum suggested an approach based
on "respect[ing] the integrity of the layers, which calls on policymakers not to adopt legal
regulations ... that violate the integrity of the [layered nature of Internet architecture], ab-
sent a compelling regulatory interest and consideration of layer-respecting alternatives."
Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward, supra note 34, at 625.
561 Using the fitness landscape metaphor, we are "locked in" at a certain fitness level,
and can find no uphill path from our current location. See Volker Schneider & Johannes M.
Bauer, Governance: Prospects of Complexity Theory in Revisiting System Theory, Pre-
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is useful and what is not to achieve our objective of BAOIP. One can be fully
in favor of that objective, and yet be cautious and even skeptical about relying
on full-blown structural mandates to achieve that policy objective.
For now, and for purposes of this analysis, I will accept the notion that these
risks outweigh the benefits of moving immediately to a prescriptive stance for
the broadband market. As a result, we should hesitate to adopt full structural or
subsidy solutions via the prescriptive stance, and instead look for still-
useful Adaptive stance options that work within the structure of the existing
marketplace,562 at least unless and until the benefits can be demonstrated to
clearly outweigh the costs. Perhaps this concedes too much to the "way things
are," but one must be realistic about political markets as well as economic
ones. The inevitable risk of under-regulation or over-regulation, the likelihood
of mission creep, and the paucity of relevant data, all should weigh heavily in
that balance. 63 Moreover, it makes sense to try the less prescriptive first, before
resorting to more dictating measures.
Some might argue that another example of a prescriptive approach is codify-
ing a straightforward ban---sweeping in breadth, specific in detail--on all non-
neutral handling of customer online traffic by broadband providers. The upside
to such an approach is that it would spell out clearly the acceptable and unac-
ceptable behavior by broadband providers, giving a useful degree of up-front
certainty to all players. The downside is that this solution almost inevitably
will be both over- and under-inclusive in its reach, depending on the particular
regulatory element. In particular, the role of politics-the political market--
cannot be minimized. Congress develops and adopts statutory language, the
FCC interprets, implements, and enforces the language, and the courts review
it."6 At any point in this process, the mix of organizations will produce com-
promise, some on better terms than others, depending on one's viewpoint. 65
Moreover, because it is likely that incentives will not be aligned properly,
some parties invariably will resist the legal requirements. Policymakers should
sented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 27 (Apr. 14,
2007) (specific landscape topologies imply a "dead end" in the evolutionary process, but
path dependency limits our available options).
562 Importantly, though, spectrum-based competition is not about different platforms, but
rather different owners and operators of platforms. To say that you can have either AT&T
U-Verse or AT&T Wireless 3G service is not to say that you have two competitive alterna-
tives. Both broadband platforms more or less answer to the same commercial master, and
presumably would not intentionally cannibalize each other in the marketplace.
563 Nachbar, supra note 64, at 129-30.
564 See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
986-87 (2005) (reviewing the FCC's interpretation of the Communications Act with regard
to definitional issues).
565 See Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 35-36 (describing the "political
market" where corporations and policymakers vie for power and leverage).
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strive instead for policies that are sustainable, as Barbara Cherry uses the term,
meaning those that are adoptable as a matter of politics, and achievable in
terms of the underlying objectives.566
One cannot know in advance whether policies based on an adaptive stance
will succeed or otherwise negate the need for a more prescriptive approach.
For example, if the Internet is indeed a "Black Swan," a wholly unexpected
event of massive impact born and raised outside the traditional commercial
markets,567 perhaps it is folly to seek to rely on traditional economic incentives
to ensure its continuing viability and success. Perhaps the broadband provid-
ers-with a mindset of fearing "dumb pipe" status and ceding economic value
to the edges-simply will be unable to see the Internet as being in their best
long-term interest. If that indeed is the case, policymakers have several possi-
ble responses. One is to compel certain new obligations on them, which may
well end badly for both sides. Another is to find ways to harness the providers'
natural financial incentives to want to enable the Net. In other words, our pol-
icy options of persuasion span a wide range, from coercion--hard power--to
incentivizing-soft power--to a watchful eye.
Down the road the Prescriptive stance-in this instance, entailing projects
like structural separation mandates, massive subsidy schemes, or comprehend-
sive and detailed nondiscrimination regulations-may be necessary, and even
inevitable. Sometimes adaptive policy means adapting to the realities of a fail-
ing marketplace without robust, Schumpterian-style competition. 68 For the
limited purposes of this Article, though, it is assumed that the Prescriptive
stance is not called for at this moment in time. Prescriptive proposals depend
on a certain theory of market failure, which may or may not be true, as well as
optimism about the ability to forge and implement a supportive political con-
sensus. Instead, we should move forward to consider policy projects based on a
more adaptive posture.
566 See Cherry, Institutional Governance for Essential Industries Complexity, supra note
86, at 2. In the words of J.B. Ruhl, the "radical middle" in environmental policy seeks sus-
tainable development, against both the "tree huggers" and the "bean counters." J.B. Ruhl, A
Manifesto for the Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO L. REv. 385, 385-86 (2002). Ruhl's proposal
includes greater transparency in the process, "bounded discretion" by the government agen-
cies, and judicial review limited to the process. Id. at 404-06.
567 NASsIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROB-
ABLE 135 (2007) (observing that the Internet was "unplanned, unpredicted, and unappreci-
ated upon its discovery, and well after").
568 See Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing Schumpeter's belief
that capitalism is an evolutionary process of creative destruction).
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C. Exploring Potential Adaptive Projects
So what are some tangible alternatives to the prescriptive stance, more in
keeping with the preceding discussion? In this subpart, I propose some possi-
ble solutions premised on an adaptive stance. These projects are the concrete
outputs of the public policy design space described earlier. To be clear, I am
not necessarily endorsing each and every one of these proposals; some serve as
alternatives to each other, or invite further analysis, or require more in-depth
analysis of the appropriate institutional overlays, these proposals appear to
have sufficient merit to warrant consideration---and perhaps adoption--by
policymakers in Congress, a regulatory agency, or even industry players on
their own.
The adaptive stance assumes that reliance on nonstructural and incentives-
based solutions may be sufficient in some instances to constrain market behav-
ior. This approach draws upon the four tinkering mechanisms described earlier:
feeding the evolutionary algorithm by adding market inputs, fostering agent
connectivity by harnessing infrastructure, shaping the fitness landscape by util-
izing market incentives, and enhancing feedback by creating transparency and
accountability.569 Elements of each of these four mechanisms are found in the
project proposals that follow. Moreover, as described above, there are various
institutional and organizational overlays that can be used to moderate or em-
phasize certain prescriptive or adaptive elements in each of the proposed fixes.
Admittedly many of the projects described below are not new. Rather, the
novelty lies in the holistic approach that is being suggested, imagining each
project as part of a policy-making continuum from more to less prescriptive, in
concert with suitable institutional overlays.
It is also the case that the tinkering inputs are not absolute goods in them-
selves. They are not optimal for all times and places-or in maximum
amounts--but instead are relative to the pertinent conditions of the market.7
Indeed, too much choice can be confusing, too much connectivity can be de-
stabilizing, and too much information can be paralyzing. The point is that these
four categories of policy inputs seem to match up well to those common mar-
ket situations where one or more of the corresponding institutional elements
tend to be insufficient. The context between market realities and policy imple-
ments is crucial.57'
569 See supra Part II.B.2.
570 In fitness landscape parlance, there is no single successful strategy of adaptation;
normal topographies with multiple peaks imply that there is a whole series of local optima.
Schneider & Bauer, supra note 561, at 27. In other words, everything is contextual.
57' See Bauer & Wildman, supra note 208, at 434. ("As public policy and private order-
ing have their respective costs, the appropriate normative question is to find the mix of(im-
perfect) collective policy arrangements and (imperfect) private ordering that yield the high-
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Moreover, where the line is drawn between tinkering and tampering likely
varies over time and from market to market. As mentioned above, we also
must be realistic about the initial conditions that brought us to a particular
moment in the story of communications markets. That said, markets with little
to no real competition and a lack of contestability might require some form of
dictating by government. Further, where there are persistent structural prob-
lems with a particular market sector, direct intervention that amounts to dictat-
ing particular business practices or outcomes may be inevitable. However, the
general rule should be to tamper only where other, less intrusive options are
unlikely to have the intended beneficial effect.
1. Feeding the Algorithm
A The policymaker first can feed the algorithm of evolution
by adding additional inputs to the process. These inputs in-
clude Business Plans, Physical Technologies, and Social
' * Technologies. In some ways, feeding the algorithm puts the
government metaphorically in the role of a lab technician,
providing different plans and technologies for agents to experiment with in the
market. This approach arguably comes closest to taking a Prescriptive stance,
although the institutional and organizational overlays can make a significant
difference in terms of the market impact.
In the context of the discussion here, the policymaker has a variety of ways
to seed the market with business models that further the concept of BAOIP.
Using the modular model as a conceptual tool, for example, policymakers can
focus on the interfaces between broadband network layers as potential points
of policy intervention to rectify issues and strengthen the optimal Internet ac-
cess outcome."'
est aggregate welfare, given the overall vision for the sector.").
572 Network layers can be used as the conceptual prism for looking at broadband-related
policy issues. See generally Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward, supra note 34, 624, 654-62;
Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking, supra note 3, at 56-59. As one example, Faulhaber cautions
appropriately in the context of a network access regime that successful regulation requires
that the interface between the incumbent's business and the entrant's businesss must be
simply and easily monitored for compliance. Gerald R. Faulhaber, Will Access Regulation
Work?, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 37, 40 (2008). The FCC's institutional competence (or lack
thereof) to monitor the progress of different projects, and shift course accordingly, also is
vital to a successful program of "feeding the algorithm."
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a. The Nondiscrimination Internet Business Model
Many network neutrality advocates have argued for a so-called fifth princi-
ple to be added to the current four principles in the FCC's Internet Policy
Statement."' This fifth principle would require that the broadband providers
employ practices that are nondiscriminatory toward end-user customers as well
as content and applications providers."4 As discussed previously, the distinc-
tion between regulations and principles appears to be one largely of the degree
of detail, and perhaps whether the obligation is enforced solely in ex post adju-
dications. 75
There are two different forms of nondiscrimination that proponents of net-
work neutrality have advocated. Under the FCC's traditional Title II standard
that allows "just and reasonable discrimination," broadband providers likely
could engage in some transactions with third parties for the preferential treat-
ment of Internet traffic, so long as the deal is offered on an equivalent basis to
similarly situated entities." 6 Professor Lawrence Lessig apparently favors this
formulation. 77 This of course would allow the paid prioritization practices that
raise concerns about providers' economic incentives not to provide sufficient
Net capacity, or integral Net access.
Under a more stringent nondiscrimination standard, there is no reasonable-
ness component, and hence no ability for broadband providers to engage in any
paid prioritization transactions. The original net neutrality legislation intro-
duced in 2006 by Senators Olympia Snowe and Byron Dorgan adopted this
stricter standard.
One possible approach at the FCC is to combine an explicit nondiscrimina-
tion standard-a legislated-in-advance principle-with a common law-like
adjudication process. The Commission could create a general requirement for
broadband providers not to discriminate in their carriage of Internet traffic, and
then flesh out and enforce the standard via adjudication on a case-by-case ba-
sis. Over time the decisions collectively would form an evolving body of opin-
ion defining the meaning and reach of the standard, in keeping with ongoing
171 See, e.g., In re Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, 22 F.C.C.R. 7894,
10 (Mar. 22, 2007) (raising the issue of whether a fifth principle of "non-discrimination"
should be added to the Internet Policy Statement).
574 See id.
575 See supra Part VIII.A.1.
576 See Werbach, Only Connect, supra note 247, at 1273-74.
577 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Testimony to the FCC En Banc Hearing at Stanford
University: Neutral Network (Apr. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.lessig.org/blog/2008/04/testifying-fcc-stanford.html (play embedded video).
578 Internet Freedom Preservation Act, S. 2917, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006); see Robert E.
Litan & Hal J. Singer, Unintended Consequences of Net Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. TELE-
COMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 533, 564 (2007).
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market and technology changes. This approach would combine the authority
and simplicity of a single standard, with the organic, dynamic processes of the
common law. Some might argue that the lack of specificity up front would cre-
ate an uncertain environment for financial investments by broadband providers
and content and applications providers alike; to others, the incremental, for-
ward-looking nature of the adjudication processes would offer an acceptable
tradeoff.
b. The Open Access Model
The Supreme Court's BrandX decision freed cable operators from any pos-
sible common carrier requirements, and the concomitant mandate to share their
broadband infrastructure with third party ISPs. 9 The FCC's Wireline Broad-
band Order did the same thing with regard to incumbent LECs.58° Without
these requirements, broadband providers currently are able to avoid ISP open
access obligations.
A potential market input is to resurrect the Open Access model, with its
regulatory distinction between basic telecommunications services (Layer 2 and
below in OSI parlance) and enhanced information services (Layer 3 and
above), and the separate regulatory frameworks that govern each.58" ' Broadband
providers would be required to lease at least a portion of their reclassified basic
service pipes to third party carriers or ISPs on a wholesale basis.582 The tradeoff
is that the broadband providers' own retail ISP information service operations
would be deemed off-limits to any network neutrality-style regulation.
One benefit of this model is that it limits potential regulation to the Layer
2/Layer 3 wholesale interface, leaving the broadband provider free to adopt
any business plans for ISP retail service of its choice. Arguably this would be
preferable to a more general nondiscrimination requirement applicable to the
broadband providers' retail service plans. On the other hand, this model could
create a fragmented Net experience for users, and broadband providers' market
power could translate into ISP market power based on factors like network
effects. Despite the serious legal and practical drawbacks in the FCC's current
Title I regime for broadband, it also is not clear that U.S. policymakers will be
579 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 996-
97 (2005).
580 Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 357, 1.
581 See supra Part VII.A.3 (discussing the regulatory regime whereby different services
have different regulatory frameworks imposed upon them).
582 See Werbach, Only Connect, supra note 247, at 1275-76. Under one variant, Con-
gress or the FCC could adopt a broad forbearance order to govern while deciding which
specific common carriage-style duties should be adopted for the broadband networks. See
Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, 63 n.380.
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inclined to roll back this aspect of today's deregulated broadband regime.
One version of this operational separation model was recently adopted in the
UK, with an Ofcom and British Telecom agreement that opened up BT's
wholesale infrastructure to competitiors"' The new Openreach entity provides
wholesale access to loop transport ("Layer 1"), Ethemet access ("Layer 2"),
and "lPstream" ("Layer 3") bitstream access. 84 Each offering constitutes its
own separate approach to a network access model.585 Recent figures indicate
there are now over five million unbundled lines in the UK, with millions of
homes and small businesses switching to providers other than BT. 86 It is
claimed that the increased competition has led to a wider range of services and
lower prices for consumers. 7 Nonetheless, most forms of network unbundling
will require establishing access points and interfaces, setting wholesale rates,
and creating an effective enforcement regime, all of which are challenging
tasks for even the most conscientious policy agency.
c. Computer IV: The Operational Split Model
A variant to the open access business model is an operational split model
that essentially draws the regulatory line between types of services in a differ-
ent place. Under a proposed Computer IV-style analysis, policymakers would
create or incent a split between the lower layered broadband network and ISP
component (OSI Layers 3 and below), and the upper-layered content, applica-
tions, and devices layers (Layers 4 and above).58 In essence, the ba-
sic/enhanced service line would be moved further up the protocol stack.89 One
583 See WINDHAUSEN, supra note 196, at 57.
584 NETWORK STRATEGIES: INVESTIGATION OF THE BT SEPARATION MODEL, Rep. No.
26018, at 1-8 (2006), http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/45602/network-strategies-bt.pdf.
585 Within the loop unbundling regime, for example, Ofcom has discussed two types of
wholesale products to support competition: active (infrastructure plus electronics) and pas-
sive (infrastructure only). OFCOM, DELIVERY SUPER-FAST BROADBAND IN THE UK 3-6
(2008), http://www2.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/nga future broadband/main.pdf.
586 Rod Smith, Off. of the Telecomm. Adjudicator, OTA2 Update for Dec. 2008,
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/updates/otaupdate2009l09.htm.
587 See Press Release, Ofcom Accepts Undertakings from Board of BT Group PLC on
Operational Separation, supra note 548. Other countries are looking at this model as well,
including New Zealand and its Chorus program. See, e.g., Chorus, About Us,
http://chorus.co.nz/how-we-work (last visited Jan. 11, 2009). This should not be surprising,
as various forms of unbundling open up new revenue streams (and perhaps deter competi-
tive entry). It may well be that the mindset to avoid becoming a dumb pipe as a regulatory
matter is deterring many broadband providers from voluntarily pursuing healthy wholesale
relationships as a business matter.
588 BT's Openreach, for example, offers a "bitstream" access service that combines the
functionality of Layers 1 through 3. NETWORK STRATEGIES: INVESTIGATION OF THE BT
SEPARATION MODEL, supra note 584, at 1-5.
589 Scott Jordan has suggested this layered approach to network neutrality, which sepa-
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implication is that Internet access would be redefined as a communications
service-at least when provided by a facilities-based broadband provider---and
thus labeled something like "Internet carriage.""59
The virtue of this operational split approach over ISP open access is that it
recognizes today's almost complete melding of broadband networks and Inter-
net access functionality that the FCC has sanctioned. After all, IP is not magic
pixie dust that transforms the regulated into the unregulated; it is a transmis-
sion protocol, pure and simple. The downside of this approach is that without
additional regulation of wholesale interfaces, the operational split model would
continue to consign independent ISPs like Earthlink to a world without guaran-
teed access to broadband networks.
d. The Proportional Capacity Model
One fundamental flaw in the traditional network neutrality position is that it
fails to address the carriers' presumed incentives over time to invest in their
private networks, and to carry proprietary content--presumably largely voice
and video-at the expense of best efforts Internet connectivity. Once the Net
community has conceded that it is acceptable for broadband providers to sup-
ply IPTV and other proprietary network services, there appears to be little to
prevent broadband providers eventually from crowding out the Net, or elimi-
nating it altogether. This result obviously would undermine the preferred
broadband platform dimension of sufficiency of Net capacity.
One approach that could deal with this gap would have broadband providers
allocate a certain fixed percentage of their total broadband capacity for basic
access to the public Internet; that portion would be free of any prioritization
deals. The broadband provider then could provide any proprietary content and
applications, under any charging arrangements, over the remaining percentage
of capacity.591 The incentives structure derives from the reality that if the total
network capacity is grown to feed additional bandwidth for the managed por-
tion, the unmanaged portion also grows proportionately. 92 This approach could
rates network infrastructure (OSI Layers 1-3) from applications (Layers 4-7). He argues that
infrastructure typically has high barriers to entry and must be implemented in every part of
the network, while applications have low barriers of entry and can be implemented at any
part of the network, but preferably in the end devices. Scott Jordan, A Layered Approach to
Network Neutrality, 2007 INT'L J. COMM. 427, 443 (2007).
590 Next generation networks ("NGNs") move the dividing line yet further up the proto-
col stack, separating Transport (Layers 1-4) from Services (Layers 5-7). See id.
591 This can be seen as akin to a PEG channel on a cable system, or a "Net easement"
across the broadband provider's private property by allowing end users to reach the publicly
shared resource of the Net.
592 Under an alternative approach, any given managed service could not be allocated
more bandwidth than is available for public Internet access. A third variation would place a
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better align the broadband provider's own incentives for more capacity for its
proprietary use, with society's interest in the spillover of more capacity dedi-
cated to Internet use.593
Of course, this proportional capacity model fairly could be labeled prescrip-
tive, because it imposes an obligation on the broadband providers' networks,
and may be premised on a somewhat arbitrary percentage figure. Some also are
bound to argue that the proposal conflicts with the public policy interest in
maximizing the availability of broadband infrastructure. Further, different
broadband networks can handle--or in some cases fail to handle--such a de-
finitive split in usage, in different ways, as wireless capacity tends to be shared
between different service offerings. Nonetheless this model would address the
very real concerns about harnessing financial incentives to build sufficient
broadband capacity to and from the Internet. Here, as elsewhere, the institu-
tional overlays are all-important, as mandating such a virtual separation of ca-
pacity is different from offering regulatory inducements in exchange, or arriv-
ing at it through voluntary negotiations, or applying it in an industry standards
body.
2. Fostering Connectivity
The policymaker can foster forms of connectivityo - -. .. Q and networking between various agents in the market.
- This can be done, for example, by strengthening or
. 0 :-0 adding links (lines of communication) between nodes
(agents). In the case of broadband, of course, policy-
makers can seek to eliminate obstacles (such as access to rights of way and
other "Layer 0" inputs) and clarify obligations (such as interconnection with
IP-enabled network facilities) so that multiple providers can deploy optimal
broadband networks, where economically viable.
cap (say, 500% of total Net access capacity) on the total amount of bandwidth that all man-
aged services combined could be allocated. This last option could deal more flexibly with
different types of broadband networks.
593 Atkinson and Weiser acknowledge the concern about shrinking broadband capacity
allocated for Internet access and discuss a similar proposal, which would leave it to the FCC
to define a specific amount of bandwidth for best efforts Internet access. ATKINSON &
WEISER, supra note 190, at 11-12. Ironically this could lead to a political environment,
where the broadband provider has reason to resist the concept and the fixed amount of the
set-aside. Moreover, in a dynamic market, the FCC would be a poor institutional choice to
attempt to define and delimit the parameters of this ever-changing obligation. Under the
suggested proportional capacity approach, by contrast, financial incentives would be har-




Scholars such as Kevin Werbach and Jim Speta argue that interconnec-
tion---how and when two networks should exchange traffic intended for the
other network--should be the real focus of the network neutrality debate,
rather than discrimination-whether or how networks should favor some traf-
fic over other. 94 Werbach points out that "[t]he defining characteristic of the
Net is not the absence of discrimination, but a relentless commitment to inter-
connection." '95 Speta concurs, noting that the Internet's utility "largely depends
on the principle of universal interconnectivity ... both as a technical and as an
economic matter."596 Paul David observes that "[o]ver the long run, the techni-
cal rules of the game affecting physical interconnection are likely to be more
consequential than pricing formulae in their effects on growth and distribution
of available bandwidth, competition in the ISP market, and the rate of innova-
tion in applications on the Internet." '597 Some even argue that the United States
would have been better off had policyrnakers imposed a blanket interconnec-
tion requirement on the Bell System, rather than pursued its breakup.598
Spulber and Yoo explain convincingly that "networks are complex systems
that can be best understood by taking into account the relationships between
each component, as well as the projected traffic flows." '599 The authors go on to
argue that access mandates disrupt the firm's natural boundaries by forcing the
network to externalize functions that it otherwise would perform internally.
Even if true-and interconnection does involve often messy decisions about
issues like defining the quality of interconnection, measuring costs, establish-
ing interfaces, and addressing discriminatory conduct-this should not neces-
sarily foreclose attempts to create, or incent, interconnection regimes where
incumbent providers otherwise refuse to embrace them voluntarily.6"'
594 See Werbach, Only Connect, supra note 247, 1234-35; James B. Speta, FCC Author-
ity to Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting It, 35 LoY. U. CHIC. L.J. 15, 17 (2003).
595 Werbach, supra note 247, at 1236.
596 Speta, supra note 594, at 31.
597 David, Economics Policy Analysis and the Internet, supra note 226, at 165.
598 See Richard A. Epstein, The AT&T Consent Decree: In Praise of Interconnection
Only, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 149, 161-165 (2008). Richard Epstein believes the United States
should have rejected the ambitious MFJ decision, with its strong separation between local
and long distance networks, in favour of a broad requirement to interconnect with all tele-
com carriers on just and nondiscriminatoiry terms. Id.
599 Spulber & Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of Access to Local Telephone Networks,
supra note 219, at 80.
600 Spulber and Yoo assert that network economic effects provide powerful pro-
interconnection incentives, but then acknowledge that this holds only where the market
contains "a sufficient number of equally-sized players." Id. at 93. This observation would
not appear to extend to the current broadband market, although as suggested above spec-
trum-based competition eventually might change that equation. Larger networks typically
have economic incentives to delay or deny interconnection to smaller networks. BUDDE,
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Interconnection may already be part of the network neutrality debate, albeit
in stealth mode. While the FCC's four Internet principles deal with discrimina-
tory practices with regard to consumers, concerns about access tiering arguably
address an interconnection practice."° Thomas Nachbar agrees that "[n]etwork
concentration is a problem best solved by imposing a duty to interconnect on
network providers.""6 2 In this view, facilitating market forces that physically
route around potential instances of network degradation makes more sense
than policing market behavior that may or may not encompass such degrada-
tion.603
b. User-Owned Connectivity
Today, investments in consumer broadband depend on a small handful of
companies under a centralized investment model. But what would happen if
individual consumers owned arguably the most essential element of connec-
tivity-the last mile? As Tim Wu and Derek Slater pointed out in their Homes
with Tails paper, there is potential in a model where consumers purchase and
own fiber connections that run from their homes to service providers of their
choice.604 These providers include modem Internet, television, and voice pro-
viders, but also video-conferencing and other information services that might
exist in the future.0 5 As Wu and Slater indicate, "[c]onsumers would have the
opportunity not only to obtain a fast broadband connection but also to benefit
from [increased choice], competition, and lower prices in the retail service
market." '606
These customer-owned, fiber "tails" are cropping up in several places, in-
cluding tests in Ottawa, Canada run by Bill St. Arnaud, a researcher at CA-
supra note 201, at 4. History proves this out, as the Bell System "systematically denied in-
terconnection to subscribers of non-Bell companies, putting the rivals at a competitive dis-
advantage." Scherer, supra note 325, at 10. All this suggests that the government should
find ways to incent, or even require, broadband networks to interconnect with other net-
works.
601 See Werbach, Only Connect, supra note 247, 1272-73. Werbach defines access tier-
ing as "charging content and application providers additional fees for preferential access."
Id. at 1272.
602 Nachbar, supra note 64, at 101.
603 See id.; Werbach, Only Connect, supra note 247, at 1286, 1286 n.244 (an intercon-
nection approach appropriately would focus on whether broadband providers are actually
degrading baseline "best efforts" Internet access); Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the
Internet, supra note 594, at 31-34 (Congress should adopt a statutory default rule requiring
Internet carriers to transport or transit IP-compliant traffic among themselves and with retail
customers, with the FCC supervising interconnection arrangements).





NARIE.6 °7 While a promising way to lower service costs for competing
ISPs-and perhaps moot many debates about network neutrality---the homes
with tails model faces potential obstacles like incumbent carrier opposition,
little current ISP competition, and an estimated cost of about $3,000 per
house."'
c. User-Operated Networks
Another connectivity model involves governments and other users building
and/or operating their own broadband infrastructure. Municipal broadband
networks are one such notable example; governments providing their own
communications service primarily as anchor tenants is another. Cooperative
access sharing-"Communities with Tails"-is yet another way for end users
to ensure connectivity.6"9 Sharing high-speed lines could enable users in small
neighborhood clusters to better control their own Internet experiences, and in
many cases at greater speeds than otherwise would be available to individual
consumers.6 By sharing their Internet connections with their own residents,6"'
communities would be able to establish "technology hubs" and perhaps central
nodes in last-mile wireless networks. Some have suggested, for example, con-
necting the nation's 16,000 public libraries with fiber-based Internet access, at
an estimated cost of $20,000 per facility.6 2 However, some broadband provid-
ers would prefer restricting or limiting competing municipal broadband net-
works, or the sharing of individual network access points,6"3 which could make
the viability of such arrangements problematic.
607 Timothy B. Lee, Does Your House Need a Tail? Sizing Up Customer-Owned Fiber,
Ars Technica, July 30, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/articles/culture/customer-owned-
fiber.ars (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). CANARIE is "a government-funded research organiza-
tion that focuses on advanced networking technologies." Id.
608 Id.; see Posting of Derek Slater, What If You Could Own Your Internet Connection?,
Google Public Policy Blog, http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2008/07/what-if-you-
could-own-your-internet.html (July 30, 2008, 14:18 CT).
609 See William H. Lehr, Sharon E. Gillet, Marvin A. Sirbu & Jon M. Peha, Scenarios for
the Network Neutrality Arms Race, 1 INT'L J. COMM. 607, 616 (2007) ("[A]ccess sharing...
mean[s] groups of end-users who band together and, in effect, share commercially provided
broadband access among themselves.").
610 John Markoff, Sharing Broadband to Increase Speed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2006, at
C6.
611 ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND How TO STOP IT, supra note 100, at 179.
612 One example is the Fiber to the Library program instituted by the Community
TeleStructure Initiative, with the national goal of connecting every public library in the
country to broadband by 2010. Community TeleStructure Initiative,
http://www.telestructure.com (last visited Jan. 27, 2009).




The first generation of online services essentially was delivered by best-
effort, flat rate connectivity, based on the capabilities of the end-users' mo-
dem.614 Another connectivity-based model would allow the end user customer
to shape the nature of its broadband service, with providers tailoring their ser-
vice offerings to suit the customer's needs. Essentially, broadband customers
would have the ability to utilize whatever amount of broadband capacity they
want for Internet access, for both upstream and downstream uses.
This approach would encompass an open-ended array of user-defined pref-
erences. For seamless connectivity, a business user may choose to maximize
the capacity allocated for a virtual private network linked to her office. On the
other hand, a teenager might be happy to sacrifice the quality of a voice or
video connection in exchange for greater throughput for an interactive gaming
service. By maximizing user control, this model can result in greater customer
loyalty and reduced chum.
There are some potential downsides to this model. While the user theoreti-
cally would define broadband allocation, different users within the same
household may have different preferences. Further, this model does not address
pricing discrimination concerns, where the provider charges more for its com-
petitors than itself, or sets a higher price for the raw pipe than the pipe bundled
with additional services offered by the provider. Finally, current cable and
wireless architecture make it difficult for consumers to define their individual
uses of those broadband networks.
3. Shaping the Fitness Landscape
Tinkering also includes the option of shaping the
fitness environment via market incentives. The first
economic principle is that incentives matter."' As a
result, policyrnakers should tap into market and
non-market forces that influence what agents do.
The policyrnaker can serve as a fitness function shaper, which amounts to act-
ing so that the evolutionary processes of the market can be better shaped to
serve society's needs. Because incentives provide useful signals to all agents in
a market, the best way to use the fitness landscape to achieve policy objectives
is to employ market-based incentives. By shaping the metaphoric landscape in
which agents operate-providing incentives to scale particular mountains, or
614 See Susan P. Crawford, The Radio and the Internet, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 949
(2008).
615 Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 12.
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supporting the discovery and sharing of path shortcuts-policymakers encour-
age the attainment of policy objectives without interfering with the core activ-
ity of evolution. This role of fitness function shaper could find the policymaker
adopting projects such as reversible deregulation, Internet truth in labeling,
universal broadband funding, tax credits, or other inducements.
a. Reversible Deregulation
To some, communications networks by definition convey their traffic indis-
criminately.6 Broadband providers currently benefit from the carrier designa-
tion for purposes of certain material advantages over other entities, including
access to rights of way, poles and conduits, gaining interconnection rights, and
tapping subsidy funds." 7 These benefits collectively constitute another gov-
ernmental lever to incent the proper market behavior.
The broadband providers won their Title I status, and its much-reduced
regulatory overhang, because they succeeded in convincing the FCC and the
Supreme Court that the provisioning of Internet access and broadband connec-
tivity essentially were one and the same." 8 One fitness shaping project involves
compelling the broadband providers to live with the precise terms of their vic-
tory. Should the broadband providers fail to provide unimpeded access to the
Internet, the FCC would step in to reinstitute some or all aspects of traditional
Title II common carrier regulation for their broadband operations.
b. Internet Access Truth in Labeling
The Internet famously is a network of networks, where each provider volun-
teers to adopt the TCP/IP protocol and join the Internet community." 9 Entities
can come and go from that virtual fraternity at any time, for any reason. Thus
broadband providers tomorrow could decide to decline offering Internet access
service, or assign it minimal capacity on their networks. As mentioned above,
they could even start their own quasi-Internet, and shape it to their own de-
signs. Few are saying that the broadband providers should be prohibited from
operating these less open-or even walled garden-online models. However, if
broadband providers want to remain voluntarily in the business of providing
Internet access, the provider must offer full, unfettered access to the Net.
616 See Nachbar, supra note 64, at 68.
617 Barbara A. Cherry, Utilizing "Essentiality of Access" Analyses to Mitigate Risky,
Costly and Untimely Government Interventions in Converging Telecommunications Tech-
nologies and Markets, 11 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUs 251, 268 (2003).
618 See National Cable and Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967,
973-74 (2005).
619 Whitt & Schultze, supra note 2, at 2.
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Thus, another possible policy project is to adopt a truth in advertising ap-
proach. Broadband providers could only promote and sell access to an Internet
that met certain parameters, including being provided along the optimal dimen-
sions of robustness and integrity.62° The parameters could be set by the FCC or
FTC, a public-private body, or a standards group. The upside is that this solu-
tion relies in part on market feedback for the question of what constitutes the
Internet. The downside is that ultimately someone would need to define access
to the Net. Moreover, the broadband providers could simply offer to provide
"broadband" without any reference to the Internet.
62
c. Universal Broadband Funding Mechanism
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 established a funding mechanism in-
tended to defray the costs of communications services for various constituen-
cies, including those who live in rural, high-cost regions of the country, low
income consumers, and schools and libraries. 622 To date the fund has not ap-
plied to broadband networks, although some groups have proposed just that.623
In a previous paper I suggested that any direct subsidy for broadband should
restrict both contributors and recipients on a technology-neutral basis to the
network infrastructure, and not to the applications or services that use the in-
frastructure.624 In other words, universal access should be about building out
networks where economic realities otherwise will not allow it, and relying on
funding for those efforts from other networks through a connections-based
contribution methodology.625 Moreover, the overarching concept should be
universal access-encompassing concepts like connectivity, ubiquity, and
symmetry-rather than universal service. We no longer live in a world rooted
in predefined, fixed, centralized, discrete voice offerings tied to a single pro-
vider and a single network. Policyrnakers should rely on that fact to engender
access to broadband functionality and then let the consumer configure it for
620 ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT, supra note 100, at 180.
621 See id. Atkinson and Weiser argue that broadband providers who fail to provide a
basic tier of unmanaged Internet access should be prohibited from calling any of their ser-
vices broadband. ATKINSON & WEISER, supra note 190, at 11-12. Because broadband is a
more generic networking term, I would prefer conditioning the use of the term "Internet,"
since that is the very offering not being provided to consumers on an adequate basis. Of
course, if broadband gains currency as shorthand for the Internet, that option also should be
explored. Alternatively, broadband providers could be required to define and promote their
service based on certain operational parameters, such as capacity and latency.
622 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000).
623 See Joint Board Recommended Decision, supra note 62, 11-15 (advocating adop-
tion of a "Broadband Fund").




whatever low-cost, or even free, applications, content, and services they de-
sire."'
Consistent with the government's role in collecting and dispersing subsidies,
one also can imagine a number of ways to incent behavior from broadband
providers. For example, use of the funds could be conditioned on providers
accepting some version of the three dimensions of BAOIP.
d Spillover Offset Inducements
It is particularly appropriate for policyrnakers to use their authority to at-
tempt to offset the presence of positive externalities in broadband networks,
essentially allowing the broadband provider to internalize some of the spillover
benefits. In addition to direct subsidies such as outright grants, nations such as
Japan, South Korea, and Sweden have used a mix of indirect subsidies to spur
the deployment of faster broadband networks.627 Atkinson and Weiser point out
that such a public policy response can combine tax incentives in the case of
positive externalities, and taxes in the case of negative externalities.628 The tai-
lored use of tax credits, accelerated depreciation expensing, federal broadband
bonds, and other financial tools can help promote capital investment in broad-
band infrastructure.629 These inducements would function as a cost reducing
mechanism to help incentivize the availability of infrastructure build-out and
upgrades. Under one variant, these spillover offsets could be conditioned on
establishing networks that provide sufficient Net capacity, or integrity of Net
access.
Some coalitions have proposed federal broadband tax credit legislation for
building out fiber or other high-speed infrastructure.630 According to an esti-
mate cited by ITI, "a one-year credit would generate between $2 and $4 billion
in broadband investment, and a five-year credit would generate between $10
626 See id.
627 EZELL ETAL., supra note 115, at 30.
628 ATKINSON & WEISER, supra note 190, at 14.
629 ROBERT D. ATKINSON, AN INNOVATION ECONOMICS AGENDA FOR THE NEXT ADMINI-
STRATION 3, 4 (2008), available at http://www.itif.org/index.php?id=180; see JONATHAN
RINTELS, USING TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION TO ADDRESS OUR NATION'S CRITICAL
CHALLENGES 2, 3 (2008), available at
http://www.benton.org/sites/benton.org/files/BentonFoundation _ActionPlan.pdf (propos-
ing a national plan that includes depreciation of broadband equipment, tax credits, and
broadband bonds).
630 Information Technology Industry Council & the Computer Systems Policy Project:
10-Point Plan to Bring Broadband to More Americans, http://www.cspp.org/documents/ITI-
CSPP 10-PointBBND Plan.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2008); see, e.g., JEFFREY A. EISEN-
ACH ET AL., ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TAX INCENTIVES FOR BROADBAND INFRASTRUCTURE DE-




and $20 billion in broadband investment."63' For example, Idaho provides a
Broadband Tax Credit of 3% for Idaho taxpayers, which allows entities to
install broadband equipment of a certain capacity.
Another proposal would modify depreciation schedules for broadband re-
lated equipment.6 3  Because telecommunications companies are some of the
largest capital investors in the world, a more favorable depreciation period is
likely to increase capital expenditures in broadband infrastructure.634 Local
govemments could also create tax incentives that encourage new and upgraded
housing developments to include next-generation broadband facilities.635
Instead of a supply-driven tax credit system, some groups have pushed for a
demand-based system that encourages broadband adoption, and thus indirectly
encourages further broadband supply. For example, a moratorium on the Inter-
net tax that has been the topic of some legislative discussions would maintain
the lucrative, innovation-driving aspects of the Internet, and thus avoid stifling
Internet growth and adoption.636
4. Enhancing Feedback Mechanisms
A final form of tinkering involves creating or enhancing
market feedback mechanisms, essentially filling in various
information or transparency gaps in the market. This means
providing agents with more and better information-and per-
haps enhanced decision-making tools as well-so they can
make informed decisions. Ultimately more information also involves holding
agents-public and private alike-accountable for their actions. Accountability
and transparency also can be achieved through dispute resolutions, and con-
sumer self-help techniques such as detecting tools or countermeasures.
631 Id.
632 M9 Systems, Existing Programs to Promote Broadband,
http://www.m9systems.com/broad-dep_7.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2009). Other states of-
fering tax credits include Montana, which "offers a 20% tax credit to telecommunication
providers who invest in advanced telecommunications infrastructure improvements in the
state;" and Maine, which "offers a number of research and development and technology tax
credit incentive programs, including the 'High Technology Investment Tax Credit'). Id.
633 Information Technology Industry Council and the Computer Systems Policy Project,
supra note 630.
634 Id.
635 For examples of government programs that could incent broadband deployment, see
WINDHAUSEN, supra note 196 (discussing tax incentives a broadband fund, among other
initiatives). See also One Economy Corporation, http://www.one-economy.com (last visited
Apr. 18, 2009) (championing the need for tax credits to promote broadband connectivity in
new housing developments for low-income residents).





Agents in the market need to have access to adequate information to make
informed decisions because "[w]henever there's a lack of transparency, then
speculation and suspicion is inevitable. 637 In short, transparency increases both
information and trust by moving information into the public domain. Users of
broadband technologies also can benefit from possessing such information, and
where possible altering their actions accordingly. While the least prescriptive
of the four tinkering inputs, enhancing feedback mechanisms still can have a
significant impact on the market behavior of broadband providers.
Unfortunately, the FCC has further complicated the absence of real competi-
tion by abdicating its responsibility to collect, publish, and base its decisions
on relevant information about the state of the broadband market.63 Until re-
cently, the Commission's broadband deployment data collection and reporting
methodology inherently overestimated high-speed Internet availability and
competition.639 For example, prior to recent changes, the FCC considered an
entire five-digit zip code served by broadband even if only one resident or
business is served within that zip code.64 The Commission also has defined
high-speed service as requiring only 200 Kbps in at least one direction, which
many experts argue fails to set a high enough bar to accommodate the use of
many common Internet services.6 ' Atkinson has discussed creating user-
generated mapping interfaces to track broadband deployment.642
637 Rosch, supra note 489, at 4.
638 Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the Ad-
ministrative State 38-39 (Colo. Law Sch. Working Paper Legal Series 09-01, 2009), avail-
able at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1336820. See also Kimberly Claffey,
Ten Things Lawyers Should Know About the Internet 9 (2008),
http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2008/lawyers-topten/lawyers top-ten.pdf ("The
FCC has no empirical basis in fact nor apparent authority in a conversation about [broad-
band and Internet] traffic, structure, pricing, or vulnerabilities on the network since it has no
access to data from Internet infrastructure beyond what providers volunteer to provide.").
639 For a thorough assessment of the FCC's ineffective data collection efforts to date, see
generally Frieden, Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics, supra note 169.
640 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT IS EXTENSIVE
THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE EXTENT OF DEPLOY-
MENT GAPS IN RURAL AREAS 14 (2006). When comparing more fine-grained data collected
in the ConnectKentucky project to the FCC's data, for example, GAO found that the FCC
methodology over-counted by some 19%. Id. at 17.
641 In re Development of Nationwide Broadband Data to Evaluate Reasonable and Time-
ly Deployment of Advanced Services to All Americans, Improvement of Wireless Broad-
band Subscribership Data, and Development of Data on Interconnected Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) Subscribership, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 7760, 5
(Feb. 26, 2007); see Connect the Nation Act, S. 1190, 110th Cong. (2007); Broadband Cen-
sus of America Act of 2007, H.R. 3919, 110th Cong. (2007); Broadband Data Improvement
Act, S. 1492, 110th Cong. (2007).
642 Atkinson, Framing a National Broadband Policy, supra note 84, at 168. Various
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Further, until recently, broadband providers were not held accountable for
the lack of information provided to would-be customers about their service. In
its recent Comcast Order, the FCC cited a lack of transparency as a key prob-
lem with the cable company's approach to network management." 3 The FCC
imposed a number of prospective obligations to ensure that Comcast disclosed
all relevant information about its practices going forward.6' Phil Weiser and
Rob Atkinson similarly lean on user transparency as a key remedy to the net-
work neutrality conundrum."5 Among other things, they call on the FCC to
adopt a "notice and monitoring regime," which would require the broadband
providers to announce details about their provision of service to consumers and
then adhere to those policies.6" More information also can help promote self-
help; after all, even if a small fraction of end users are more aware of the poli-
cies and limitations on service, they can use software and hardware tools to
engage in their own efforts to monitor their broadband connections and, if pos-
sible, act accordingly.
On the other hand, it is unclear whether disclosure by itself can be meaning-
ful enough to most end users."7 In particular, the relative lack of broadband
competition and increased reliance on bundling practices greatly limits the
ability of end users to move seamlessly from one provider to another. For that
reason alone, transparency by itself should not be seen as a panacea.
b. Dispute Resolution Processes
End users also could benefit from the timely and low-cost resolution of dis-
putes with broadband providers. Paul Kouroupas points out that where there is
unequal bargaining power between two parties, the best solution is to equalize
the bargaining power through process support, rather than policy support.6"
This proposal especially makes sense where accounting ahead of time for all
undesired behavior is difficult.6" An expedited complaint process facilitated by
the FCC--one where the burden of persuasion shifted to the broadband pro-
vider after a prima facie showing of a violation-would be a positive start.
Kouroupas also points to the recent Comcast Order as evidence that the lack of
advocacy groups have taken up this call for better deployment and uptake data. See, e.g.,
ALLIANCE FOR PUBLIC TECHNOLOGY, ACHIEVING UNIVERSAL BROADBAND: POLICIES FOR
STIMULATING DEPLOYMENT AND DEMAND 6-7 (2007),
http://www.apt.org/publications/reports-studies/Final-Report-Feb2007.pdf.
643 Comcast Order, supra note 205, at 52-55.
644 Id. at 54-55.
645 Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 190, at 10.
646 Id. at 10, 11.
647 Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra 52, at 50.
648 Kouroupas, supra note 557, at 14-15.
649 See id. at 16.
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established rules allowed the dispute to be resolved relatively quickly, with
policymakers compelled to operate outside the formal regulatory process and
exert political pressure on Comcast to alter its practices.65 °
c. User Detection Tools
Jonathan Zittrain notes that preventing the advent of a non-generative digital
world will require policymakers to "create and demonstrate the tools and prac-
tices by which relevant people and institutions can help secure the Net them-
selves.""65 Another type of feedback mechanism is to allow end users to em-
ploy software that monitors broadband connectivity and detects and reports on
anomalies. Google and several academics recently have unveiled "Measure-
ment Lab," a program designed to develop user tools to test their broadband
connections.652 The FCC could use its authority to clarify that broadband pro-
viders are not able to interfere with the utilization of such detection tools.
d. User Countermeasures
Users also can take matters into their own hands by employing actual tech-
nical countermeasures, including end-to-end encryption, VPNs, and "routing
anonymizers. ' Some believe these software-based techniques can be success-
ful, particularly as broadband providers are unlikely to go the expensive route
of banning the software.654 Others see the countermeasures as insufficient in
themselves, but still find the ultimate outcome uncertain given the dynamic
nature of the Internet.655 Further, a market arms race escalation may be insuffi-
cient to deter bad conduct by the broadband providers.656
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper seeks to bring to light some new ways of looking at broadband
policy in the United States. The approach is intended to be consistent with the
view expressed by Paul David as he surveyed the ways that public policy grap-
ples with the converging communications world:
650 See id. at 16-17.
651 ZITrRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT, supra note 100, at 152.
652 See Vint Cerf & Stephen Stuart, Introductory Measurement Lab, google-
blog.blogspot.com/2009/01/introducing-measurement-lab (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
653 Id. at 627-28.
654 See ZIrRArN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT, supra note 100, at
181.
655 See Lehr et al., supra note 609, at 608.
656 Id. at 608.
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[T]he relevant policy questions ought not to be construed in terms of making either-or
choices. It is important to resist the rhetoric of much contemporary discussion of eco-
nomic policy, which tends to offer only extreme alternatives .... [P]erhaps the most
important general lesson to be drawn for the future of Internet policy analysis is for
economists to start thinking about the ways in which the structure of the existing mar-
kets, and the uneven and uncoordinated regime of regulation and nonregulation, can
induce research and technological innovation to take some directions, while discour-
aging it from proceeding in others.6 57
With the advent of the various economic schools of thought brought to-
gether under the heading of emergence economics, public policy can begin to
find the proper analytical and empirical grounding. Traditional economics
alone is not close to being the full story, and monetary outputs alone do not
convey the richness of human values. With Adaptive Policymaking, there is a
more methodical way to approach policy public issues, with the means and
ends cleanly delineated. Through the use of policy design spaces, new policy
options can be discovered, particularly in terms of a range of institutions and
organizations, conceptual tools, and tinkering inputs.
This Article attempts to show how broadband must be considered critical
communications infrastructure, a conveyer of More Good Ideas, and an opti-
mal Intemet platform in the three interrelated dimensions of availability, ro-
bustness, and integrity. An examination of economic motivators reveals how
broadband providers-and thus policymakers-face some tough decisions re-
garding the potential of ruinous competition, the existence of significant posi-
tive externalities, the desire to manage and prioritize network traffic, and con-
flicting mindsets. The Article also demonstrates how the path dependency of
U.S. history has brought about private ownership of communications networks,
and, much more recently, a common carriage doctrine stripped down solely-
and as it turns out erroneously-to a sterile preoccupation with market concen-
tration. It may well prove more fruitful to look instead to the relatively ne-
glected yet pertinent prongs of public callings, which is focused on the impor-
tance of the communications carrier, and bailment, which is focused on the
importance of the cargo. Institutional overlays also provide much-needed
flexibility by adding some viable policy options to the mix.
Finally, the Article urges that policyrnakers resist the easy temptation to
adopt prescriptive remedies to deal with possible failings in BAOIP. While
such remedies eventually may need to be considered, an adaptive stance for
now will allow nuanced explorations of equally effective, yet often more flexi-
ble, alternatives. These would include policy projects that feed the market with
different business models, foster connectivity between players, shape the fit-
ness landscape through incentives, and enhance feedback with transparency
and accountability mechanisms. Only in this way can we hope to match our
657 David, Economics Policy Analysis and the Internet, supra note 226, at 163, 165.
20091
534 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS [Vol. 17
public policy-making aspirations to the emergent, human, networked, evolv-
ing, growth economy that increasingly is being enabled by broadband infra-
structure.
